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  INTRODUCTION   
The United States has surpassed Russia as the world’s top 
natural gas producer,1 and according to the world’s most re-
spected energy forecaster, the U.S. will also overtake Saudi 
Arabia as the largest oil producer by 2020.2
 
 1. BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY, JUNE 2013 22 (2013), 
available at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/ 
statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf (U.S. production in 2012 was 
681.4 billion cubic meters, compared with 592.3 for Russia).  
 This surge in U.S. 
 2. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 23, 138 (2012) 
[hereinafter IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012], available at http:// 
iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf; see also 
LEONARDO MAUGERI, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, HARVARD 
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oil and gas production would have seemed wildly improbable a 
decade ago. It flows from a revolution in U.S. oil and gas pro-
duction. Energy companies have learned to tap previously inac-
cessible oil and gas in shale and other impermeable (or “tight”) 
rock formations.3
Fracturing is controversial. By reducing the price of natu-
ral gas, it may undercut the fledgling renewable energy indus-
try, at least in the near term. The fracturing boom may also ex-
acerbate air pollution, traffic and congestion. The technology 
uses significant amounts of water, and some aspects of fractur-
ing operations may induce tremors and minor earthquakes. In 
all these regards, fracturing is not unique, since each of these 
risks arises in conventional oil and gas drilling and, for that 
matter, in other economic activity as well.  
 To do so, they use “hydraulic fracturing” 
(“fracturing” or “fracking”), pumping fluid into shale at high 
pressure to crack the rock and release gas and oil trapped in-
side. This “shale revolution” has created high-paying drilling 
jobs, revived the petrochemicals industry as well as other do-
mestic manufacturing, improved our balance of payments, and 
increased the competitiveness of the United States in the global 
economy. It has also reduced our reliance on energy imports 
and enhanced our energy security. In addition, the shale revo-
lution has enabled the United States to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions over the past seven years—the largest reduction an-
ywhere—by substituting natural gas for coal. 
The most unique risk associated with fracturing, which has 
generated widespread public apprehension,4
 
KENNEDY SCH., OIL: THE NEXT REVOLUTION 42 (2012).  
 is the potential 
 3. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 75. In addition 
to shale oil and shale gas, the analysis in this Article also applies to “tight 
sands gas” and “tight oil,” which are found in sandstone, coal seams and car-
bonate. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: THE UNCON-
VENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE US ECONOMY: NATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 12 (2012) [hereinafter IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
CONTRIBUTIONS]. For simplicity’s sake, we use the phrase “shale oil and gas” 
to cover all these sources of unconventional oil and gas.  
 4. See, e.g., EPA, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT], available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf (“[A]s the use of hydraulic fracturing has 
increased, so have concerns about its potential human health and environ-
mental impacts, especially for drinking water . . . .”); ERNEST J. MONIZ, HENRY 
D. JACOBY & ANTHONY J.M. MEGGS, MIT STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF NATURAL 
GAS 37 (2011), available at http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_ 
Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 MIT STUDY] (describing popular anxiety about 
the fact that “the fracturing process risks injecting toxic fracture fluids into 
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contamination of groundwater. The fluid used in fracturing 
contains toxic chemicals. In a sense, this risk is also not new. 
Although fracturing in shale has developed in the past decade, 
fracturing has been used in conventional drilling for over sixty 
years, so that two million wells have been “fracked” in the U.S. 
There is little evidence so far that subterranean fracturing ac-
tivity can directly contaminate groundwater. The layer of shale 
that is fractured is usually thousands of feet below the water 
table, with a buffer of dense rock or clay in between. But other 
risks to groundwater may prove to be more meaningful, includ-
ing surface spills of fracturing fluid, improper handling of 
waste products, and the migration of natural gas into water 
wells. In response, we need effective regulation. Since fractur-
ing in shale began fairly recently, the regime for dealing with 
some of these risks is not yet fully developed. 
This Article considers how to regulate this risk of water 
contamination. The task entails a careful balance of competing 
considerations. The shale boom offers enormous benefits and 
should be encouraged. At the same time, we need regulation to 
ensure that it is safe, since water is a vitally important re-
source. In addition, the public must believe that shale drilling is 
safe. Otherwise, the shale revolution could be vulnerable to 
regulatory overkill, as media stories about flaming water fau-
cets, brown well water, and sickly farm animals prompt wide-
spread public apprehension about water contamination. In or-
der to realize the potential benefits of fracturing, we need 
regulation that is carefully calibrated to minimize the real 
risks, without deterring socially valuable drilling.  
This challenge is all the more difficult because fracturing 
can potentially contaminate water in several ways. Some are 
well understood from decades of conventional oil and gas pro-
duction and can be controlled with best practices regulations. 
 
shallow groundwater aquifers, which are in many cases the source of potable 
water for public use”); Mireya Navarro, Gas Drilling Jitters Unsettle Catskills 
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at RE 1, 6 (noting that the possibility of 
fracturing and its related water contamination risk has unsettled Catskills 
real estate market); Lucija Muehlenbachs, Elisheba Spiller & Christopher 
Timmins, Shale Gas Development and the Costs of Groundwater Contamina-
tion Risk (Res. for the Future, Working Paper 2013), available at http://rff 
.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-40-REV.pdf (studying residential property 
values in Washington County, PA and finding “that properties are positively 
affected by the drilling of a nearby shale gas well—relative to the overall 
change in economic activity within the county—unless the property depends 
on groundwater, in which case the risk to groundwater (whether real or per-
ceived) more than fully offsets these gains”). 
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Others are highly speculative, may or may not present real 
risks, and currently have no known solutions. As a result, regu-
latory responses should be dynamic, generating additional in-
formation about potential risks and stimulating innovations to 
reduce these risks.5
One element of our strategy is an evolving body of best 
practices regulations designed to reduce the risks of water con-
tamination. Rules based on “best available” technology have a 
double advantage over other regulatory strategies. First, best-
practices regulation reassures the public that a responsible 
regulatory body is focused on the issue and has directed the use 
of state-of-the-art control measures. Second, although best 
practices regulation may not always be optimally efficient, it 
provides industry with a significant measure of certainty. Giv-
en the substantial investments required to exploit shale oil and 
gas, the regulatory regime has to be relatively predictable.  
  
At the same time, best practices regulation has two major 
shortcomings in the context of the shale revolution. First, the 
body of regulations will remain incomplete for the foreseeable 
future because fracturing in shale poses new risks that are not 
yet fully understood. Therefore, we need to provide a fallback 
source of protection, and also to create incentives for regulators 
and industry to close these regulatory gaps. Second, best prac-
tices regulations are only as effective as the mechanisms for en-
forcing them. If penalties are low and inspections are infre-
quent, best practices regulation will offer only limited 
protection. Thus, it is important to build in incentives to en-
courage compliance. 
To capture the advantages of best practices regulation 
while minimizing its disadvantages, we propose to backstop 
best practices regulation with liability rules. Specifically, we 
need a liability rule for three different situations. First, assume 
water is contaminated by a problem that is, in fact, governed by 
best practices regulations. If the energy company has not com-
plied with these regulations, it should be liable. Second (and 
conversely), if the company has complied, this should be a de-
 
 5. To borrow a term favored by some of our colleagues, the regime should 
be “experimentalist.” See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contex-
tualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpre-
tation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1298 (2012); Charles 
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Ad-
ministrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011). With respect to regulation of 
the shale revolution, not only the specific control measures but the entire reg-
ulatory regime should be adaptive. See infra Part VII. 
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fense against claims that it should have done more (although 
we would not allow this defense if the regulation falls signifi-
cantly below industry norms). Third, what if there are no best 
practices regulations governing the particular circumstances 
that caused the water contamination? If the energy company 
caused the contamination, it should bear the burden to show it 
was not at fault (e.g., that it could not have avoided the prob-
lem by taking reasonable precautions). In combination, these 
three liability rules would encourage firms to comply with best 
practices regulations, while also motivating them to help devel-
op new best practices regulations covering novel water contam-
ination risks. We would augment these incentives further by 
eliminating punitive damages for any firm that complies with 
all best practices regulations. 
Since determinations of causation are critical under any li-
ability system, we recommend information-forcing rules to fa-
cilitate more accurate determinations of causation. For exam-
ple, we would require energy companies to test water quality 
before they begin fracturing and to disclose the chemicals in 
their fracturing fluid. We also suggest a number of other design 
features for a liability system, including one-way fee shifting, 
and provisions to ensure that defendants will not be judgment 
proof.  
To ensure that the regulatory regime is both dynamic and 
tailored to local conditions, we recommend keeping the regula-
tory center of gravity in the states, instead of fashioning a new 
federal regime. All states with oil and gas production have reg-
ulatory commissions that impose best practices regulations.6 As 
a result, the states have a head start in developing best prac-
tices regulations, and are moving rapidly to adopt additional 
regulations focused on fracturing. Likewise, state regulators 
can take account of variations in local conditions. Fracturing 
differs from one shale field to another, as do water supplies, ex-
posed populations, and the best ways to handle waste.7
 
 6. See, e.g., NORTH DAKOTA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF 
MINERAL RESOURCES, OIL AND GAS DIVISION, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/ 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 State 
regulation is also likely to be dynamic. Because state regulators 
observe each other, successful regulatory initiatives are likely 
to disseminate from one state to another. A federal regime, in 
 7. See Kara Cheever, States’ Varied Approaches to Fracking Regulation, 
REGBLOG (July 24, 2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2013/07/24 
-cheever-state-fracking.html. 
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contrast, would have to be developed from scratch after lengthy 
and contested rulemaking proceedings. It might impose uni-
form rules that do not always fit local conditions, and that 
could be harder to change once in place. 
Part I offers a brief description of fracturing. Part II sum-
marizes the economic, national security, and environmental 
benefits of this practice. Part III surveys a number of risks that 
are not unique to fracturing. Part IV considers the risks to 
groundwater. Part V offers a general framework for choosing a 
regulatory strategy, and uses it to recommend a combination of 
best practices regulation and liability. Part VI fleshes out the 
details of our proposed liability scheme, including: provisions to 
enhance the accuracy of determinations of causation; the role of 
best practices regulations in establishing liability; burden-
shifting to energy companies in circumstances where there are 
no applicable best practices regulations; adjustments to liabil-
ity if plaintiffs contribute to contamination or have signed a re-
lease; the proper measure of damages and allocation of attor-
ney’s fees; and ways to address the potential insolvency of 
defendants. Part VII observes that these functional character-
istics can be implemented in various ways—at the federal or 
state level, and by legislatures or courts. The most realistic 
course of action in the near term, in our view, is to use select 
legislative amendments augmenting the authority of state reg-
ulatory commissions as needed, plus appropriate modifications 
to the state common law of torts.  
I.  HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP 
IN DRILLING FOR SHALE OIL AND GAS   
Traditionally, energy companies have drilled only in rock 
that is permeable, and thus allows oil and gas to flow freely 
through it. Petroleum engineers have long understood that de-
posits within permeable rock represent only a fraction of the oil 
and gas beneath the earth’s surface. Far more is contained in 
shale deposits, which were off limits because shale is not per-
meable enough for oil and gas to flow out of it.8
 
 8. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 
 
3, at 12. The 
exact amount of unconventional oil reserves remains uncertain, but recent es-
timates suggest the United States and Canada have a combined 1301.7 billion 
barrels (bbl) in total technically recoverable unconventional oil, that is, oil 
which may or may not be economically recoverable at present. In comparison, 
the proved reserves (oil which can be economically recovered at current prices) 
for the entire world are assessed at 1354.2 billion/bbl. AMY MYERS JAFFE ET 
AL., JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, RICE UNIV., THE STATUS OF 
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Yet in the past decade, energy companies have learned to 
tap shale oil and gas reserves, developing new technologies that 
are commercially feasible at current oil and gas prices.9 The 
key innovation was to pair two technologies which were devel-
oped separately: the first is “hydraulic fracturing” or “fractur-
ing,” and the second is horizontal drilling. Neither is new—
fracturing, for instance, was first used in the late 1940s—but 
the use of both techniques in combination to extract gas from 
subterranean shale deposits began about ten years ago.10
Fracturing involves pumping water into rock at high pres-
sure so the rock cracks (“fractures”), releasing gas and oil 
trapped inside. The water is mixed with sand or some other 
“proppant” to prop open the cracks, so they do not reseal and 
the gas and oil can keep pouring out.
 
11 To hold the sand in 
place, and also to keep bacteria from degrading the gas and oil, 
other chemicals are added to fracturing fluid as well. Pioneered 
in the 1940s as a way to extract greater production from exist-
ing wells, this technique was then used in the 1980s to release 
natural gas from coal beds.12 In the past sixty years, over 2 mil-
lion fracturing treatments have been utilized in connection 
with oil and gas wells.13 An oilman named George Mitchell pio-
neered the use of fracturing in shale deposits, investing $6 mil-
lion over ten years in the Barnett Shale in Texas.14
The key to accessing natural gas and oil in shale is to com-
bine fracturing with horizontal drilling. After drilling down be-
tween 6 thousand and 10 thousand feet, energy companies turn 
  
 
WORLD OIL RESERVES: CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCES IN 
THE FUTURE SUPPLY MIX 18–19 (2011). 
 9. See Gas Works: Shale Gas is Giving a Big Boost to America’s Economy, 
ECONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 5–7 [hereinafter ECONOMIST], available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558459.  
 10. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOM-
MITTEE 90-DAY REPORT 8 (2011) [hereinafter FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT], avail-
able at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Final_90_day_Report.pdf (pairing hy-
draulic fracturing with horizontal drilling began in 2002 or 2003 to make shale 
gas commercially viable). 
 11. Armando Benincasa, The Current and Future State of Shale Gas and 
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation, TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 8. 
 12. Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing 
in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 122–23 (2009) [hereinafter Wiseman, Untested Waters]. 
 13. Kevin Fisher, Data Confirm Safety of Well Fracturing, AM. OIL & GAS 
REP., July 2010, at 2, available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/pe/ 
contents/Papers_and_Articles/web/A_through_P/AOGR%20Article%20Data% 
20Prove%20Safety%20of%20Frac.pdf.  
 14. ECONOMIST, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
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the drill sideways. The purpose of drilling horizontally is to in-
crease contact with the layer of shale that has gas or oil in it; 
this so-called pay zone is sometimes likened to the filling in an 
Oreo cookie, since it lies between rock layers that have no oil or 
gas.15
The result is a massive new domestic supply of natural gas 
and oil.
  
16 In 2000, shale supplied negligible amounts of oil and 
only 2% of domestically produced natural gas in the U.S.17 As 
recently as 2007, we were preparing to become a major import-
er of natural gas.18 Yet since 2008, domestic natural gas pro-
duction has increased by 25%.19 Today, 37% of our gas comes 
from shale; tight sands and shale together account for 50%, 
with 80% expected by 2035.20 Pennsylvania has the second 
largest natural gas field in the world, and there are sizable de-
posits in Arkansas, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia.21 While natural gas 
generated 20% of the nation’s electricity in 2006, the percent-
age has increased to 31% in just six years.22
 
 15. Eric Konigsberg, Kuwait on the Prairie, NEW YORKER, Apr. 25, 2011, 
at 45.  
 Of the additional 
capacity to generate electricity that will be added in the next 25 
 16. In the one-year period from 2009 to 2010 alone, U.S. proved reserves 
of crude oil increased 12.8%, from 22.3 billion barrels (bbl) to 25.2 bbl, and 
natural gas proved reserves increased 11.9%, from 283.9 trillion cubic feet (tcf) 
to 317.6 tcf. U.S. INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND NATURAL 
GAS LIQUIDS PROVED RESERVES, 2010 at 1 (2012), available at http://www.eia 
.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/archive/2010/pdf/uscrudeoil.pdf. These in-
creases represented the largest one-year additions since the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration began publishing reserve estimates in 1977, an in-
crease the agency attributed to “the expanding application of horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing in shale and other ‘tight’ formations.” Id. 
 17. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, THE ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBU-
TIONS OF SHALE GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2011) [hereinafter, IHS GLOB-
AL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT], available for download at http://www 
.ihs.com/info/ecc/a/shale-gas-jobs-report.aspx. 
 18. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7; IHS, NATIONAL ECO-
NOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 19. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 20. Id. at 3, 15. 
 21. Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking Mess, VANITY FAIR (June 
21, 2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/06/fracking-in 
-pennsylvania-201006. 
 22. ECONOMIST, supra note 9; Benoit Faucon & Keith Johnson, U.S. Re-
draws World Oil Map, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2012, at A4 (quoting an estimate 
of International Energy Agency that natural gas will replace oil as the largest 
single fuel in the energy mix, and noting that natural gas accounted for 31% of 
electricity in the first eight months of 2012). 
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years, 60% is expected to come from natural gas.23
In addition to natural gas, massive supplies of domestic oil 
in shale beds have also been unlocked. “The rise in tight oil 
production in the United States in the past few years,” the IEA 
observed in November 2012, “has been nothing short of spec-
tacular.”
 
24 While only 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil were 
produced from shale in 2003, 2 million bpd were produced in 
2012, and the level is expected to rise to 4.5 million bpd in the 
coming years.25 While U.S. oil production had been in steep de-
cline for decades, we experienced a 2.735 million bpd net in-
crease in production from 2008 to the first four months of 2013, 
representing a 40% increase.26 Production increased by a record 
1 million bpd in 2012 alone.27 Notably, the Bakken Shale in 
North Dakota is a 25,000 square mile sheet of embedded oil. It 
is estimated to have 11 billion barrels of oil recoverable with 
current technology, an estimate that keeps increasing; the ul-
timate number may be as much as 30 billion barrels.28 Alt-
hough North Dakota was producing less than one percent of the 
nation’s oil as recently as 2008,29 it passed California and Alas-
ka in 2012 to become the second largest oil producing state in 
the U.S. after Texas (where production is also surging).30
 
 23. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 13 
(forecasting the addition of 481 gigawatts between 2010 and 2035, and project-
ing that 60% would be generated with natural gas). 
 By 
2020, the U.S. is expected to produce 11.1 million barrels a day, 
 24. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 108. 
 25. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 5, 17. 
 26. U.S. production was 6.784 million bpd in 2008, and the average for the 
first four months of 2013 was 9.519 million bpd. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 37 (May 2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351305.pdf. 
 27. BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2013 at 8 (2013), 
available at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical_review_of_ 
world_energy_2013.pdf (production increased from approximately 7.9 bpd to 
8.9 bpd in 2012). 
 28. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 43–44, 52; see also, e.g., USGS, ASSESS-
MENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL RESOURCES IN THE BAKKEN AND THREE FORKS 
FORMATIONS, WILLISTON BASIN PROVINCE, MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, AND 
SOUTH DAKOTA (2013), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2013/3013/fs2013 
-3013.pdf (estimating 7.4 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil in the 
Bakken and Three Forks formations). 
 29. James MacPherson, North Dakota Oil Production Forecast to Surpass 
Alaska’s, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2011, http://www.adn.com/2011/01/ 
02/1629025/north-dakota-oil-production-is.html. 
 30. Russell Gold, Oil and Gas Bubble Up All Over, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 
2012, at A7 (noting the Bakken oil field produced 424,000 bpd in July 2011, 
compared with 453,000 per day from Prudhoe Bay in Alaska). 
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which will be more than Saudi Arabia.31
There is some question about the staying power of these 
new natural gas and oil reserves.
 
32 For instance, drilling costs 
for shale oil are high, so a global decline in prices could cause 
companies to reduce production.33 In addition, some experts 
caution that fractured wells may not produce as long as con-
ventional wells.34 Even so, estimates of recoverable reserves 
have generally been increasing over time.35 It may well be, as 
President Obama suggested in his 2012 State of the Union Ad-
dress, that fracturing will generate 100 years of natural gas 
supply for the United States at our current rate of consump-
tion.36
 
 31. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 
  
2, at 107 (projecting 
11.1mb/d in US in 2020); id. at 115 (projecting 10.6mb/d in Saudi Arabia in 
2020); Faucon & Johnson, supra note 22, at 1 (quoting estimate of Interna-
tional Energy Agency). 
 32. See James Stafford, Shale Gas Will Be the Next Bubble to Pop: An In-
terview With Art Berman, OILPRICE.COM (Nov. 12, 2012, 11:11 PM), http:// 
oilprice.com/Interviews/Shale-Gas-Will-be-the-Next-Bubble-to-Pop-An 
-Interview-with-Arthur-Berman.html (noting that decline rates in shale plays 
are high and that shale gas has not been profitable). 
 33. Indeed, in 2012 U.S. natural gas prices fell below the marginal cost of 
drilling (approximately $5.00 per MBtu), so that energy companies focused in-
stead on oil or on so-called wet gas (i.e., natural gas wells that also provide 
more-profitable natural gas liquids). U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL 
GAS WEEKLY UPDATE (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/ 
weekly/archive/2013/09_05/index.cfm. Yet prices subsequently rose in 2013. 
See Id. Indeed, if demand increases from exports, new dry gas wells could be-
come profitable again. See IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, 
at 143–44.  
 34. Henry D. Jacoby et al., The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and 
Environmental Policy, 1 ECON. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 37, 39–40 (2012) 
(noting that shale wells experience steep production declines, but that these 
declines have been taken into account in estimates of proven reserves). 
 35. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SHALE GAS: A RENAISSANCE IN US 
MANUFACTURING? 2 (2011), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industrial 
-products/assets/pwc-shale-gas-us-manufacturing-renaissance.pdf; 2011 MIT 
STUDY, supra note 4, at 7 (“Assessments of the recoverable volumes of shale 
gas in the U.S. have increased dramatically over the last five years, and con-
tinue to grow.”).  
 36. President Barack Obama, 2012 State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 
2012) (transcript available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-24/ 
politics/35440939_1_fair-share-hard-work-world-war-ii). An MIT study esti-
mates ninety-two years of supply (assuming continuation of the 2009 level of 
gas consumption), and notes that this represents a 77% increase in estimates 
of remaining gas resources since 1990. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 30, 
32. Cf. KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III ET AL., JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. 
POL’Y AT RICE UNIV., SHALE GAS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2011), available 
at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas 
-07192011.pdf (estimating 45 years of technically recoverable natural gas). 
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II.  ECONOMIC, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FROM FRACTURING   
A. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The benefits from this new supply of energy for our econo-
my, security, and environment are enormous. A cheap domestic 
supply of energy is a powerful engine of economic growth.37 
Shale oil and gas are capital-intensive and high-paying indus-
tries, generating $87 billion of capital investments in the U.S. 
2012. They are expected to generate $172.5 billion of invest-
ment annually by the end of the decade and $5.1 trillion in to-
tal by 2035.38 Every drilling job is estimated to create three to 
four other jobs (e.g., among suppliers of machinery, geological 
surveys, and financial services), a so-called employment multi-
plier that compares favorably with other industries.39 Not sur-
prisingly, then, North Dakota has the lowest unemployment 
rate in the nation, which is less than half the national rate.40 In 
Pennsylvania, counties with more than 200 wells added jobs at 
a 7% annual rate between 2007 and 2011, compared with a 3% 
annual decline during the same period in counties with few or 
no wells.41
 
 37. See IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 
 Nor are economic growth and job creation confined to 
3 at 2. 
 38. Id. at 2, 6–7 (projecting $2.1 trillion of capital investment for uncon-
ventional oil and $3 trillion for unconventional natural gas between 2012 and 
2035 and noting that supply chains for industry are principally domestic); id. 
at 28 (noting that average hourly wage in unconventional oil and gas, $51.00 
per hour, is more than double average wage in economy overall, $23.07). 
 39. Id. at 2, 31 (noting that jobs from drilling represent only 20% of total 
jobs created and that employment multiplier is high compared with other in-
dustries); IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 
17, 21 (noting that shale gas industries employment multiplier of three is “one 
of the larger employment multipliers,” ahead of “finance, construction, and 
many of the manufacturing sectors”; further noting that drilling is also high-
paying); GREG JANSEN & ETHAN LEVINE, COMMONFUND CAPITAL, BEHIND THE 
ENERGY RENAISSANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (2012), available at http:// 
www.commonfund.org/InvestorResources/Publications/INSIGHT%20Articles% 
20Only/Insight_Fall2012_Jansen.pdf (long supply chains and high pay in in-
dustry contribute to employment multiplier). One journalist reported that oil 
industry workers in North Dakota can earn over $70,000 in five months, and 
that their supervisors earn $320,000 in a year. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 
50. 
 40. North Dakota Unemployment, DEPARTMENT OF NUMBERS, http://www 
.deptofnumbers.com/unemployment/north-dakota/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) 
(noting that in December 2012, North Dakota’s unemployment rate was 3.2%, 
while the national rate was 7.8%). 
 41. DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & ANDREW GRAY, EMPIRE CTR. FOR N.Y. 
STATE POL’Y, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HYDROFRACTURING ON LOCAL 
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oil and gas producing states, since supply chains extend to oth-
er states as well.42 According to IHS Global Insight, shale oil 
and gas supported 1.7 million U.S. jobs in 2012; this number is 
expected to increase to 3 million in 2020, representing 2% of to-
tal employment in the U.S.43 Obviously, this is a significant 
boon to an economy that shed 7 million jobs in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis and has created jobs haltingly in the five 
years since.44
Fracturing in shale beds can also enhance the purchasing 
power of landowners. The media has reported that North Dako-
ta landowners generally earn a bonus royalty of $3,000 per acre 
plus a 20% stake in any oil that is produced. This means that a 
“moderately productive plot of two square miles could bring the 
owners— typically, groups of relatives and speculators— a mil-
lion dollars up front, and five hundred thousand dollars a year 
for two decades.”
  
45
Even more important, though, is the impact on consumers. 
The shale gas boom has caused natural gas prices to plummet 
to between one-third and one-half of their 2008 level.
  
46 By con-
trast, natural gas prices are four to eight times higher in Eu-
rope and Asia, which gives a sense of what U.S. prices would be 
if set by gas imports, instead of by domestically produced shale 
gas.47
 
ECONOMIES: A COMPARISON OF NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.empirecenter.org/Reports/2013/05/econeffectfracking 
050613.cfm. 
 This savings ripples throughout the economy, since over 
 42. See generally IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: 
THE UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
STATE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS (2012). 
 43. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 2, 7–8, 
27–28. 
 44. Jeffrey Bartash, U.S. Job Growth Better, But Is it Good?, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-job 
-growth-is-better-but-is-it-good-2013-08-09. 
 45. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 51. 
 46. U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN-
ISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm (last updated 
Aug. 30, 2013) (declining from $10.36 in June 2008 to $2.54 in June of 2012, 
with prices stated in dollars per thousand cubic feet). Prices rebounded to ap-
proximately $3.00 in the fall of 2012. See Liam Pleven, What Glut? Gas Prices 
Rise, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2012, at C4, and to approximately $4.00 in the 
spring of 2013; Natural Gas Weekly Update, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION AD-
MINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/ (last updated Aug. 29. 
2013). 
 47. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 129 (finding gas 
prices in June 2012 were $2.10 per MBtu in the United States, $9.90/MBtu in 
the United Kingdom, $12/MBtu for liquid natural gas in the Mediterranean 
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half of U.S. energy consumption is for heating and electricity in 
residential and commercial buildings.48 The savings averages 
$926 per year for every American household49—almost 2% of 
the U.S. median household income50—and is expected to grow 
to $2,000 in 2035.51
Since every business spends on energy, this savings also 
hits the bottom line of U.S. businesses, enabling them to cut 
costs, increase profits, and hire more people.
  
52 Reductions in 
natural gas prices, for instance, are expected to reduce electric-
ity prices by 10%, and to trigger a 2.9% increase in industrial 
production by 2017, and a 4.7% increase by 2035.53 The most 
significant impact is on energy-intensive industries such as 
glass, steel, cement, aluminum and, especially, the petrochemi-
cals industry.54 The latter also uses chemicals in natural gas, 
such as ethane, as raw material for its products. In response to 
declining U.S. natural gas prices, Methanex is moving a plant 
from Chile to Louisiana,55 and Dow Chemical, Chevron Phillips 
Chemical, and Exxon Mobil have also announced new invest-
ments in the United States.56 An Egyptian company is building 
a fertilizer plant in Iowa, making the largest investment in the 
state’s history.57
 
and $17.40/MBtu in northeast Asia); see also JANSEN & LEVINE, supra note 
 Industry analysts project that lower petro-
chemical and energy costs will yield one million more manufac-
39, 
at 39 (finding U.S. natural gas prices are lowest in the world). 
 48. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4 (49.2 out of 94.6 quads). 
 49. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 26.  
 50. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2011 median household in-
come in the United States was $50,054. Median Household Income by State—
Single-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/income/data/statemedian/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).  
 51. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 26 
(estimating savings of $926 per household from 2012–15, growing to $2000 per 
household in 2035).  
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 36. 
 54. Id. at 4, 11. 
 55. Methanex Corp to Move Chile Plant to Louisiana, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 
2013), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/methanex-plant-idINL2N0DC17 
J20130425. 
 56. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, 2011 SHALE GAS REPORT, supra note 17, at 2, 
28–31. 
 57. Ahmed A. Namatalla & Nadine Marroushi, Egypt’s OCI to Build $1.4 
Billion Fertilizer Plant in Iowa, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/egypt-s-oci-to-build-1-dot-4-billion-fertilizer 
-plant-in-iowa (“Orascom Construction Industries (OCIC), Egypt’s biggest pub-
licly traded company, said it will build a $1.4-billion fertilizer plant in Iowa, 
the biggest investment in the state’s history.”). 
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turing jobs in the United States by 2025, adding .5% annual 
growth to gross domestic product.58
Since almost one-third of U.S. energy consumption is for 
transportation, cheap natural gas can have even greater impact 
over the long term by replacing petroleum for cars, trucks, and 
buses.
 
59 It is possible to power vehicles with natural gas, and 
natural gas now costs less than a fifth of the cost of oil on an 
energy-equivalent basis, creating a powerful economic incentive 
to substitute natural gas for oil.60 Today, filling stations and 
other infrastructure are overwhelmingly focused on petrole-
um.61 This is less of an issue, though, for buses, garbage trucks, 
and other municipal vehicles, which have their own refueling 
facilities.62 As a result, an increasing number of companies and 
municipalities are buying natural-gas-powered buses and 
trucks.63 The economics of powering long-haul trucks with nat-
ural gas are especially compelling. Electric cars and plug-in hy-
brids can also be powered by electricity generated with natural 
gas, and there are chemical processes to convert natural gas in-
to a liquid fuel as well.64 If the enormous price differential be-
tween natural gas and petroleum persists, entrepreneurs will 
figure out how to supply natural gas as a fuel for ordinary cars 
and trucks.65
 
 58. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 
  
35, at 1 (estimating one mil-
lion additional jobs due to affordable energy and demand for products to ex-
tract shale gas); DAVID P. MURPHY, OUTLOOK NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY IN-
DEPENDENCE, REENERGIZED (2012), available at http://americanpetproducts 
.org/Uploads/MemServices/UBS_SummerOutlookJuly2012.pdf (noting that 
UBS economists forecast that the U.S. energy boom is contributing additional 
.5% annual GDP growth). But see Nelson D. Schwartz, Manufacturing’s Mi-
rage: A Jobs Boom Built on Cheap Energy Has Yet to Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
2, 2013, at B1–B2 (cautioning that widespread automation may temper job 
creation associated with a manufacturing rebound driven by cheap energy). 
 59. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4, 99. 
 60. See MURPHY, supra note 58.  
 61. Cf. 2011 MIT Study, supra note 4, at 121 (“Use of CNG requires a new 
fueling infrastructure . . . .”). 
 62. See id. at 11 (“[I]nfrastructure issues do not impede development.”). 
See generally CALEY JOHNSON, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUSINESS CASE 
FOR COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS IN MUNICIPAL FLEETS, NREL TECHNICAL RE-
PORT NREL/TP-7A247919 (2010), available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/ 
pdfs/47919.pdf (offering a model to project profitability of CNG use for fleets 
such as buses and trucks).  
 63. Michael Rubinkam, Natural Gas Drillers Target US Truck, Bus Mar-
ket YAHOO FINANCE (Nov. 25, 2012, 3:12 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
natural-gas-drillers-target-us-truck-bus-market-182633169-finance.html. 
 64. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4, 125–28. 
 65. Cf. id. at 123. 
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All of these economic benefits will be reflected in our bal-
ance of payments. The 2012 current accounts deficit of the 
United States was estimated to be $695 billion,66 which includ-
ed $319 billion of oil imports. If not for the increase in shale oil 
and gas production since 2008, the deficit would have been al-
most 25% larger (reflecting an additional $70 billion of oil and 
$100 billion of natural gas for a total of $865 billion).67 If do-
mestic oil production increases as expected, the deficit will be 
reduced further by $185 billion (or 27%) over the coming 
years68
Through the combination of all these effects, shale oil and 
gas contributed over $237 billion to U.S. GDP in 2012, and is 
expected to contribute $416 billion in 2020 and $475 billion in 
2035.
—and by more if we export significant amounts of natu-
ral gas. 
69 Likewise, shale oil and gas contributed nearly $62 bil-
lion in federal, state and local tax revenue in 2012, a level that 
is projected to grow to $111 billion in 2020, for a total of nearly 
$2.5 trillion over the next quarter century.70
B. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
Reducing our dependence on imported energy has geopolit-
ical advantages as well.71 Some of the world’s leading oil and 
natural gas exporters are either unstable or hostile to the Unit-
ed States or both. The top eight oil-exporting nations to the 
world market are Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, the United Arab 
Emirates, Norway, Iraq, Angola, and Nigeria.72 Likewise, 70% 
of the world’s conventional gas reserves (i.e., not including 
shale gas) are in Iran, Qatar, and Russia.73
 
 66. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 
 Some of these re-
gimes consistently seek to undermine U.S. foreign policy goals, 
and added oil and gas revenue strengthens their ability to do 
3, at 5.  
 67. Id. at 3, 5. 
 68. Id. at 6 (assuming a reduction of 6 million barrels per day of imports 
at $112 per barrel, the average price per barrel during the first nine months of 
2012). 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Id. at 2, 8. 
 71. John Bussey, Shale: A New Kingmaker in Energy Geopolitics, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 21, 2012, at B1 (“Had it not been for this growth in U.S. produc-
tion, the sanctions on Iran could not have been as successful . . . .”) (quoting 
Daniel Yergin). 
 72. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia 
.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2013).  
 73. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 7. 
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so.74 Indeed, in some cases, these resources may fund terrorist 
networks that target the U.S. and our allies.75
It is fortunate, then, that the U.S. has gone from importing 
60.3% of its oil (on a net basis) in 2005 to 36.2% in early 2013, 
with further reductions in U.S. oil imports expected in the next 
two decades.
 Recent events in 
the Middle East—the nuclear program in Iran, the attack on 
the U.S. Embassy in Libya, the seizure of hostages by terrorists 
at a natural gas facility in Algeria, etc.—suggest that, if any-
thing, the Middle East is becoming more unstable and hostile 
to the U.S.  
76 In fact, the IEA projects the U.S. to be 97% ener-
gy self-sufficient in net terms by 2035.77 The increase in U.S. oil 
production since 2008 is more than what Iran was exporting be-
fore sanctions were imposed, a fact that has made those sanc-
tions more viable.78 Likewise, if Europe starts to buy natural 
gas from the U.S. and other sources instead of Russia, Russia 
will have less leverage over Europe.79
 
 74. See John Hannah, Energy Insecurity: How Oil Dependence Under-
mines America's Effort to Stop the Iranian Bomb, FOREIGN POL'Y, Oct. 12, 
2012, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/12/energy_insecurity_ 
how_oil_dependence_undermines_america_s_effort_to_stop_the_irania. 
 Meanwhile, China has 
shale gas reserves that may be larger than those in the U.S. (as 
well as significant reserves of shale oil), and ultimately may al-
so depend less on the Middle East and other traditional energy 
 75. See Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the 
War on Terror Without the War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587, 614 (2003). 
 76. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 120 (predicting 
that US oil imports fall from over 12 mb/d in 2005 to 3.4 mb/d in 2035, and 
“North America as a whole becomes a net exporting region”); Elisabeth Rosen-
thal, U.S. Is Forecast to Be No. 1 Oil Producer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at 
B6; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 26, at 41. 
 77. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 2, at 75 (projecting 
US to be “97% energy self-sufficient in net terms” by 2035, as exports of coal, 
gas, and bioenergy offset declining oil imports). 
 78. Daniel Yergin, The Real Stimulus: Low Cost Natural Gas, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 23, 2012, at A17 (“Without the additional oil coming from the surge in 
U.S. oil output, the Iranian oil sanctions could not have worked as well as they 
have.”); see also MEDLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 13 (tapping domestic shale 
gas reserves “[r]educes Iran’s ability to tap energy diplomacy as a means to 
strengthen its regional power or buttress its nuclear aspirations”). U.S. oil 
production increased by 2.735 million bpd from 2008 through the first four 
months of 2013. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. supra note 26. By contrast, 
Iran was producing 4.396 million bpd in 2008 and consuming 1.906 million 
bpd, leaving a net of 2.490 for export. See BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD 
ENERGY 8–9 (2012), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/ 
globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_ 
review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/oil_section_2012.pdf. 
 79. MEDLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 54. 
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suppliers.80 The United Kingdom recently doubled its estimate 
of its shale gas reserves, and Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Aus-
tralia, and other nations have significant reserves of shale oil 
and gas as well.81
For example, developing U.S. and other shale oil and gas 
resources may enable the U.S. to cut its defense budget and 
even to reduce the probability of future terrorist attacks and 
wars. The U.S. spends $60 to $80 billion every year to police 
the sea lanes from the Middle East, but as we import less oil, 
we may be able to spend less.
 This greater diversity of energy supply is sure 
to have geopolitical consequences.  
82 Admittedly, the U.S. remains 
exposed to price shocks in the oil market, even with domestical-
ly produced oil (since prices are based on global, rather than lo-
cal, market conditions).83 Putting the need for energy aside, 
moreover, there are other reasons why the U.S. has been, and 
will remain, engaged in the Middle East, including the value of 
averting instability and its associated costs.84
 
 80. Elizabeth Muller, China Must Exploit its Shale Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 2013, at A21 (“China has the potential to unearth large amounts of shale 
gas through hydraulic fracturing. In 2011, the United States Energy Infor-
mation Administration estimated that China had ‘technically recoverable’ re-
serves of 1.3 quadrillion cubic feet, nearly 50 percent more than the United 
States.”). In July of 2013, PetroChina entered into an agreement with Hess to 
begin developing a shale oil field in northwest China. Chen Aizhu & Judy 
Hua, Hess, PetroChina Sign China’s First Shale Oil Deal, REUTERS (July 24, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-cnpc-hess-shale-idUSBRE 
96N0EL20130724. 
 Yet even so, there 
 81. Sarah Young & John McGarrity, Update 2-Britain Doubles North Eng-
land Shale Gas Estimate, REUTERS, June 27, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/06/27/uk-britain-shale-resources-idUKBRE95Q0CD20130627; 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas 
Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the 
United States (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/ 
worldshalegas/ (listing nations with most shale oil and shale gas reserves); see 
Press Release, UK Dep’t of Energy & Climate Change, Estimates of Shale Gas 
Resource in North of England Published, Alongside a Package of Community 
Benefits (June 27, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
estimates-of-shale-gas-resource-in-north-of-england-published-alongside-a 
-package-of-community-benefits (“Scientists from the British Geological Sur-
vey have estimated on a central scenario that there is likely to be some 40 tril-
lion cubic metres (1,300 trillion cubic feet) of shale gas in the ground in this 
area.”).  
 82. Faucon & Johnson, supra note 22, at A4 (quoting prediction of Inter-
national Energy Agency). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Indeed, if a collapse in oil prices destabilizes the region, this would 
create a number of challenges for the U.S. and its allies. See, e.g., Charles C. 
Mann, What if We Never Run Out of Oil?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2013, at 
48, 61 (describing an “arc of instability stretching from Venezuela to Nigeria to 
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are obvious advantages to energy independence, which explain 
why every President in recent memory has championed this 
goal.85
C. ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS: AIR QUALITY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
 While it has not seemed attainable for decades, the en-
ergy reserves in U.S. shale beds have changed the equation.  
1. Cleaner Air from Using Gas Instead of Coal 
Although this Article’s focus is on regulating potential en-
vironmental risks from fracturing, there are two potentially 
significant environmental benefits as well. The first is cleaner 
air, an indisputable benefit of replacing coal with natural gas. 
Coal pollutes the air with particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, 
and carbon monoxide, producing pea-soup like air (which can 
be found, for instance, in Chinese cities), as well as attendant 
health effects.86 By contrast, natural gas burns much cleaner 
than coal.87 Until recently, coal generated almost half of the 
electricity in the United States, but declining natural gas prices 
have led power plants to switch to gas; as a result, the level of 
coal-generated electricity declined to 42% in 2011 and 36% in 
2012, the lowest levels since these numbers were first tracked 
in 1949.88
 
Saudi Arabia to Kazakhstan to Siberia”). But see Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Why 
the Energy Mopes Are Wrong, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2013, at A15 (arguing that 
prices are unlikely to fall to the extent that they would destabilize these re-
gimes, and emphasizing the geopolitical advantages of reducing the coercive 
capacity of petrostates).  
  
 85. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY, 260–61 (2011) (describ-
ing the importance of energy security). 
 86. Jeff Blagdon, China’s Air Pollution Led to 1.2 Million Premature 
Deaths in 2010, THE VERGE (Apr. 3, 2013, 1:22 AM), http://www.theverge.com/ 
2013/4/3/4177568/china-air-pollution-causes-1-2-million-premature-deaths; see 
also, e.g., Yuyu Chen et al., Evidence on the Impact of Sustained Exposure to 
Air Pollution on Life Expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy, 110 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 12,936, 12,936 (2013); Anthony Seaton, William Macnee, 
Kenneth Donaldson & David Godden, Particulate Air Pollution and Acute 
Health Effects, 345 THE LANCET 176, 176 (1995) (describing health effects from 
coal pollution); Richard Silk, Coal Pollution Cuts Life Expectancy in China, 
Study Finds, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2013, at A14 (life expectancy cut by more 
than five years in 1990’s). 
 87. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 3 (“Among the fossil fuels . . . [natu-
ral gas] burns cleanly and efficiently, with very few non-carbon emissions.”). 
 88. ECONOMIST, supra note 9, at 6. 
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2. Climate Change: Reduced Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Burning Gas Instead of Coal 
 A second (more contested) environmental benefit from frac-
turing—and, in particular, from replacing coal with natural 
gas—is the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and 
thus to combat climate change. Burning natural gas produces 
only half as much carbon dioxide as coal.89 This shift from coal 
to natural gas is a key reason why U.S. carbon dioxide emis-
sions declined by 12% from 2005 to 2012 (including a 3.8% de-
cline in 2012 alone), and are at their lowest level since 1994.90 
This decline is the largest anywhere in the world, and occurred 
during a period when global emissions rose by 8%. China’s 
emissions have risen dramatically as they have built more coal-
fired power plants.91 Likewise, Europe has made less progress 
than the U.S.—notwithstanding its stricter regulations of 
greenhouse gas emissions—because natural gas is more expen-
sive there, so that Europe has been increasing its use of coal.92
Going forward, by making greater use of natural gas to 
generate electric power, we can reduce U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions from this sector by 20%, or 8% overall, according to a 
2011 MIT study.
  
93
 
 89. Benincasa, supra note 
 We can make even more progress by using 
more natural gas to power industry, home heating, and trans-
11, at 8; see also 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, 
at 3 (“Among the fossil fuels, [natural gas] has the lowest carbon intensity, 
emitting less CO2 per unit of energy generated than other fossil fuels. It burns 
cleanly and efficiently, with very few non-carbon emissions.”); id. at 121 (natu-
ral gas also burns cleaner than oil, producing 25% less CO2 compared to gaso-
line). For numerical estimates of the difference between coal and natural gas 
on a lifecycle basis, see the studies cited infra notes 91 & 97. 
 90. Russell Gold, Rise in U.S. Gas Production Fuels Unexpected Plunge in 
Emissions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2013, at A1 (citing study by the Energy In-
formation Administration); Trevor Houser, Neck and Neck: US and European 
GHG Emissions Trends, RHODIUM GROUP (May 29, 2013), http://rhg.com/ 
notes/neck-and-neck-us-and-european-ghg-emissions-trends.  
 91. See Muller, supra note 80 (“China’s greenhouse gas emissions are 
twice those of the United States and growing at 8 percent to 10 percent per 
year. Last year, China increased its coal-fired generating capacity by 50 giga-
watts, enough to power a city that uses seven times the energy of New York 
City.”). 
 92. Brad Plumer, How Long Before Fracking Spreads to Europe? A Dec-
ade, at Least, WASH. POST. WONKBLOG (Feb. 7, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/20B/02/07/will-fracking-ever-spread 
-to-europe-maybe-in-a-decade. 
 93. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 2; see also id. at 9 (“Displacement of 
coal-fired power by gas-fired power over the next 25 to 30 years is the most 
cost-effective way of reducing CO2 emissions in the power sector.”). 
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portation.94 Fracturing thus facilitates the use of natural gas as 
a bridge fuel, reducing carbon emissions in the near term, while 
solar and other renewable technologies are developed over the 
long term.95
3. Climate Change: Offsetting Effects of Fugitive Methane 
Emissions 
 We also avoid the risks of nuclear power, demon-
strated at Chernobyl and Fukushima. 
A caveat about greenhouse gas emissions is in order, 
though. Although burning methane (the main ingredient in 
natural gas) releases comparatively small amounts of CO2, re-
leasing methane into the atmosphere—for instance, during 
drilling or from pipeline leaks—is a potentially significant 
source of greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, methane traps 
twenty times more heat than carbon dioxide.96 Focusing on the-
se fugitive emissions, Robert Howarth has argued that shifting 
from coal to natural gas actually does not reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions when measured on a “lifecycle” basis.97
Yet this conclusion is not widely accepted.
  
98 A number of 
studies reach more favorable conclusions. They argue that Pro-
fessor Howarth’s analysis is plagued by measurement and 
methodological errors, such as failing to distinguish between 
methane that is “vented” (deliberately leaked during drilling) 
or “flared” (burned during drilling).99
 
 94. Id. at 10–11. 
 The debate is ongoing, 
 95. Id. at 2 (“[N]atural gas provides a cost-effective bridge to . . . a low-
carbon future.”). 
 96. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, at 
ES-12 (2013). 
 97. See Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro & Anthony Ingraffea, Methane 
and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations, a 
Letter, 106 CLIMATE CHANGE 679, 683 (2011).  
 98. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 17 (noting that Howarth’s 
study’s conclusion is “not widely accepted”). 
 99. See, e.g, Jacoby, O’Sullivan & Paltsev, supra note 34, at 44 n.2 (criti-
cizing Howarth for “questionable interpretation of methane leakage data” and 
for assuming “inappropriate substitution of gas for coal generation”); Francis 
O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, Shale Gas Production: Potential Versus Actual 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 6 (2012), available at 
http://m.iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/4/044030/pdf/1748-9326_7_4_044030 
.pdf (rebutting the Howarth study and arguing that methane emissions from 
fractured natural gas wells are comparable to methane emissions from con-
ventional gas drilling); see also MARY LASHLEY BARCELLA ET AL., IHS 
CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., MISMEASURING METHANE: ESTIMAT-
ING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS DEVELOP-
MENT, PRIVATE REPORT 9 (2011) (“IHS data . . . was misused and severely dis-
torted in the Howarth paper. The analysis included wells that were not in the 
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and a number of methodological and empirical questions need 
to be resolved.  
For example, when we analyze whether natural gas or coal 
contributes more to greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
change on a life-cycle basis, time horizon is an important issue. 
Methane traps more heat than carbon dioxide, but only as long 
as it remains in the atmosphere—for only twenty years, com-
pared with 100 years for carbon dioxide.100 As a result, esti-
mates of methane’s impact over a twenty year time horizon are 
greater than over a 100 year time horizon, but the latter is 
probably a better measure of long-run effects on climate.101
Another key question in this life-cycle comparison is the 
rate of methane leakage from natural gas production. Esti-
mates range from a low of 1% to a high of 5% or even 8%.
  
102 In 
an April 2013 study, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) offered a reassuring assessment, concluding that me-
thane emissions declined by 8.2% between 1990 and 2011.103
 
flowback phase at all; double-counted a particularly prolific well; and in the 
single case of a well tested during the flowback process, assumed that me-
thane was emitted when in fact it was captured for sale, as clearly stated in 
the IHS report.”); id. (“The Howarth paper states that methane emissions 
from unconventional gas wells average nearly 2 percent of the ultimate recov-
ery of natural gas over the lifetime of the well . . . . By contrast, the authors 
estimate that flowback methane emissions from a conventional gas well aver-
age only 0.01 percent of ultimate recovery.”).  
 
 100. Global Warming FAQ, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www 
.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/global-warming-faq 
.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  
 101. James Bradbury et al., Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Green-
house Gas Emissions from U.S. Natural Gas Systems, 14–15 (World Resources 
Institute, Working Paper Apr. 2013), available at http://pdf.wri.org/clearing_ 
the_air_full.pdf; David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral 
Outrage vs. Cool Analysis, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228398. See generally Michael A. Levi, 
Comment on “Hydrocarbon Emissions Characterization in the Colorado Front 
Range: A Pilot Study” by Gabrielle Pétron et al., 117 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
D21203 (2012) (measuing methane emissions from natural gas). 
 102. Ramon A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage 
from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6435, 6437 
(2012) (concluding that the cumulative leakage rate from natural-gas produc-
tion is 3.2%); Michael Levi, Climate Consequences of Natural Gas as a Bridge 
Fuel, 118 CLIMATIC CHANGE 609, 620 (2013) (“Most recent publications have 
indicated that leakage in the United States is likely to be 1–2%, and have all 
but rejected the possibility of leakage on the order of 5 percent . . . .”); Jeff 
Tollefson, Methane Leaks Erode Green Credentials of Natural Gas, 493 NA-
TURE 12, 12 (2013) (reporting on preliminary data from joint study by National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of Colorado indi-
cating leakage rate may be as high as 9%).  
 103. EPA, supra note 96, at ES-12 
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Although this period coincides with a dramatic increase in nat-
ural gas production, methane emissions from natural gas pro-
duction are down even more—by 10.2%.104 This progress is “due 
largely to a decrease in emissions from transmission and stor-
age,” EPA concluded, “due to increased voluntary reductions 
and a decrease in distribution emissions due to a decrease in 
cast iron and unprotected steel pipelines.”105 Likewise, the sub-
set of methane leaks attributed to field production (as opposed 
to pipelines) is down even more sharply—by 12%.106 This de-
cline has not been linear: EPA reports that methane field pro-
duction emissions actually increased by 43% from 1990 through 
2006, and then declined by 38% from 2006 through 2011, even 
though this later period is when the shale gas boom took off.107 
Compared with the assessment it issued in 2012, EPA’s 2013 
assessment is significantly more favorable: it reduced its esti-
mate (a) of total methane emissions in 2010 by 11%108 and (b) of 
methane emissions from natural gas systems in 2010 by 33%.109 
According to EPA’s 2013 report, U.S. natural gas production 
emits only slightly more methane into the atmosphere than 
livestock (i.e., from “enteric fermentation” or belches).110
 
 104. Id. at ES-13 (reporting decline of 16.5 Tg C02 Eq.). 
 Like-
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Compare EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2010, at ES–5 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-ES.pdf (re-
porting 666.5 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for 2010 in their 2012 re-
port), with EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 
1990–2011, at ES–6 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013-Main-Text.pdf (reporting 
592.7 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for 2010 in their 2013 report). The 
change from 666.5 to 592.7 is an 11% decline.  
 109. Compare EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2010, at ES–5 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-ES.pdf (re-
porting 215.4 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for natural gas systems in 
2010 in their 2012 report), with EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011, at ES–6 (2013), available at http://www 
.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013 
-Main-Text.pdf (reporting 143.6 teragrams carbon dioxide equivalent for natu-
ral gas systems in 2010 in their 2013 report). The change from 215.4 to 143.6 
is a 33% decline. 
 110. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 
1990–2011, at ES-12–ES-13 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013-Main 
-Text.pdf; EPA Methane Report Further Divides Fracking Camps, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 28, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/APe433c8a9448749f38fc513232d72 
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wise, a September 2013 study organized by the Environmental 
Defense Fund also finds relatively little methane leakage dur-
ing the natural gas extraction process, based on measurements 
from 190 onshore production sites; the measurements are in 
line with EPA’s most recent estimates, although the distribu-
tion is somewhat different (with lower emissions from well 
completion and higher emissions from pneumatic controllers 
and equipment leaks).111
What is clear, though, is that as long as methane leakage 
can be contained at the low end of this range, switching from 
coal to natural gas is beneficial from a climate perspective.
 Further research will hopefully yield a 
more definitive assessment over time.  
112 
Fortunately, there are cost effective measures to contain me-
thane leaks and energy companies have an economic incentive 
to adopt them, so they can sell the methane that otherwise 
would escape.113 They also have safety reasons to minimize me-
thane leaks, since methane is highly flammable and inhaling it 
can cause dizziness, headaches, and other symptoms.114
 
d1e2.html (reporting 145 million metric tons annually from natural gas pro-
duction versus 137 million from livestock). 
 In addi-
tion, EPA’s recently promulgated regulations on fugitive emis-
sions reinforce this incentive, requiring energy companies to 
capture or burn methane released during drilling (so-called 
 111. David T. Allen et al., Measurements of Methane Emissions at Natural 
Gas Production Sites in the United States, PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCIENCE 1 
(2013). 
 112. See Alvarez et al., supra note 102, at 6435; Andrew Burnham et al., 
Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Shale Gas, Natural Gas, Coal, and 
Petroleum, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 619, 624 (2011) (concluding that, on a life-
cycle basis, electricity generated from coal produces 41% more greenhouse gas 
emissions than electricity from conventional natural gas, while electricity from 
shale gas produces 6% less greenhouse gas emissions than electricity from 
conventional gas); Timothy J. Skone, Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Analysis of 
Natural Gas Extraction & Delivery in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 
34 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/ 
NG_LC_GHG_ PRES_12MAY11.pdf (illustrating the Department of Energy’s 
analysis concluding that power generation from natural gas produces 54% less 
greenhouse gas than from coal on a life-cycle basis with a 100 year time hori-
zon); Paulina Jaramillo et al.Comparative Life-Cycle Air Emissions of Coal, 
Domestic Natural Gas, LNG, and SNG for Electricity Generation, 41 ENVTL. 
SCI. & TECH. 6290, 6293 (2007) (concluding that life-cycle carbon dioxide emis-
sions from electricity generated with domestically produced natural gas is 50% 
less than electricity generated from coal, though the difference is narrower for 
liquefied and synthetic natural gas). 
 113. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 133 (noting both “environmental 
and business reasons” to capture emissions from methane leaks). 
 114. BARCELLA ET AL., supra note 99, at 1–2 (noting incentive of energy 
companies to minimize methane emissions for health and safety reasons). 
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“green capture” and “flaring”) and mandating various other 
control technologies.115
III.  FAMILIAR RISKS THAT ARE NOT UNIQUE TO 
FRACTURING   
 
Balanced against the benefits of fracturing are a number of 
potential risks. In our view, the most important of these—and, 
indeed, the one that is unique to fracturing — is the risk of con-
taminating groundwater. We describe this risk in Part IV and 
consider how to address it in Parts V, VI, and VII.  
But before we turn to water contamination, Part III re-
views five other environmental risks: the economic competition 
that shale gas and oil pose to renewable energy; air pollution; 
congestion and pressure on local communities; water usage; 
and induced tremors and earthquakes. A unifying theme 
among these risks is that they are not unique to fracturing. 
Almost all arise, for instance, when oil and natural gas wells 
are drilled conventionally (i.e., without fracturing and horizon-
tal drilling).116
A. ECONOMIC COMPETITION FOR SOLAR, WIND, AND OTHER 
RENEWABLES 
 Some of these risks also arise in coal mining, 
manufacturing, and even in opening new sports arenas and 
shopping malls. Because these risks are familiar in other con-
texts, most are already governed by existing regulatory re-
gimes. While fracturing might justify an increase in the scale or 
intensity of these regulations, in most cases it is unlikely to re-
quire new fracturing-specific regimes for these risks. 
By increasing the supply of natural gas and oil, and thus 
holding down their prices, fracturing diminishes price-based in-
centives to conserve energy. Does it also impede the develop-
ment of renewable energy, such as solar, wind and geothermal?  
Arguably, the answer is “no.” To the extent government in-
itiatives guarantee a percentage of the energy market to re-
newable energy, shale gas does not undercut the incentive to 
use renewables because it is not a renewable fuel.117
 
 115. New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Stand-
ards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 
2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 Aside from 
 116. Christopher L. Weber & Christopher Clavin, Life Cycle Carbon Foot-
print of Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and Implications, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 5688 (2012). 
 117. JANSEN & LEVINE, supra note 39, at 40 (noting that utilities invest in 
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the protection afforded by such mandates, shale gas is often 
viewed as a bridge fuel, which will help satisfy the nation’s en-
ergy needs until renewables are more competitive.118 In addi-
tion, since wind and solar are intermittent sources of energy, 
they need another source to fill in when they are unavailable, 
which usually is natural gas.119
Nevertheless, there is a risk that cheap natural gas will 
undercut the political support for renewable fuel mandates 
and, more generally, will outcompete renewables so that they 
never become economically viable.
 
120
While we agree with the goal of using taxes and other poli-
cy instruments to ensure that carbon fuel prices reflect their 
true social cost, including externalities—and have made a pro-
posal in this spirit elsewhere
 Although opponents of 
fracturing do not usually say so explicitly, one reason some may 
favor a moratorium or costly new regulations for fracturing is 
to shore up the competitive position of renewables. 
121—this strategy does not make 
sense if applied only to shale gas and oil, but not to other car-
bon fuels. If fracturing is banned or becomes significantly more 
expensive, while coal remains cheap, the result will not be more 
solar and wind energy, but more coal.122
 
renewables in part because of state-based renewable portfolio standards). 
 This is not an outcome 
 118. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 70 (“Gas can be an effective bridge 
to a lower CO2 emissions [in the] future . . . .”). 
 119. IHS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 3, at 16; 2011 
MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 73 (claiming natural gas provides baseload power 
and system flexibility for intermittent sources).  
 120. Ryan Tracy, States Cooling to Renewable Energy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
28, 2013, at A3 (“Legislatures in half the states that require electric utilities to 
buy renewable energy are considering proposals to roll back those mandates.”); 
2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 2 (“[N]atural gas sets the cost benchmark 
against which other clean power sources must compete to remove the marginal 
ton of CO2.”); id. at 10 (noting that in some short- and long-term scenarios, re-
newables and gas substitute for each other on a nearly one-for-one basis); id. 
at 54 (estimating cost per kilowatt hour of electricity is 5.4 cents for coal, 5.6 
cents for gas, 6.0 cents for wind, 8.5 cents for biomass, and 19.3 cents for solar, 
without including cost of backup and storage for renewables, which would lead 
to a higher estimate); Jacoby et al., supra note 34, at 49 (modeling the effect of 
cheap shale gas on economic viability of renewables through 2050 and finding 
that “cheaper gas serves to reduce the rate of market penetration of renewable 
generation”).  
 121. Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic 
Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1 (2010).  
 122. Susan L. Brantley & Anna Meyendorff, Op-Ed., The Facts on 
Fracking, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/ 
opinion/global/the-facts-on-fracking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
  
172 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:145 
 
that environmentalists should favor, since gas burns more 
cleanly than coal. Any such effort to reduce consumption of car-
bon fuels should apply in an even-handed manner to all carbon 
fuels. 
The global nature of climate change and energy production 
reinforces this point. Even if the U.S. bans fracturing, other 
countries will use it.123 For example, there are large shale oil 
and gas reserves in China, Argentina, Ukraine, Poland, Libya, 
Algeria, and in other nations as well; although it may take 
some time for these nations to develop their capacity for shale 
drilling, they presumably will do so eventually.124
B. AIR POLLUTION 
 If these re-
sources undercut the development of renewables, there is little 
the United States (alone) can do to stop them. An effort to stop 
fracturing in the U.S. could therefore deprive the U.S. of the 
benefits of fracturing without doing much to hasten the devel-
opment of renewables on a global basis.  
Another environmental risk from drilling in shale beds is 
air pollution, which can arise in four ways. First, methane can 
be released from a well or a leak in a pipeline, as discussed 
above, contributing to greenhouse gas emissions,125 and in rare 
cases can even cause explosions. Of course, methane emissions 
arise not just from fractured wells, but also from conventional 
wells,126
 
 123. MEDLOCK ET AL., supra note 
 pipelines, and, for that matter, from landfills and cattle 
36, at 11 (noting that shale gas produc-
tion is being discussed in Europe, China, India, and Australia); 2011 MIT 
STUDY, supra note 4, at 154 (noting that China has 1.2 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas reserves). 
 124. Russell Gold & Marynia Kruk, Global Gas Push Stalls, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, 2012, at A1 (noting that other nations lag behind the U.S. in technical 
capacity as well as in knowledge of geological conditions, and also that the 
U.S. property rights system, which vests landowners as opposed to the state 
with mineral rights, creates added incentive to drill); id. at A6 (noting also 
that other countries are likely to catch up to the U.S. eventually, though it 
may take time). France, on the other hand, has indicated that it will not per-
mit fracturing. See Op-Ed., No Fracking, We’re French, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 
2012, at A16.  
 125. See generally Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the Greenhouse-
Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 
679 (2011). 
 126. Indeed, a number of studies have compared air pollution and emis-
sions from conventional and shale gas. See Weber & Clavin, supra note 116, at 
5688. Although there is some uncertainty on the question, the evidence so far 
suggests that life-cycle emissions from conventional and shale gas are compa-
rable. See, e.g., Christopher L. Weber & Christopher Clavin, Life Cycle Carbon 
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ranches.127
Second, fracturing fluid can contain volatile organic com-
pounds (VOCs), such as benzene, which can be released into the 
atmosphere when the fluid evaporates.
 Over time, we will have better information about the 
life-cycle emissions of shale and other sources of energy, so that 
more definitive judgments can be made and additional regula-
tory steps can be considered as needed. In any event, we do not 
offer a comprehensive analysis of this issue, since this Article 
focuses on water contamination.  
128 VOCs can increase 
the risk of cancer, as well as asthma, nausea, and other symp-
toms.129 As a result, some states monitor VOC emissions near 
drilling sites (e.g., Texas),130 while others require energy com-
panies to use “vapor recovery systems” or holding tanks to min-
imize VOC emissions (e.g., Colorado).131
 
Footprint of Shale Gas: Review of Evidence and Implications, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 5688, 5693 (2012) (“Our review of several studies published since 
Howarth’s initial shale gas carbon footprint study shows that although the 
carbon footprint of shale gas is highly uncertain, it is also difficult to distin-
guish from conventional onshore gas production.”) (footnote omitted).  
 In addition, EPA’s new 
regulations are expected to reduce VOC emissions from the oil 
 127. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (cata-
loging various sources of methane emissions, including landfills, animal hus-
bandry, natural gas production, coal mining, and wastewater treatment). Ac-
cording to EPA, animal husbandry produced nearly as much methane 
emissions as natural gas systems in 2009. Id. (189 TgCO2 compared to 221 
TgCO2).  
 128. Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations From a Public Health 
Perspective, 17 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: INT’L J. 1039, 1040–42 
(2011).  
 129. Id. at 1045–46; see also The Potential Health Impacts of Hydraulic 
Fracking Wastewater and Drill Cuttings: Hearing before the N.Y. State 
Assemb. Standing Comms. on Envtl. Conservation & Health (May 26, 2011) 
(statement of Sandra Steingraber, Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Ithaca 
College), available at http://fingerlakescleanwaters.org/?page_id=94 (describ-
ing possible health effects from air polluted with benzene and other toxic 
chemicals).  
 130. See A Commitment to Air Quality in the Barnett Shale, TEX. COMM’N 
ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/publications/pd/020/10-04/a 
-commitment-to-air-quality-in-the-barnett-shale (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) 
(noting that “the ‘TCEQ has committed a tremendous amount of time and re-
sources to the issue of Barnett Shale air quality, and we will continue to do 
so,’” and that twenty-four hour air quality monitors have been operating for 
several months) (quoting Chairman Bryan Shaw).  
 131. Rule 805 Air Quality & Odor, COLORADO OIL & GAS CONSERVATION 
COMMISSION, http://cogcc.state.co.us/RR_Training/presentations/805_ 
AirQuality.pdf (slide presentation describing new Rule 805.b(2) requiring con-
trol devices in condensate tanks). 
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and gas industry by 25%.132 This would be useful, since EPA es-
timates that the oil and gas industry is the largest industrial 
source of VOC emissions.133 Still, other activities, such as car 
emissions and smoking, are equally significant.134 Indeed, after 
a high profile charge that elevated VOC levels near drilling 
sites causing health effects in Dish, Texas,135 studies by Texas 
authorities found that VOC levels in the air generally were not 
elevated.136
 
 132. Proposed Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil and Natural Gas 
Industry Fact Sheet, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/ 
20110728factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (“The proposal would cut 
smog-forming volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions by nearly one-fourth 
across the oil and gas industry, including a nearly 95 percent reduction in 
VOCs emitted from new and modified hydraulically fractured gas wells.”); see 
also New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), available at http://epa.gov/airquality/ 
oilandgas/pdfs/20120417finalrule.pdf (final rule requiring VOC containment 
vessels to reduce VOC emissions by 95%).  
 They also found that biological tests of Dish resi-
 133. Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards, Basic Information, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/basic.html (last visited Sept. 10, 
2013). The precise contribution of the oil and gas industry is contested.  
 134. See, e.g., BARBARA ZIELINSKA ET AL., DESERT RES. INST., MONITORING 
OF EMISSIONS FROM BARNETT SHALE NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 
FOR POPULATION EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT (2010), available at https://sph.uth 
.edu/mleland/attachments/Barnett%20Shale%20Study%20Final%20Report.pdf 
(study of VOC emissions in Texas finding that “the dominant source category 
was motor vehicle emissions to which 46 ± 14% was attributed,” while 
“[c]ombined natural gas and condensate tank emissions were estimated to con-
tribute about the same amount; 43 ± 5%,” and “[s]mall gasoline engines (e.g. 
lawnmowers) accounted for about 17 ± 7% of the total”). 
 135. Wolf Eagle Environmental did a study showing elevated benzene lev-
els in Dish, Texas, near Fort Worth, and the Earthworks Accountability pro-
ject conducted a survey of health effects. See WOLF EAGLE ENVTL., TOWN OF 
DISH TEXAS AMBIENT AIR MONITORING ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT (2009), 
available at http://townofdish.com/objects/DISH_-_final_report_revised.pdf 
(“Laboratory results confirmed the presence of multiple Recognized and Sus-
pected Human Carcinogens . . . .”); WILMA SUBRA, EARTHWORKS OIL AND GAS 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT RESULTS OF HEALTH SURVEY OF CURRENT AND 
FORMER DISH/CLARK, TEXAS RESIDENTS (2009), available at http://www 
.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/DishTXHealthSurvey_FINAL_hi.pdf 
(noting that 19% of survey participants described themselves as either sick, or 
“both healthy and sick,” and that “61% of the health impacts reported by par-
ticipants are known health effects of chemicals detected in the air”).  
 136. See Press Release, R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Chairman Carrillo Issues 
Statement on Barnett Shale Emissions Issues (Jan. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/pressreleases/2010/011310.php (statement by the 
Chair of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality reporting results of 
air quality study that found “no cause for concern”). According to John Sadlier, 
Deputy Director of the Office of Compliance and Enforcement, “the majority of 
the testing during that trip found no detection of volatile organic compounds 
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dents revealed elevated VOC’s only among smokers.137
Third, fracturing involves drilling deep under the earth, 
where there are so-called “naturally occurring radioactive ma-
terials” or “NORMs,” and the drilling process can bring these to 
the surface.
 Hopeful-
ly, further research will provide greater certainty on these is-
sues.  
138 There is a debate about whether this material 
poses health risks to drillingworkers and others.139 In any 
event, the same issue can arise with conventional drilling,140 
and states and the federal government have various regula-
tions in place addressing this risk.141
Finally, drilling equipment and trucks produce emis-
sions.
 
142 Conventional wells pose the same issue, as do factories 
and shopping malls. Substituting equipment and trucks pow-
ered by natural gas instead of diesel will help mitigate this 
problem, and low natural gas prices offer an added incentive to 
do so.143
 
at all . . . .” Id. 
  
 137. Press Release, Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., Tests Indicate Expo-
sures in Dish Similar to U.S. Population (May 12, 2010), available at http:// 
www.dshs.state.tx.us/news/releases/20100512.shtm (“Biological test results 
from a Texas Department of State Health Services investigation in Dish, Tex-
as, indicate that residents’ exposure to certain contaminants was not greater 
than that of the general U.S. population . . . . The only residents who had 
higher levels of benzene in their blood were smokers. Because cigarette smoke 
contains benzene, finding it in smokers’ blood is not unusual.”). 
 138. Craig Slatin & Charles Levenstein, An Energy Policy that Provides 
Clean and Green Policy, 23 NEW SOLUTIONS 1, 16 (2013). 
 139. For example, a study by Radioactive Waste Management Associates 
concluded that there were risks to workers and possibly also to farmers. 
MARVIN RESNIKOFF ET AL., RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, 
RADIOACTIVITY IN MARCELLUS SHALE (2010), available at http://energy.wilkes 
.edu/PDFFiles/Library/Marcellus%20Shale%20Radioactivity%20Report%205 
-18-2010.pdf. In response, another study questioned their assumptions and 
concluded that the risks are minimal. See Lynn Kerr McKay et al., Science 
and the Reasonable Development of Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Resources in 
Pennsylvania and New York, 32 ENERGY L.J. 125, 129–30 (2011) (arguing that 
radioactivity risk is minimal). 
 140. For example, EPA’s discussion of the issue on the webpage indicates 
that one potential source of exposure is from wells drilled before the 1970s 
when the regulations went into effect. This obviously was long before fractur-
ing in shale beds began. Radioactive Wastes from Oil and Gas Drilling, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/radtown/drilling-waste.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2012).  
 141. Id. (“Most states and federal land management agencies currently 
have regulations which control the handling and disposal of radionuclides 
which may be present in production sites.”). 
 142. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15. 
 143. Id. at 24. 
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C. CONGESTION AND PRESSURE ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
Environmental pressure of a different kind arises from the 
influx of workers when oil or natural gas is discovered in a 
shale bed. A population surge can put pressure on the local 
housing stock, schools, and other services. Drilling can be 
noisy.144 There is more traffic and, thus, additional wear and 
tear on roads.145 Pipelines may be needed to bring in fracturing 
fluid or to transport oil and gas.146 All this activity can disrupt 
local habitats.147
These challenges often arise with new economic activity 
that brings jobs and purchasing power to rural areas, including 
new conventional gas wells, coal mines, factories, and shopping 
malls. In managing these costs, municipalities already have a 
host of policy instruments, from land use regulation, to condi-
tioning drilling permits, to taxes and fines.
  
148 For example, mu-
nicipalities can require energy company trucks to follow desig-
nated routes or firms to post a bond and pay for the creation or 
maintenance of roads.149 Or, as Pennsylvania has done, the 
state can impose “impact fees” on energy companies, a portion 
of which are dedicated to repairing local roads and bridges.150
 
 144. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOM-
MITTEE SECOND 90-DAY REPORT 8 (2011), available at http://www.shalegas 
.energy.gov/resources/111811_final_report.pdf [hereinafter SECOND 2011 DOE 
REPORT] (noting potential impact on traffic, noise, land use, wildlife, and habi-
tats). 
 
 145. NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, POTENTIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE NATURAL GAS RESOURCES IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 8 (Dec. 
2008), available at http://www.eesi.psu.edu/seminars-conferences/earthtalks 
-spring2009-marcellus-supplements/NatParkService-GRD-M-Shale_12-11 
-2008_view.pdf (a single well can require between 320 and 1365 truckloads of 
equipment). 
 146. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 4. 
 147. SECOND 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 144, at 8.  
 148. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that energy compa-
nies must obtain a permit before drilling a well). 
 149. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT 
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, 
GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 7-143 (2011), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (“Municipalities may re-
quire trucks transporting hazardous materials to travel on designated routes, 
in accordance with a road use agreement . . . .”); Ryan Delaney, Fracking Will 
Bring Heavy Truck Traffic, But Towns Are Ready, INNOVATION TRAIL (Sept. 4, 
2012, 3:40 PM), http://innovationtrail.org/post/fracking-will-bring-heavy-truck 
-traffic-towns-are-ready (explaining Steuben County requires energy compa-
nies to post a $250,000 bond or to pay to upgrade the road and post a $15,000 
bond).  
 150. See 58 P.A. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2012). 
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It is worth emphasizing, moreover, that drilling in shale 
has an important advantage over conventional drilling in this 
regard. When horizontal drilling is used, fewer drill pads are 
needed on the surface, since a single pad can be used for multi-
ple wells.151 There is also more flexibility about where the drill 
pad is located. If a deposit is found near a school, for instance, 
the well does not have to be right next to the school, as with 
conventional drilling; instead, it can be some distance away, us-
ing horizontal drilling below the surface to access the deposit.152
D. WATER USAGE 
 
Fracturing also requires a significant amount of water. A 
single well uses 2 to 4 million gallons.153 EPA estimates that 
fracturing will consume as much water as 5 million people if 
35,000 wells are fractured each year.154
Whether this demand is easy or hard to satisfy depends on 
the local water supply where the wells are drilled. For instance, 
according to a recent study of water resources, “the area overly-
ing the Marcellus Shale [in Pennsylvania and New York] has 
abundant precipitation, making water readily available.”
  
155 
More generally, “[w]hile water availability varies across the 
country,” a 2011 Department of Energy Report observes, “in 
most regions water used in hydraulic fracturing represents a 
small fraction of total water consumption.”156 In all states 
where shale gas drilling takes place, it uses less than 1% of the 
state’s water (e.g., less than .1% in Pennsylvania).157
 
 151. See FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 
 Even so, 
10, at 26 (noting that multi-
well drill pads minimize traffic). 
 152. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 145, at 4 (“While the horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing practices expected to be used in developing the Mar-
cellus Shale may have negative environmental effects on the surrounding ar-
ea, when compared to development of conventional oil and gas resources this 
development method could result in fewer impacts than conventional vertical 
wells due to greater flexibility in well location.”).  
 153. EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 80. 
 154. EPA, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRAC-
TURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 22 (2011), available at http://water 
.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hf_study_ 
plan_110211_final_508.pdf [hereinafter EPA 2011 PLAN].  
 155. J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., WATER RESOURCES AND USE FOR HYDRAU-
LIC FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION 2, available at http://www 
.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/ENVreports/FE0000797_ 
WaterResourceIssues.pdf. 
 156. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.  
 157. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 43–44. 
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water supplies are constrained in Colorado, as well as in some 
counties in Texas where fracturing takes place.158
In using water, shale gas drilling is no different from many 
other economic activities. In Texas, for example, 56% of the 
state’s annual water consumption is for irrigation, 26% is for 
municipal use, and less than 1% is for shale gas.
  
159 Likewise, 
livestock uses significantly more water in all states where shale 
gas drilling takes place.160 Shale gas also uses less water per 
unit of energy than many forms of energy, and is comparable to 
coal.161
Of course, it is more economical to use water that is ex-
tremely close to drilling sites, and in some locations water is 
scarce in the immediate vicinity.
   
162 Localities already have sys-
tems in place to allocate water rights and regulate water us-
age.163 Some require permitting or water usage plans.164
 
 158. MONIKA FREYMAN & RYAN SALMON, CERES, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
& WATER STRESS: GROWING COMPETITIVE PRESSURES FOR WATER 3 (2013), 
available at https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/hydraulic-fracturing 
-water-stress-growing-competitive-pressures-for-water (analyzing stresses 
that fracturing imposes on water supply). 
 The 
 159. Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas 
Production in Texas, U.S., 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3580, 3584 (2012).  
 160. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 44. In the Barnett Shale in Texas, 
for example, .4% of local water is used for shale gas drilling, compared with 
2.3% for livestock. Id. 
 161. Id. (noting that shale gas’s water needs are “low compared to many 
other energy sources” and comparing shale gas, which uses 1 gallon of water 
per Million British thermal units (MMBtu) of energy, with ethanol, which uses 
several thousand gallons of water per MMBtu); Nicot & Scanlon, supra note 
159, at 3585 (“Texas shale gas has a cumulative water use efficiency of 8.3–
10.4 L per gigajoule (L/GJ) . . . . [D]ata collected in this study (including 
8.3−16.6 L/GJ for coal and 6.1 L/GJ for uranium) show that net water use for 
shale gas is within the same general range as that for other energy sources.”). 
Shale gas uses water at the beginning of production, while coal uses it 
throughout the mining process. Nicot & Scanlon, supra note 159, at 3585. 
 162. See ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 155, at 2 (“[G]round and surface water 
sources most proximal to the well sites are most desirable.”). See also Nicot & 
Scanlon, supra note 159, at 3583 tbl. 2, for a county-by-county analysis in Tex-
as. 
 163. Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 101, 147–48 (2013). 
 164. See ARTHUR, URETSKY & WILSON, supra note 155, at 2 (“[A] primary 
issue for water withdrawal will be the regulations governing permitting pro-
cedures . . . from the water bodies nearest the wells. In New York, Pennsylva-
nia and West Virginia, withdrawal permitting is regulated by a matrix of state 
and interstate regulatory agencies, whose regulations reflect the needs of indi-
vidual states or watersheds.”).  
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bottom line is that, if energy companies cannot buy water local-
ly, they have to pipe or truck it in.  
Fortunately, the issue has become less important since en-
ergy companies began reusing (or “recycling”) fracturing fluid; 
in some areas, they reuse 80% of it.165 Not only does recycling 
reduce the amount of water needed for fracturing, but it also 
diminishes the volume of fracturing waste, easing the challenge 
of disposing of it.166
E. INDUCED TREMORS AND EARTHQUAKES 
 
Finally, there have been reports that fracturing can cause 
tremors and minor earthquakes. There is one confirmed case of 
seismic activity induced by fracturing in Blackpool, England, 
and another possible case in Oklahoma.167 In each instance, the 
seismic disturbance was small and caused no surface dam-
age.168 A thorough study of the issue by the National Research 
Council concludes that seismic events from fracturing will be 
“small and rare,” most likely “due to the short duration of injec-
tion of fluids and the limited fluid volumes used in a small spa-
tial area.”169
There is greater potential for earthquakes from disposal of 
spent fracturing fluid in injection wells. Seismic activity related 
to disposal of fracturing waste in injection wells has led to regu-
latory responses in Ohio and Arkansas.
  
170
 
 165. Jeff Bell, Fracking Injection Wells Booming but Need May Lessen with 
Time, BUSINESS FIRST (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/ 
print-edition/2012/11/23/fracking-injection-wells-booming-but.html?page=all 
(stating 80% of fracturing fluid in Pennsylvania is recycled). 
 But the risk here is 
 166. EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 104. 
 167. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT’L ACADS., INDUCED SEISMICITY 
POTENTIAL IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 156 (2012); Katie M. Keranen et al., 
Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between 
Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 GEOLOGY 
699, 702 (2013) (concluding that an Oklahoma earthquake was caused by 
wastewater injection well); see also John Tagliabue, Parts of Low Country Are 
Now Quake Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/03/27/world/europe/more-earthquakes-in-loppersum-the-netherlands 
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (describing minor earthquakes in the Nether-
lands that may be related to natural gas drilling, although the drilling is in 
porous rock and does not involve fracturing). 
 168. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 167, at 3.  
 169. Id. at 8, 93.  
 170. Ohio has amended its injection well regulations to require investiga-
tion of geological fault lines and monitoring for seismic activity. OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE 1501:9-3-06(C)(2)–(3) (2012). Arkansas has proposed a moratorium on 
injection wells in an area where seismic activity was detected. Request for an 
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no different from disposal of waste water from conventional oil 
and gas production or waste from other industrial operations.171 
Indeed, the greatest risk of seismic disturbance is likely to 
come from carbon sequestration proposals for conventional coal 
burning power plants.172
To sum up, then, fracturing poses a number of potentially 
significant risks that are not unique to fracturing, including the 
competitive threat to renewable energy, air pollution, pressure 
on local infrastructure, pressure on local water supplies, and 
induced earthquakes. We assume these problems can be ad-
dressed by adapting or expanding existing regulatory systems. 
All carbon fuels pose a competitive challenge to renewables. All 
states have departments of transportation regulating the use of 
local roads by trucks. EPA has regulatory authority over air 
pollution risks, and all states have systems for dealing with 
competing claims to groundwater. Earthquake risks, primarily 
from disposal of spent fluid in injection wells, appear to be 
small and are similar to the risks associated with other deep 
injection projects.
  
173
IV.  NOVEL RISKS OF WATER CONTAMINATION   
 
Unlike the risks discussed in Part III, the risk of contami-
nating groundwater is, in important ways, unique to fracturing. 
It is not surprising that this issue has attracted a great deal of 
attention from the media and environmental organizations, 
since groundwater obviously is an essential resource, every bit 
as important as energy.  
This Part describes four different ways that fracturing and 
horizontal drilling in shale might contaminate groundwater: 
first, during or after the fracturing itself, fracturing fluid might 
migrate from the shale seam into water wells and aquifers; se-
cond, natural gas released or disturbed by fracturing might 
seep into water wells and aquifers; third, vibrations from drill-
ing or fracturing might disturb contaminants lying at the bot-
 
Order Imposing an Immediate Cessation of All Disposal Well Operations and 
Establishment of a Moratorium Area for Any Class II or Class II Commercial 
Disposal Wells in a Certain Area, Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (pro-
posed July 8, 2011). 
 171. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 167 at 13. 
 172. Id. at 8–9, 89. 
 173. Although developing a regulatory regime for seismic risks is beyond 
the scope of this Article, the regulatory strategy proposed here, backstopping 
best practices rules with liability, could be applied to seismic risks if they 
prove sufficiently serious to warrant this effort. 
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tom of a water well, mixing them into the well water; fourth, 
used fracturing fluid, or waste products generated by the pro-
duction of oil and gas, might be disposed of in ways that pollute 
water wells and aquifers. Unlike the risks described in Part III, 
at least some of these risks are unlikely to arise in conventional 
gas drilling or, for that matter, in other industrial and commer-
cial activities. An important challenge for policymakers is that 
the magnitude of these fracturing-specific risks is uncertain. 
Although experience so far suggests that the risks are limited, 
the practice is sufficiently new that definitive conclusions are 
hard to draw.  
In addition, in part because these risks are novel, there is 
something of a regulatory vacuum for dealing with them. Im-
portant provisions of federal law exempt fracturing.174 Oil and 
gas production are regulated primarily at the state and local 
level.175
A. FIRST RISK: FRACTURING FLUID 
 States have begun focusing on water contamination is-
sues, but these efforts are currently in progress. 
Fracturing fluid is 99.5% water and sand, but the other 
.5% currently includes toxic chemicals.176
 Technological advances may reduce the use of toxic chemi-
cals in shale oil and gas drilling. Leaks and spills are less wor-
risome if new fracturing technologies are developed that do not 
include toxic chemicals. Halliburton has tested a fracturing flu-
id that uses enzymes and acids from food, and a senior Halli-
burton executive attracted media attention by drinking it (in 
diluted form).
 Obviously, we do not 
want toxic chemicals to seep into water wells and underground 
aquifers.  
177 A number of companies are also working on 
developing “eco-friendly” fracturing fluid.178
 
 174. Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 
 Others are explor-
12, at 134–35 (discussing frac-
turing’s exemption from the Safe Water Drinking Act). 
 175. Id. at 43.  
 176. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 52. Although different companies use 
different formulas, fracturing fluid could include benzene, ethylbenzene, tolu-
ene, boric acid, monoethanolamine, xylene, diesel-range organics, methanol, 
formaldehyde, hydrochloric acid, ammonium bisulfite, 2-butoxyethanol, and 5-
chloro-2-methyl-4-isothiazotin-3-one. Bateman, supra note 21.  
 177. Steve Hargreaves, Clean Fracking: Moving to Replace Chemicals, 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 16, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/16/news/economy/ 
clean_fracking/index.htm.  
 178. Joe Carroll, Chesapeake Testing ‘Green’ Fracking Fluids in Shale 
Wells, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012 3:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-10-02/chesapeake-testing-green-fracking-fluids-in-u-s-shale-wells 
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ing ways to fracture shale without using any water, substitut-
ing liquid propane, carbon dioxide, or some other gas.179 Hope-
fully these efforts will be successful. This would alleviate most 
of the risks associated with transporting water to and from the 
drilling site. Of course, these techniques may present other 
risks, and it may still be necessary to inject the production zone 
with toxic biocides to keep bacteria from degrading the oil and 
gas.180
Therefore, although these advances should prove helpful, 
they probably will not represent a complete solution, at least in 
the near term. How likely is it, then, that toxic chemicals used 
in shale oil and gas drilling will migrate into drinking water? 
In theory, this could happen in five different ways. We describe 
each of these five fracking-fluid risks in turn.  
  
1. First Fracturing Fluid Risk: Migration Through Subsurface 
Cracks 
The goal of fracturing is to produce cracks in underground 
shale formations, so gas and oil will come out. One concern is 
that fracturing fluid might migrate through these cracks into 
water wells and aquifers. This is “[o]ne of the commonly per-
ceived risks from hydraulic fracturing,” a 2011 Department of 
Energy study observed.181
Fortunately, though, geological considerations suggest that 
this risk is remote. Fracturing in shale beds typically takes 
place at 5,000 to 10,000 feet, which is one to two miles below 
the surface, while the water table is typically only 500 to 1,000 
feet down.
 
182
 
.html; Press Release, Business Wire, New EPA-Aproved Fracking Fluid 100% 
Green (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20120110005568/en/EPA-Aproved-Fracking-Fluid-100-Green; Press Release, 
Family Joule Holdings, Eco-Friendly Fracking Fluid Set for Debut (Dec. 6, 
2011), available at http://www.prlog.org/11743014-eco-friendly-fracking-fluid 
-set-for-debut.html (announcing release of nontoxic fracking fluid made from 
waste tallow from beef processing by Family Joule Holdings, Inc.). 
 In between are multiple layers of rock and clay, 
some of which are highly impermeable. Toxic chemicals would 
have to migrate upward—against the massive weight of rock 
 179. Kevin Bullis, Skipping the Water in Fracking, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 
22, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/512656/skipping-the-water 
-in-fracking; Kate Galbraith, Waterless Fracking Makes Headway in Texas, 
Slowly, NPR (March 27, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/03/27/ 
waterless-fracking-makes-headway-in-texas-slowly/.  
 180. EPA 2011 PLAN, supra note 154, at 29.  
 181. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19. 
 182. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 40 tbl. 2.4.  
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and soil pressing down on the layer of shale being fractured—a 
mile or more to contaminate groundwater.183 It is extremely un-
likely that cracks produced on a horizontal plane this far below 
the surface would produce permeable fissures extending up-
ward thousands of feet, and a study analyzing thousands of 
fractures in Texas and Pennsylvania shows they have not done 
so.184
Accordingly, a 2011 DOE study “shares the prevailing view 
that the risk of fracturing fluid leakage into drinking water 
sources through fractures made in deep shale reservoirs is re-
mote” and observes that “there are few, if any, documented ex-
amples of such migration.”
  
185 A 2011 MIT study co-authored by 
Ernest Moniz, who became the Secretary of Energy two years 
later, offers a similar assessment.186 Given EPA’s estimate that 
35,000 U.S. gas wells were fractured in 2006 alone187
 
 183. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, AQUIFERS (2013), available at http://ga 
.water.usgs.gov/edu/pdf/earthgwaquifers.pdf (“On the average . . . the porosity 
and permeability of rocks decreases as their depth below land surface increas-
es; the pores and cracks in rocks at great depths are closed or greatly reduced 
in size because of the weight of overlying rocks.”).  
—and the 
fact that two million fracturing treatments have been pumped 
 184. Fisher, supra note 13 (concluding from fractures mapped in the Bar-
nett Shale in Texas and the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania, gathered from 
over 15,000 fracturing operations, that the data “show the huge distances sep-
arating the fracs from the nearest aquifers at their closest points of approach, 
conclusively demonstrating that hydraulic fractures are not growing into 
groundwater supplies, and therefore, cannot contaminate them”); see also Ko-
nigsberg, supra note 15, at 52 (risk of underground contamination “as close to 
scientifically impossible as anything can be said to be” (quoting Lynn Helms, 
chief mineral-resources regulator in North Dakota)). 
 185. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 19. 
 186. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 7 (“Shale development requires 
large-scale fracturing of the shale formation to induce economic production 
rates. There has been concern that these fractures can also penetrate shallow 
freshwater zones and contaminate them with fracturing fluid, but there is no 
evidence that this is occurring.”); id. at 40 (“In the studies surveyed, no inci-
dents are reported which conclusively demonstrate contamination of shallow 
water zones with fracture fluids.”); id. app. 2E at 2 (“It is noteworthy that no 
incidents of direct invasion of shallow water zones by fracture fluids during 
the fracturing process have been recorded.”). A variation of this concern is that 
there may be cracks or other pathways—not created by fracturing but occur-
ring naturally—that connect shallow aquifers with shale formations that are 
much deeper underground. A 2012 study theorizes that naturally occurring 
brine from the shale can migrate through these pathways up to aquifers. Na-
thaniel R. Warner et al., Geochemical Evidence for Possible Natural Migration 
of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 11961, 11965 (2012), available at http://www.biology.duke 
.edu/jackson/pnas2012.pdf. 
 187. EPA 2011 PLAN, supra note 154, at 22. 
  
184 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:145 
 
in the past sixty years188
2. Second Fracturing Fluid Risk: Surface Spills  
—the paucity of confirmed incidents of 
water contamination from the underground migration of frac-
turing fluid provides powerful evidence that the risk is small. 
Even so, the risk is clearly disturbing to many people, and war-
rants further study and monitoring as the use of fracturing 
spreads further. 
There are other pathways in which fracturing fluid could 
enter water supplies, each of which presents a more realistic 
risk.189 Fracturing chemicals might be accidentally spilled on 
the surface—before or after the drilling process—and might 
then seep down into the water table.190 Trucks carrying toxic 
chemicals, for instance, can be involved in traffic accidents. 
“There are some legitimate risks to simply getting frack chemi-
cals to the well,” North Dakota’s chief minerals resources regu-
lator said. “You’ve got thirty gallons of biohazard at a well site 
that can be very dangerous in its concentrated form.”191 Some 
spills have been reported in the media192 although, as EPA has 
observed, “the frequency and typical causes of these spills re-
main unclear.”193
 
 188. Fisher, supra note 
 In posing a risk of surface spills, fracturing 
resembles other industrial and commercial activities that 
transport and store toxic chemicals; the chemicals used in frac-
turing are commonly used in other products, including swim-
ming pool cleaner (HCl), cosmetics, toothpaste and sauces (guar 
gum), detergents and hair cosmetics (ammonium persulfate, 
potassium, sodium perosydisulfate), glass cleaner and antiper-
spirant (isopropanol), and low sodium table salt (potassium 
13 at 1.  
 189. See generally Wiseman, supra note 163 (concluding, based on survey 
of reports of violations of state standards, that the most pressing risks arise 
not from injection of fracturing fluid underground but from other stages in the 
well development process and the higher rate of well drilling spurred by frac-
turing).  
 190. Surface spills can also pose risks to soil and vegetation. In one exper-
iment, researchers released approximately 300,000 gallons of fracturing fluid 
in a West Virginia forest. The spill damaged ground vegetation, caused leaves 
to drop prematurely, and increased the mortality rate of trees. Mary Beth Ad-
ams, Land Application of Hydrofracturing Fluids Damages a Deciduous Forest 
Stand in West Virginia, 40 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 1340, 1341 (2011). 
 191. Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 52 (quoting Lynn Helms). 
 192. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Frack Fluid Spill in Dimock Contami-
nates Stream, Killing Fish, PRO PUBLICA (Sept. 21, 2009, 4:09 PM), http://www 
.propublica.org/article/frack-fluid-spill-in-dimock-contaminates-stream-killing 
-fish-921.  
 193. EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 31–32.  
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chloride).194 A range of regulations already govern the risks of 
such spills, requiring spill prevention plans and rules govern-
ing the storage of chemicals.195
3. Third Fracturing Fluid Risk: Flow-Back and Produced 
Water 
 Of course, by increasing the to-
tal volume of toxic chemicals that are transported, fracturing 
makes this risk more significant. The bottom line, then, is that 
fracturing fluid needs to be transported and stored carefully.  
When shale cracks, the gas that is released pushes some 
fluid back up to the surface. Some of this is used fracturing flu-
id, which is called “flow-back.”196 In addition, water that had ac-
cumulated naturally in the shale formation, called “produced 
water,” is also pushed up.197 Although it does not contain toxic 
fracturing chemicals, produced water has natural contami-
nants, including salt, other organic compounds, silt, clay, oil, 
grease, and naturally occurring radioactive material.198
4. Fourth Fracturing Fluid Risk: Cracked Well Casings 
 Energy 
companies have to catch this fluid when it comes up, so it does 
not seep down into the water table. 
There is a risk that the well itself might crack at or above 
the water table, allowing fluid to leak into nearby wells or aqui-
fers.199
 
 194. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 
 If there is a crack in the well casing (the layers of steel 
and concrete encasing the well), then what is inside the well-
bore—whether it is fracturing fluid, gas, or oil—could leak out. 
As a result, it is essential for the concrete in the well casing to 
set properly, and for the casing to be thick and deep enough to 
prevent leaks near the water table. The need for effective well 
4, at 42; see also EPA 2012 PROGRESS 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30 (“[S]ome of the chemicals commonly used in hy-
draulic fracturing fluid are ubiquitous . . . .”). 
 195. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 9 (describing current law governing sur-
face activities). 
 196. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21. 
 197. Id. 
 198. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MA-
TERIALS (NORM) IN PRODUCED WATER AND OIL-FIELD EQUIPMENT—AN ISSUE 
FOR THE ENERGY INDUSTRY (1999), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs 
-0142-99/fs-0142-99.pdf (finding that produced water can bring to the surface 
radium that comes from the shale deep underground). 
 199. See FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19. 
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casings is familiar to state oil and gas regulators, since it is es-
sential in conventional drilling as well.200
5. Fifth Fracturing Fluid Risk: Blowouts 
 
There can be a blowout—an uncontrolled release of gas or 
fluid inside the well, in effect, a “gusher”—either at the surface 
or inside the well. This can happen when energy companies en-
counter an unexpected level of pressure (e.g., a pocket of gas). 
For example, three blowouts at Pennsylvania gas wells—two 
operated by Chesapeake Energy and one by EOG Resources 
Inc.—led to surface spills and attracted national media atten-
tion.201
 
 200. Id. at 20 (“[A] well with poorly cemented casing could potentially leak, 
regardless of whether the well has been hydraulically fractured.”); Benincasa, 
supra note 
 Blowouts are a familiar risk to be managed in conven-
11, at 9 (“It should first be noted that the states have always had 
well design, construction, and cementing standards to protect USDW [under-
ground sources of drinking water] that are encountered during drilling opera-
tions. The states also have existing casing requirements to ensure that fluids 
injected into the well and removed from the well are isolated from USDW.”); 
see also, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1, RULES 308(a), 317(g)–(h) (2013) 
(Colorado requires casing to fifty feet and set “in a manner sufficient to protect 
all fresh water and to ensure against blowouts or uncontrolled flows,” mini-
mum psi, and copies of “all logs run”); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-21, 31 
(2013) (North Dakota requires casing “at sufficient depths to adequately pro-
tect and isolate all formations containing water, oil, or gas or any combination 
of these,” new or pressure tested pipe, and bond logs); N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, MITIGATION MEASURES CH. 7 § 7.1.4.2–3, REVISED DRAFT 
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2011) (N.Y. 
requires casing to seventy-five feet or into bedrock, whichever is deeper, new 
or pressure tested pipe, and bond logs); 25 PA. CODE § 78.83–85 (2013) (Penn-
sylvania requires casing to fifty feet or into consolidated rock, whichever is 
deeper, with internal pressure rating “that is at least 20% greater than the 
anticipated maximum pressure,” cement that meets minimum specified 
standards, and cement bond logs).  
 201. See Susan Phillips, Bradford County Blow-out Costs Chesapeake More 
Than $250k, NPR STATE IMPACT (Feb. 9, 2012, 5:43PM), http://stateimpact 
.npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/02/09/bradford-county-blow-out-costs-chesapeake 
-more-than-200000/; Mike Soraghan, PA Well Blowout Tests Natural Gas In-
dustry on Voluntary Fracking Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/04/04greenwire-pa-well-blowout-tests 
-natural-gas-industry-on-36297.html; Mark Long & Jason Womack, Blowout 
Occurs at Pennsylvania Gas Well, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, http://online.wsj 
.com/article/SB10001424052748704764404575286910201269800.html; Lisa J. 
Molofsky et al., Evaluation of Methane Sources in Groundwater in Northeast-
ern Pennsylvania, 51 GROUNDWATER 333, 333 (May–June 2013) (“[O]ur as-
sessment of isotopic and molecular analyses of hydrocarbon gases in Dimock 
Township suggests that gases present in local water wells are most consistent 
with Middle and Upper Devonian gases sampled in the annular spaces of local 
gas wells, as opposed to Marcellus Production gas.”).  
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tional drilling; they usually can be prevented with thick and 
deep casing, as well as with so-called blowout preventers.202
6. Studies on the Magnitude of These Fracking-Fluid Risks 
  
The magnitude of all these risks is uncertain and highly 
contested. A number of recent lawsuits have alleged water con-
tamination from fracturing.203 For example, residents in 
Dimock Township, Pennsylvania claimed their water turned 
brown because of fracturing. However, EPA later surveyed 
their groundwater and concluded that it was safe, and a subse-
quent academic study concluded that the methane in Dimock 
water was naturally occurring “with no necessary contribution 
from deeper Marcellus shale gas.”204 The Dimock lawsuit, which 
was covered prominently in Vanity Fair and other media out-
lets,205 settled (with confidential terms) in August 2012.206 A 
range of other allegations has been publicized widely,207 includ-
ing claims about potential effects of fracturing on livestock and 
the food supply.208
 
 202. Some states offer detailed and specific requirements governing blow-
out prevention, while others have more general requirements. See, e.g., ARK. 
OIL & GAS COMMISSION GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, R. B–16 (2013) 
(establishing a general requirement to take “[a]ll proper and necessary pre-
cautions . . . for keeping the well under control . . . including but not limited to 
the use of blow-out preventers”); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1014 (2013) (detailing 
blowout prevention regulations). 
 Parties in fracturing-related litigation have 
 203. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 
508 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Tucker v. S.W. Energy Co., 1:11-CV-44-DPM, 2012 WL 
528253, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012). 
 204. Molofsky et al., supra note 201, at 345.  
 205. See Bateman, supra note 21; see also Michael Rubinkam, Dimock, PA 
Water Tests Conducted by EPA Amid Fracking Concerns, HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 25, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/dimock 
-pa-water_n_1702992.html. 
 206. Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Drilling Town Agrees to Settlement in 
Fracking Federal Lawsuit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 15, 2012), http:// 
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wries/2012/0815/Pa.-drilling-town 
-agrees-to-settle-in-fracking-federal-lawsuit.html. 
 207. McKay et al., supra note 139, at 126 (“Media reports of landowner 
complaints alleging problems with drinking water wells due to nearby Marcel-
lus Shale operations abound.”). 
 208. Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on 
Human and Animal Health, 22 NEW SOLUTIONS 51, 55–59 (2012) (identifying 
illnesses in animals based on anonymous interviews with landowners near 
drilling sites and their veterinarians); Elizabeth Royte, Fracking our Food 
Supply, THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/ 
171504/fracking-our-food-supply#.html (describing concerns that fracking may 
cause human health effects through the food supply).  
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testified before Congress.209 Popular and documentary films 
have highlighted environmental concerns about fracturing,210 
and celebrities have taken an interest in the issue.211 Overall, 
media coverage has been quite negative.212 There is also evi-
dence that concerns about groundwater contamination from 
fracturing have affected residential real estate prices.213
 
 209. Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 
  
12, at 138; see also RUTH 
WOOD ET AL., THE TYNDALL CENTRE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, SHALE GAS: A 
PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PACTS 5 (2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/55017665/The-Tyndall 
-Report-on-Fracking (“There is considerable anecdotal evidence from the US 
that contamination of both ground and surface water has occurred in a range 
of cases.”); Robert W. Howarth, Statement for the EPA Hydraulic Fracturing 
Public Informational Meeting (Sep. 15, 2010), available at http://cce 
.cornell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/PDFs/ 
Howarth%20statement%20to%20EPA%—20%2015%20Sept%20%202010.pdf 
(“Shale gas development clearly has the potential to contaminate surficial 
groundwater with methane, as shown by the large number of incidences of ex-
plosions and contaminated wells in Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and Ohio in re-
cent years.”). 
 210. See A.O. Scott, Deep Down, He Wants to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 
2012, at C1 (reviewing Promised Land with Matt Damon and describing its 
“polemical intentions”); see also GAS LAND (Josh Fox, 2010) (documentary film 
critical of fracturing). 
 211. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert, Matt Damon Fracking Film Lights Up Petro-
leum Lobby, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2012, at B1; Alex Katz, Yoko Ono’s Anti-
Fracturing Coalition Includes Lady Gaga and . . . Paul McCartney?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/08/29/yoko-onos-anti-fracturing_n_1841291.html.  
 212. According to one study, out of 444 newspaper articles discussing frac-
turing, 288 (65%) were negative, 103 (23%) were neutral, and only 53 (12%) 
were positive. CHARLES G. GROAT & THOMAS W. GRIMSHAW, THE UNIV. OF 
TEX. AT AUSTIN ENERGY INSTITUTE, FACT-BASED REGULATION FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 13–14 (2012), available at 
http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ei_shale_gas_ 
regulation120215.pdf. TV coverage was even more negative. Of 224 TV seg-
ments, 152 (68%) were negative, 55 (25%) were neutral, and 17 (8%) were pos-
itive. Finally, of 311 online stories, 197 (63%) were negative, 92 (30%) were 
neutral, and 22 (7%) were positive. Id. This study was part of a broader report 
authored by the University of Texas Energy Institute, which was withdrawn 
based on a finding that the report’s principal investigator had a conflict of in-
terest that he had not disclosed in the report. Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Mark 
Drajem, Texas Energy Institute Head Quits Amid Fracking Study Conflicts, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 3:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-12-06/texas-energy-institute-head-quits-amid-fracking-study-conflicts 
.html.  
 213. See Muehlenbachs et al., supra note 4, at 29 (finding that among 
Washington, PA houses near drilling sites, those that depend on groundwater 
sell at a discount compared to comparable houses that use water piped in from 
municipal sources). 
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Yet according to a number of studies, after thousands of 
wells have been fractured in shale beds, there are no docu-
mented cases in which fracturing fluid has migrated into aqui-
fers during the fracturing process.214 Surface spills are more of 
an issue, as is methane contamination, which is discussed be-
low.215 A 1998 study by an association of state regulators known 
as the Groundwater Protection Council—which focused on frac-
turing in coal beds, since fracturing in shale was not yet wide-
spread—found only one complaint of groundwater contamina-
tion and concluded that it was unsubstantiated.216
EPA did a study in 2004—again, of coal beds instead of 
shale—surveying 200 peer review studies, and interviewing fif-
ty state and local employees as well as approximately forty 
people who complained of water contamination.
  
217 It found “no 
confirmed cases [of groundwater well contamination] that are 
linked to fracturing fluid injection into CBM [coal bed methane] 
wells or subsequent underground movement of fracturing flu-
ids.”218 Further, although thousands of CBM wells are fractured 
annually, EPA did not find confirmed evidence that drinking 
water wells have been contaminated “by hydraulic fracturing 
fluid injection into CBM wells.”219
 
 214. See, e.g., EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 
  
4, at 127–37; EPA 
2011 PLAN, supra note 154, at 37–40; Konigsberg, supra note 15, at 46–47; 
Wiseman, supra note 163, at 123. 
 215. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 216. GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, SURVEY RESULTS ON INVENTO-
RY AND EXTENT OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN COALBED METHANE WELLS IN 
THE PRODUCING STATES 9 (1998). 
 217. McKay et al., supra note 139, at 135. 
 218. EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINK-
ING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, 
NATIONAL STUDY FINAL REPORT 2 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattachuic-final-factsheet.pdf. 
 219. OFFICE OF GROUNDWATER & DRINKING WATER, EPA, EVALUATION OF 
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS: NATIONAL STUDY FINAL RE-
PORT ES-13 (2004). EPA went onto say that “[b]ased on the information col-
lected and reviewed, EPA has determined that the injection of hydraulic frac-
turing fluids into CBM [coalbed methane wells] poses little or no threat to 
ESDWs [underground sources of drinking water]. Continued investigation is 
not warranted at this time.” Id. at ES-16. This study has been criticized on the 
grounds that an analysis of coalbeds may not apply to shale. Leonard S. Ru-
bin, Note, Frack to the Future: Considering a Strict Liability Standard for Hy-
draulic Fracturing Activities, 3 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 117, 120 (2012). But 
see Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 12, at 140–41 (noting that coal is 
probably riskier than shale, which is farther underground). An EPA employee 
also charged that the study “appear[ed] to have a conflict-of-interest” because 
the panel included three industry experts and two former employees of oil 
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In addition, a 2009 survey of state regulators did not iden-
tify any verified case of water contamination from fracturing.220 
Two years later, the Groundwater Protection Council commis-
sioned a study of fracturing in Texas and Ohio. According to the 
study, between 1993 and 2008, 16,000 shale gas wells were 
drilled in Texas, and after investigating 211 incidents of water 
contamination, the Texas Railroad Commission did not identify 
a single ground water contamination incident resulting from 
site preparation, drilling, well construction, completion, hy-
draulic fracturing stimulation, or protection operation.221 The 
study drew the same conclusion about the 185 incidents inves-
tigated in Ohio between 1983 and 2007.222
The 2011 MIT study co-authored by Ernest Moniz identi-
fied forty-three incidents related to gas-well drilling, based on 
its survey of the literature.
  
223 Fourteen were surface spills, 
while most of the others involved methane contamination.224 “It 
is noteworthy,” the MIT study says, “that no incidents of direct 
invasion of shallow water zones by fracture fluids during the 
fracturing process have been recorded.”225
Likewise, the Department of Energy injected fracturing 
fluid that contained tracer chemicals in a Pennsylvania drilling 
site that was 8000 feet below the surface. After years of moni-
toring, they reported in 2013 that no tracer chemicals had been 
detected in a monitoring zone above this drilling site (which 
was itself 3000 feet below the surface).
 
226
 
companies. Letter from Weston Wilson, EPA Employee, to Wayne Alard & Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell, then serving U.S. Senators, and Diana DeGette, U.S. 
House Rep. (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://www.latimes.com/media/acrobat/ 
2004-10/14647025.pdf; see also Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 
  
12, at 
173 (claiming that there was no evidence that the experts were in fact biased, 
as opposed to manifesting an appearance of bias). 
 220. McKay et al., supra note 139, at 135–36 & n.61 (discussing a 2009 
survey conducted by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission of state 
regulators). 
 221. SCOTT KELL, THE GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, STATE OIL 
AND GAS AGENCY GROUNDWATER INVESTIGATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN AD-
VANCING REGULATORY REFORMS: A TWO STAGE REVIEW: OHIO AND TEXAS 2 
(2011). 
 222. Id.  
 223. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 39. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at app. 2E at 2; id. at 39–40. 
 226. Kevin Begos, DOE Study: Fracking Chemicals Didn’t Taint Water, 
USA TODAY, July 19, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/ 
2013/07/19/doc-study-fracking-didn’t-taint/2567721/. 
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So far, only one government study has concluded that “the 
data indicates likely impact to groundwater that can be ex-
plained by hydraulic fracturing.”227 In December 2011, EPA re-
leased a draft study of water contamination in Pavillion, Wyo-
ming, finding methane, benzene, and other organic compounds. 
Yet, as the study pointed out, the gas wells in Pavillion are un-
usually shallow—at 1,000 to 1,500 feet, instead of 5000 to 
10,000 feet.228 As a result, the findings are not representative, 
as EPA itself emphasized: “[t]he draft findings announced to-
day are specific to Pavillion, where the fracturing is taking 
place in and below the drinking water aquifer and in close prox-
imity to drinking water wells—production conditions different 
from those in many other areas of the country.”229 In addition, 
EPA did not find contamination in drinking water wells—
which complied with safety standards.230 Rather, they found 
contamination in deeper monitoring wells that were dug specif-
ically for the study.231 Moreover, the owner of the natural gas 
wells in Pavillion responded that U.S. geological surveys from 
as early as the 1880s have documented the poor quality of 
groundwater in Pavillion.232 It may be, therefore, that contami-
nants found by EPA occur naturally in the water (e.g., because 
natural gas is so close to the surface)233 or derive from “legacy 
pits” (i.e., old wells that predate fracturing).234
 
 227. EPA, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., DRAFT: INVESTIGATION OF 
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING xiii (2011). 
 
 228. Id. at 33. 
 229. Press Release, EPA, EPA Releases Draft Findings of Pavillion, Wyo-
ming Ground Water Investigation for Public Comment and Independent Sci-
entific Review, (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/ 
admpress.nsf/D/EF35BD26A80D6CE3852579600065C94E. 
 230. Id. (“Detections in drinking water wells are generally below estab-
lished health and safety standards.”). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Press Release, Encana Corp.,Why Encana Refutes U.S. EPA Pavillion 
Groundwater Report, (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.encana.com/news-stories/ 
news-releases/details.html?release=632327. 
 233. See Mead Gruver, Encana Mounts Response to EPA Fracking Report, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK. (Dec. 21, 2011, 10:48AM), http://www.businessweek 
.com/op/financialnews/D9ROVVB00.htm. 
 234. See Jeffrey Folks, The EPA’s Unconscionable War on Fracking, 
AMERICAN THINKER (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/12/ 
the_epas_unconscionable_war_on_fracking.html; The EPA’s Fracking Scare, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2011, at A18. 
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EPA is currently conducting a more comprehensive study 
of the risks to groundwater. Hopefully this study will shed fur-
ther light on these issues.235
B. SECOND RISK: CONTAMINATION OF WATER WELLS WITH 
METHANE  
  
In addition to fracturing fluid and produced water, the 
natural gas itself—which is predominantly methane—can also 
contaminate groundwater. This is a more significant risk than 
the migration of fracturing fluid, and there have been reported 
incidents of methane contamination in fractured wells—and, 
for that matter, also in conventionally drilled gas wells.236 In-
deed, methane contamination is an old problem, which is not 
unique to fracturing. Since methane can leak out through 
cracks in vertical well pipes that pass through aquifers, the 
most effective response is for states to regulate the thickness 
and depth of well casings, something they already do.237 For ex-
ample, Texas enacted legislation updating its well casing regu-
lations in 2013.238
 
 235. See generally EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 
 In addition, old wells, which predate fractur-
ing and horizontal drilling, also can leak if not sealed properly. 
The novel risk presented by fracturing is the possibility that 
methane might migrate from the fractured shale seam through 
4. 
 236. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that although there is no 
evidence of the migration of fracking fluid, “[t]here is, however, evidence of 
natural gas migration into freshwater zones in some areas”); id. at app. 2E at 
2 (noting that approximately half of forty-three documented instances of water 
contamination from oil and gas drilling in their survey of literature are from 
methane contamination, mostly from cracks in well casing); FIRST 2011 DOE 
STUDY, supra note 10, at 20 (“Methane leakage from producing wells into sur-
rounding drinking water wells . . . is a greater source of concern [than the 
leakage of fracking fluid].”); see also GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, 
supra note 216, at 10 (finding no proven incidents of underground water pollu-
tion from methane). 
 237. See 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 41 (“The protection of ground-
water aquifers is one of the primary objectives of state regulatory programs, 
and it should be emphasized that good oil field practice, governed by existing 
regulations, should provide an adequate level of protection from [methane 
leaks].”); Benincasa, supra note 11, at 9 (“It should first be noted that the 
states have always had well design, construction, and cementing standards to 
protect USDW [underground sources of drinking water] that are encountered 
during drilling operations. The states also have existing casing requirements 
to ensure that fluids injected into the well and removed from the well are iso-
lated from USDW.”). 
 238. Railroad Commission Today Adopts Amendments to Oil & Gas Well 
Construction Rules, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (May 24, 2013), http://www.rrc.state 
.tx.us/pressreleases/2013/052413.php. 
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pre-existing fissures in the overlying rock—or fissures created 
or enlarged by fracturing—into aquifers above or near the 
seam.  
The mere presence of methane in water wells, though, does 
not establish that this methane contamination was caused by 
fracturing. Some methane contamination occurs naturally, 
since shallow methane deposits sometimes migrate up into the 
water table on their own.239 For example, a U.S. Geological sur-
vey in forty-seven counties in West Virginia, which was con-
ducted before shale gas drilling took place there (from 1997 
through 2005), found methane in 131 out of the 170 residential 
wells that they tested.240 Likewise, a 2011 study establishing 
baseline levels of contamination in Pennsylvania before shale 
gas drilling began found methane contamination in 40% of 
wells.241 The study then compared levels of contamination after 
the drilling, and found no statistically significant difference; 
likewise, a 2013 study found methane in 78% of water samples 
taken in Pennsylvania before drilling began, and noted histori-
cal evidence of “flammable effervescing springs and water wells 
dating back to the late 1700s.”242 Although a 2011 academic 
study claims to find a link between drilling and methane con-
tamination—by showing that there is more methane in Penn-
sylvania water wells that are within a kilometer of active drill-
ing than in those that are more than a kilometer away243
 
 239. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 
 —the 
study did not do baseline testing to establish that the wells had 
10, at 20 (“The presence of me-
thane in wells surrounding a shale gas production sight is not ipso facto evi-
dence of methane leakage from the fractured producing well since methane 
may be present in surrounding shallow methane deposits or the result of past 
conventional drilling activity.”).  
 240. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, METHANE IN WEST VIRGINIA GROUND WA-
TER 1 (2006), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3011/pdf/ 
Factsheet2006_3011.pdf.  
 241. ELIZABETH W. BOYER ET AL., THE CENTER FOR RURAL PENNSYLVANIA, 
THE IMPACT OF MARCELLUS GAS DRILLING ON RURAL DRINKING WATER SUP-
PLIES 12 (2011), available at http://www.rural.palegislature.us/documents/ 
reports/Marcellus_and_drinking_water_2011_rev.pdf. 
 242. Id. at 4 (“[S]tatistical analyses of post-drilling versus pre-drilling wa-
ter chemistry did not suggest major influences from gas well drilling or 
hydrofracturing (fracking) on nearby water wells, when considering changes in 
potential pollutants that are most prominent in drilling waste fluids” and “no 
statistically significant increases in methane levels [were found] after drill-
ing . . . .”); Molofsky et al., supra note 201, at 336, 345. 
 243. Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water 
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172 (2011) (claiming to “document systemic evidence for me-
thane contamination”). 
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less methane before the drilling. It is to be expected, after all, 
that companies would drill where there is more methane in the 
ground (and therefore, perhaps, in the water). The study also 
does not find any chemicals from fracturing fluid in the wells, 
which one might expect to be present if fracturing—as opposed 
to natural migration—is the source of this methane.244 In re-
sponse, therefore, a 2013 study concluded that the presence of 
methane in water correlates better with topography than with 
shale gas production—it is more common in valleys and low ar-
eas—so that “the use of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in 
northeastern Pennsylvania has not resulted in widespread gas 
migration into the shallow subsurface.”245
C. THIRD RISK: DISTURBANCE OF SLUDGE OR OTHER RESIDUES 
IN WELLS DUE TO FRACTURING  
 
A third source of water contamination comes from vibra-
tions and pressure pulses caused by fracturing. Like a spoon 
stirring a glass of milk with chocolate syrup in the bottom, frac-
turing can bring iron, manganese, and other contaminants up 
from the bottom of the well into the water.246 This theory may 
explain why some water wells near drilling sites appear dirty 
but do not include fracturing chemicals. It is also consistent 
with studies comparing water quality before and after fractur-
ing that find no change except for increases in manganese and 
iron.247
 
 244. In light of the methodological limitations in the Osborn 2011 study, 
Samuel Schon, a geologist at Brown, concludes that “[t]he data presented 
simply do not support the interpretation put forth that shale-gas development 
is leading to methane migration from the Marcellus into shallow groundwater. 
These data especially do not justify coauthors’ reports in the popular press 
about the process of hydraulic fracturing.” Samuel C. Schon, Hydraulic Frac-
turing Not Responsible for Methane Migration, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/08/25/1107960108 
.full.pdf (citing Rob Jackson & Avner Vengosh, Strong Evidence that Shale 
Drilling is Risky, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 10, 2011, http://articles.philly 
.com/2011-05-10/news/29528421_1_water-wells-safe-drinking-natural-gas). 
 A key aspect of this risk is that the contaminants are al-
ready in the well. Residential wells are often dirtier than their 
 245. Molofsky et al., supra note 201, at 345. 
 246. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF 
IAN DUNCAN 2, available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/RR_HF2012/Groundwater/ 
Presentations/DuncanTestimony.pdf (positing that “possible perturbation by 
pressure waves associated with drilling and completion activities that can lead 
to false positives”). 
 247. See BOYER ET AL., supra note 241, at 4 (comparing water wells before 
and after fracturing, and finding no change in methane, but finding increases 
in sediment and iron in water). 
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owners realize. For example, a recent Pennsylvania survey 
found that only 16% of rural wells have a sealed sanitary well 
cap, while more than half were near septic tanks that had not 
been pumped with sufficient regularity (if at all).248 While frac-
turing can stir up contaminants that are already in a water 
well, other activities can as well, such as running multiple fau-
cets at once.249
D. FOURTH RISK: FRACTURING WASTE AND PRODUCED WATER—
INJECTION WELLS AND SEWAGE FACILITIES 
 
Once fracturing fluid has been used, energy companies 
need to dispose of it. They also need to dispose of produced wa-
ter, which is a byproduct of all oil and gas production. It is ex-
tremely important to dispose of this waste properly.250 Some 
methods are risky, while others are safe. The worst method—
so-called land application, in which the fluid is simply poured 
onto the ground—creates a meaningful risk that the fluid will 
seep down into the water table; this practice should be (and 
generally is) prohibited.251
 
 248. BRYAN R. SWISTOCK ET AL., THE CTR. FOR RURAL PA., DRINKING WA-
TER QUALITY IN RURAL PENNSYLVANIA AND THE EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 9, 11 (2009), available at http://www.rural.palegislature.us/ 
drinking_water_quality.pdf (noting that although septic tank should be 
pumped every two to four years to avoid contamination of water wells, 28% of 
the 625 wells in the survey with on-lot septic systems were never pumped, 
while 33% were pumped less frequently than every four years). 
 The fluid may also be trucked to a 
waste treatment facility. If all the facility does is to dilute it 
and then release it into a body of water—as occurred in Penn-
sylvania before this practice was stopped—there is a risk of wa-
 249. Mark Eisner, Separating Fact from Fiction: Careful Hydrogeologic 
Evaluation May Protect Against Unfair and Baseless Domestic Supply Impact 
Allegations, Remarks at the AIPG Marcellus Shale: Energy Development and 
Enhancement by Hydraulic Fracturing Conference (May 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.aipg.org/Seminars/HFMS/Eisner,%20Mark.pdf (showing elevated 
turbidity correlated only with domestic use fluctuations). 
 250. See Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Asso-
ciated with Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALY-
SIS 1382, 1391 (2012) (using probability bounds analysis to conclude that “ep-
istemic uncertainty was largest for wastewater disposal,” as opposed to four 
other potential pathways of water contamination: transportation spills, well 
casing leaks, leaks through fractured rock, and drilling site surface discharge).  
 251. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that surface 
runoff is forbidden). In March 2011, a company in Pennsylvania was charged 
with illegally dumping fracturing wastewater on land from 2003 to 2009. 
Fracking and Water Pollution, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/ 
index.php/Fracking_ and_water_pollution (last visted Oct. 17, 2013). 
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ter contamination, since the fluid is unlikely to be diluted to the 
point where it is no longer toxic.252
More sophisticated treatment processes do not present this 
risk. It has become increasingly common for used fracturing 
fluid to be recycled, as noted above,
  
253 which is helpful in mini-
mizing the total volume created. Another practice is to store 
used fluid and produced water deep underground in so-called 
injection wells drilled for this purpose and regulated by EPA.254 
To ensure that injection wells do not pose a risk to the water 
table, their well casings need to be sufficiently thick and deep, 
and the well itself should be deep enough so the waste is far be-
low the water table. The issues here are similar to those pre-
sented by proposals to inject carbon dioxide from coal-burning 
power plants into deep geological fissures (so-called carbon se-
questration).255
 
 252. See Renee Schoof, As Shale Fracturing Booms, Environmental Protec-
tion Lags, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc 
.com/2011/12/21/133807/as-shale-fracking-booms-environmental.html# 
.Uh9qQxtOOsp; Sheila M. Olmstead et al., Shale Gas Development Impacts on 
Surface Water Quality in Pennsylvania, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4962, 4966 
(2013) (finding that drilling does not increase presence of chlorides in surface 
water, but that treatment and release of wastewater from waste treatment 
facilities does increase chloride levels). For instance, a study of water down-
stream from a Pennsylvania plant that used to treat fracturing wastewater 
found elevated levels of radioactivity, salts and metals. Nathaniel R. Warner 
et al., Impacts of Shale Gas Wastewater Disposal on Water Quality in Western 
Pennsylvania, ENV. SCIENCE & TECH. (2013) (“Overall we show that treatment 
in Josephine Brine Treatment Facility reduces the concentrations of some el-
ements before releasing them into the stream, but wastewater discharge nev-
ertheless reduces the quality of downstream surface water and sediments.”). 
Critics of this study note that the facility has not been used by members of the 
Marcellus Shale Coalition since May 2011, and that radium levels were below 
industrial discharge limits. Katie Brown, Five Facts About Duke’s Latest Anti-
Shale Study, Energy In Depth, ENERGY IN DEPTH (last visited Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/five-facts-about-dukes 
-latest-anti-shale-study/. 
  
 253. See Bell, supra note 165. 
 254. 2011 MIT STUDY, supra note 4, at 43 (“The optimum method for dis-
posal of oil field wastewater is injection into a deep saline aquifer through an 
EPA regulated Underground Injection Control (UIC) water disposal well.”). 
 255. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and 
Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 115–19 (2008). 
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E. THE EXISTING REGULATORY REGIME 
1. State and Local Law 
Since fracturing and horizontal drilling in shale beds are 
relatively new practices, it is not surprising that regulatory re-
gimes governing them are not fully developed. Since the goal of 
this Article is to propose a regulatory response to the risk of 
water contamination, we should first offer a brief overview of 
current law. 
Historically, states have been the principal regulators of oil 
and gas.256 As a result, the risk that fracturing could contami-
nate water is regulated primarily at the state level.257 Obvious-
ly, tort liability is potentially applicable, although few cases 
have been decided thus far, so it is unclear how key doctrines 
will evolve.258
In addition, every oil—and gas—producing state has an oil 
and gas commission.
 
259 These commissions require energy com-
panies to file an Application for Permission to Drill (APD) be-
fore sinking an oil or gas well. Through this APD authority, 
state agencies enforce pooling requirements, unitization re-
quirements, well spacing requirements, and so forth.260
States also enforce regulations targeting environmental 
harms, including, increasingly, regulations specific to fractur-
ing.
 
261
 
 256. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Econ-
omy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 477 (2012). 
 In some states, such as Pennsylvania and New York, 
 257. See id. 
 258. For a discussion, see infra Part VII.B. See also Thomas E. Kurth et al., 
American Law and Jurisprudence of Fracing—2012, 58 ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
MIN. L. FOUND. 1, 56–62, available at http://www.haynesboone.com/american 
-law-and-jurisprudence-on-fracing-2012/ (citing dozens of complaints, but no 
reported opinions on the merits); Rubin, supra note 219, at 123–25 (consider-
ing application of precedents on subsurface trespass, nuisance, negligence, and 
strict liability to fracturing). 
 259. A complete listing of state oil and gas commissions can be found on 
the website of the Texas Railroad Commission, which serves as the oil and gas 
commission for Texas. Oil and Gas Related Web Addresses, R.R. COMM’N OF 
TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/links/statewebadd.php (last visited Oct. 17, 
2013). 
 260. For a general discussion of state and local rules on permission to drill, 
see Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and 
Federal Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 
44 URB. LAW. 533, 542–56 (2012). 
 261. For a very useful summary of recent regulatory activity in eighteen 
states that have adopted statutes or regulations directed at fracturing, see 
Kurth et al., supra note 258, at 64–157.  
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these environmental harms are regulated by the state depart-
ment of environmental protection.262 Thus, state commissions 
regulate the strength and depth of well casings and require 
blowout preventers.263 They also require a minimum distance 
between well pads or particular drilling activities and bodies of 
water—and these distances vary by state264—while others apply 
these so-called “minimum setback” requirements also to 
schools, property lines, etc.265 Colorado has a tiered regulatory 
system: drilling that is closer to water and other sensitive areas 
is subject to more exacting restrictions.266 States also have rules 
seeking to prevent and contain surface spills (e.g. with walls 
and steel tanks),267 and requiring leaks to be reported.268 In ad-
dition, states regulate the disposal of fracturing waste in vari-
ous ways.269
 
 262. Id.  
 Many jurisdictions also require energy companies 
 263. For a discussion of different state approaches to these issues along 
with citations, see supra notes 200 and 202 and accompanying text.  
 264. For example, Texas generally does not have a setback requirement. 
See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37 (2012) (providing well spacing requirements 
but no setback requirements). New York’s proposed regulations specify mini-
mum distances from bodies of water, including 500 feet from private wells, 
2000 feet from public reservoirs, and 4000 feet from unfiltered watersheds. 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 750-3.3(a) (proposed Sep. 28, 2011) (ex-
pired on February 27, 2013). Setbacks in other states usually are smaller. See, 
e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(a) (2012) (Pennsylvania requires 200 feet); 
W.VA. CODE § 22-6-21 (2012) (West Virginia requires 200 feet); N.M. CODE R. 
§ 19.15.17.10(A)(3)(d) (2011) (repealed effective June 28, 2013) (New Mexico 
required 500 feet). 
 265. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603(a)(2), :603(a)(1) (2013) (Colorado re-
quires 150 feet or 1.5 times a derrick’s height from surface property lines, and 
1,000 feet setbacks in high occupancy areas from educational and other group 
facilities); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.09(G) (2013) (Maryland requires 1000 feet 
setback from schools or occupied dwellings).  
 266. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603, :604 (2013). 
 267. See, e.g., id. § 404-1:604(c)(2)(G) (Colorado requires that “secondary 
containment devices shall be constructed around crude oil, condensate, and 
produced water storage tanks”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 6, § 750-
3.7(k)(4), (7), (9), (l), (m), (n) (proposed Sept. 28, 2011) (expired Feb. 27, 2013) 
(as condition of receiving a permit, New York’s proposed regulations require 
an owner to have fluid disposal plan, spill prevention plan, containment sys-
tem; to use a closed loop tank system for certain drilling fluids and cuttings, 
and to maintain lined reserve pits in good condition). 
 268. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, 7.1.6, at 7-57 (N.Y. 2011) (New York requirement 
to report spill within two hours of discovery); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-30 
(2012) (North Dakota requirement to notify director within twenty-four 
hours). 
 269. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-19.2 (2013) (“All waste associat-
ed with exploration or production of oil and gas must be properly disposed of 
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to disclose the chemical composition of their fracturing fluid,270 
and some require energy companies to do baseline testing of 
water quality before they begin drilling;271 we favor both of the-
se information-forcing rules, and discuss them further below.272
While local governments do not generally have authority to 
regulate health and safety issues, they do have the power to 
regulate land use. A number of localities in various states have 
sought to prohibit fracturing,
 
273 and there has been litigation 
about whether state law preempts these local ordinances.274 
The issue has generally been framed in terms of whether the 
local ordinance is a form of “land use” regulation, or a regula-
tion of the operation of oil and gas wells.275 The former is un-
derstood to be a permissible local function; the latter is re-
served to the state.276
 
in an authorized facility . . . .”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.9(1) (2012) (Texas 
rule requiring underground injection control wells); DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSER-
VATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, 7.1.8, at 7–63 
(N.Y. 2011) (New York rule requiring approved wastewater treatment plant or 
recycling). 
 
 270. Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, and Wyoming all require disclosure. See SUSAN WILLIAMS, IRRC DIS-
COVERING SHALE GAS: AN INVESTOR GUIDE TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1, 23 
(2012), available at http://si2news.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/discovering-
shale-gas-an-investor-guide-to-hydraulic-fracturing.pdf. So do West Virginia, 
Maryland, and Ohio. See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-14 (2012); S.B. 165, 128th Gen. 
Assemb., 2009–2010 Sess. (Ohio 2010); MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, OIL/GAS 
WELL COMPLETION REPORT, Form No. MDE/LMA/PER.019, at 3 (2009). New 
York included a disclosure requirement in its proposed regulations, N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 6, § 750–3.7(k)(1), (3) (proposed Sep. 28, 2011) 
(expired Feb. 27, 2013), and North Dakota is considering such proposals as 
well, see N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1(1)(g) (2013).  
 271. See, e.g., 58 P.A. CONS. STAT. § 3218(c)(1)(i) (2012) (Pennsylvania’s 
provision authorizing testing and creating rebuttable presumption that a well 
operator caused contamination within 1000 feet of a well); COLO. CODE REGS. 
§ 404-1:317B(d)(4) (2013) (Colorado’s requirement of baseline surface water 
data); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 6, § 750-3.7(k)(5) (proposed Sep. 28, 
2011) (New York’s proposed, and since expired, requirement of pre-drilling 
testing). 
 272. See infra Part VI.A.1. 
 273. ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: 
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1, 27–29 (2013), available at http://www.slideshare 
.net/MarcellusDN/ r43152. 
 274. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2013); Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2012). 
 275. See, e.g., Norse Energy, 964 N.Y.S.2d. at 714.  
 276. A similar distinction is found in federal preemption law. See Pac. Gas 
& Elec. v. State Energy Res. Conservation Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983) 
(holding that the federal government has exclusive authority over the regula-
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2. Federal Law 
Given the traditional primacy of states in oil and gas regu-
lation, federal law has little to say about fracturing. Indeed, 
key environmental statutes exempt the practice.277 For exam-
ple, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was amended in 2005 
to exempt fracturing from regulations that govern injection 
wells (unless the fracturing fluid includes diesel).278 This means 
SDWA permitting requirements generally do not apply to frac-
turing, although they do govern the disposal of fracturing waste 
in injection wells.279
The Clean Water Act is generally concerned with pollution 
of surface water, not groundwater.
  
280 Even with respect to sur-
face water, the Act contains an exemption for storm water run-
off from oil and gas production facilities (which was expanded 
in 2005),281 although energy companies still usually need storm 
water permits if the runoff is contaminated with waste prod-
ucts or soil sediment.282
Oil and gas wastes from exploration and production activi-
ty are exempt from Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation 
  
 
tion of the safety of nuclear reactors; states are allowed to regulate questions 
of “need, reliability, [and] cost”). 
 277. For a survey of how federal environmental laws apply to fracturing, 
see generally VANN ET AL., supra note 273. 
 278. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding from the SDWA defini-
tion of underground injection “the underground injection of fluids or propping 
agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations 
related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities”); Energy Policy Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).  
 279. Benincasa, supra note 11 at 9. The exemption does not apply to frac-
turing fluid containing diesel. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1). 
 280. The Act generally disallows the discharge of any pollutant except in 
compliance with the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). Discharge of a pollu-
tant is defined primarily as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12). The “navigable waters” are defined in 
turn as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id. 
§ 1362(7). Although there has been much dispute about the meaning of “navi-
gable waters,” see, for example, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 
(2006) (concluding in a divided decision that hydrologically connected wet-
lands are covered); Solid Waste Agencies of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (concluding in a divided decision that 
an isolated gravel pit frequented by migratory birds is not covered), the term 
is generally assumed not to include groundwater.  
 281. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2). 
 282. Id. § 1342(l)(2); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2005 act amending defi-
nition of the term “oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or treat-
ment operations or transmission facilities”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 
526 F.3d 591, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking down an EPA effort to broaden 
permitting exemption for storm water discharge for the oil and gas industry). 
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and Recovery Act (RCRA), which regulates the disposal of haz-
ardous waste products.283 Natural gas and petroleum are also 
exempt from the definition of “hazardous waste” under 
CERCLA;284 presumably, therefore, contamination of ground-
water by methane is not subject to remedial action under this 
statute. Many of the chemicals in fracturing fluid are listed as 
hazardous wastes. A release of such chemicals in large enough 
volume might conceivably trigger an emergency response action 
under CERCLA, although small spills or contamination in 
highly diluted form most likely would not.285 The oil and gas in-
dustry is also exempt from reporting toxic releases under the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRTKA).286
In contrast, the Clean Air Act applies. As we have seen, 
EPA issued regulations in April, 2012 governing air emissions 
from fracturing sites.
  
287
V.  CHOOSING A REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR WATER 
CONTAMINATION   
  
How, then, should policymakers respond to the water con-
tamination risks of fracturing? The overarching goal, we be-
lieve, should be to support the shale revolution by steadily im-
proving our understanding of the water contamination risks 
and working to reduce those risks. This means the system of 
regulation must be dynamic. It cannot be designed simply to 
address known risks using present-day technology. It must be 
one that stimulates new extraction technologies and new risk 
control techniques. The best way to achieve this goal, as we will 
 
 283. See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2006) (creat-
ing presumption of no oil-related or gas-related waste under the RCRA); Han-
nah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 229, 244–45 (2010) (summarizing regulatory history relating to 
the determination of whether oil and gas is hazardous waste). 
 284. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(F) (2006).  
 285. See id. § 9601(14) (defining hazardous waste to include any waste reg-
ulated under the Solid Waste Disposal Act or listed as hazardous under the 
Clean Water Act and the Clean Act, among other statutes); id. § 9602 (estab-
lishing reportable quantities of hazardous wastes). Permanent removal actions 
under CERCLA require that the site be listed on the National Priorities List, 
which would be difficult to achieve for localized spills in relatively small quan-
tities. See id. § 9605(e).  
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 287. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.40–63.44 (2012); John M. Broder, U.S. Caps Emis-
sions in Drilling for Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/04/19/science/earth/epa-caps-emissions-at-gas-and-oil-wells.html?_r=0.  
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explain, is by adopting a blended regulatory scheme that com-
bines best practices regulation with liability for fracturing-
related harms. 
We start in Section A with observations about the dangers 
of regulatory overkill. The miscellaneous risks we have labeled 
“familiar,” canvassed in Part III, are unlikely to mobilize wide-
spread public opposition to fracturing. The danger of water con-
tamination is different, so it is all the more critical to calibrate 
regulatory responses correctly.  
Section B surveys five alternative regulatory strategies: (1) 
prohibitions; (2) command and control regulations; (3) infor-
mation disclosure; (4) liability rules; and (5) Coasean bar-
gains.288
Section C highlights four factors that should influence the 
choice of regulatory strategy by drawing on the literature on ex 
ante versus ex post regulation, and the tradeoff it highlights 
about the timing of when to determine optimal behavior: (1) 
whether a uniform solution is likely to be optimal; (2) the mag-
nitude of the expected harm; (3) the settlement costs of making 
case-by-case determinations ex-post; and (4) the novelty of the 
relevant technology. While the first two are familiar, the third 
and fourth have not featured as prominently in the literature.  
  
Section D applies these factors to fracturing, recommend-
ing a blended strategy of best practices regulations and liabil-
ity. For issues that are already well understood, we would rely 
on command and control regulations to enforce best practices. 
For issues that are unique to fracturing and are not yet well 
understood, we would rely on liability rules, motivating the in-
dustry to take precautions and develop risk-reducing innova-
tions. We also would ban fracturing in a limited number of sen-
sitive areas and would require certain types of disclosure.  
Finally, Section E sets forth in summary form our proposed 
regulatory strategy. 
A. THE DANGER OF REGULATORY OVERKILL  
1. Public Anxiety and Love Canal 
The prospect of groundwater contamination can elicit a re-
sponse known as “dread.”289
 
 288. Compare infra Part V.B. with the discussion of the “regulatory toolkit” 
in JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 44–51 (2d ed. 2007). 
 In part this is because water is a 
 289. See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987) (de-
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necessity of life. If land is deprived of a source of water, its val-
ue can be seriously impaired. If the contamination is not de-
tected, livestock and crops may be destroyed. Human consump-
tion may lead to illness. We are also uneasy because we know 
comparatively little about groundwater. Typically, we do not 
know where it comes from, where it goes, whether aquifers are 
interconnected, and how long it would take for contamination 
to work its way out of the system. Thus, the prospect of water 
contamination is uniquely disturbing because we do not fully 
understand how to prevent or cure it. 
 We know that the prospect of groundwater contamination 
can motivate the public to support draconian regulatory 
measures. In the late 1970s, extensive publicity about toxic 
chemicals leaking into basements in Love Canal (near Niagara 
Falls, New York) produced a groundswell of concern about haz-
ardous wastes contaminating ground water.290 Congress re-
sponded by enacting CERCLA, which generated massive fund-
ing for excavating and incinerating soil at hazardous waste 
disposal sites.291 Federal laws on disposal of hazardous wastes 
were also beefed up, and a de facto moratorium was imposed on 
new solid waste disposal sites near urban areas.292 There is no 
question that regulation of toxic waste had previously been too 
lax. Yet with the benefit of hindsight, many commentators be-
lieve the cost of the response was disproportionate to the bene-
fit.293
 
fining “dread risk” as one characterized by a perceived lack of control, cata-
strophic potential, and an inequitable distribution of risks and benefits). 
 The pressure driving this reaction was public apprehen-
 290. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (1999). 
 291. Id. at 691–98; see also supra notes 280–88 and accompanying text 
(discussing oil and natural gas exception to CERCLA).  
 292. See, e.g., Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
 293. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and 
Policy Implications of Health Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZ-
ING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW, 55, 78–81 (Richard L. Revesz 
& Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995); Katherine D. Walker et al., Confronting Su-
perfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment and Management, in ANALYZ-
ING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW, at 25, 47–50; NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, VOL. 1: PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 256–57 (1991). Although debate persists about the 
social benefits of remediating waste sites, many commentators agree that the 
transaction costs generated by the draconian liability scheme were dispropor-
tionate to any benefits obtained. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and 
Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy 
Reconcilable?, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 706, 717 (1998).  
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sion about groundwater,294 stoked by the media and advocacy 
organizations.295
2. Precautionary Principle  
 It would be unfortunate if a similar dynamic 
were to stifle the shale revolution. The solution, we believe, is 
to adopt a sensible regulatory regime that reassures the public, 
motivates industry to take appropriate precautions, and pro-
vides incentives to develop risk-reducing innovations over time. 
A related point concerns the relevance of the “precaution-
ary principle.” Translated roughly as “better safe than sorry,”296 
this principle is often invoked to restrict the use of new tech-
nology until potential risks are better understood.297 The pre-
cautionary principle is widely invoked in Europe and has 
gained a foothold in the United States, although it has also 
generated significant pushback among regulatory theorists 
here.298
First, the precautionary principle is most commonly in-
voked for potentially catastrophic risks,
 For several reasons, we think it is unhelpful in analyz-
ing water contamination risks of fracturing. 
299 such as nuclear pow-
er, genetically modified organisms, human cloning, and climate 
change. In each case, the harm is potentially irreversible and 
could affect large numbers of people. In contrast, fracturing 
poses risks primarily to individual aquifers.300
 
 294. See GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 638–39 (1995). 
 It is true, of 
course, that fracturing could destroy an aquifer’s usefulness for 
human consumption or agriculture, and that as fracturing be-
 295. Id. at 606–07, 638–39 (1995); Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. 
Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story 
of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2193–2200 (2009). For a 
case study highlighting the role of anxiety about water contamination in gen-
erating opposition to landfills, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of SWANCC: 
Federalism and the Politics of Locally Unwanted Land Uses, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW STORIES 283, 290–91 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 
2005). 
 296. Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 851 (1996). 
 297. See generally EUROPEAN RISK FORUM, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCI-
PLE: APPLICATION AND WAY FORWARD 18–20 (2011) (defining and discussing 
the precautionary principle’s origins). 
 298. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAU-
TIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) (discussing various mechanisms that enable a fear-
ful public to invoke the precautionary principle, which yields unjustified intru-
sions upon civil liberties). 
 299. See Frederick Schauer, Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech 
and the Precautionary Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 304–06 (2009). 
 300. Spence, supra note 256, at 492–93. 
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comes more widespread, more aquifers are put at risk. But sub-
stitute sources of water would remain available at a cost. In the 
extreme case, contaminated water could be pumped out and de-
contaminated.301
Second, critics of the precautionary principle urge us to 
consider the risks not only of adopting a new technology but al-
so of not adopting it.
 So the potential harm, although not trivial, is 
localized and reversible.  
302
Third, invocation of the precautionary principle ignores the 
decades of experience we already have with fracturing. Alt-
hough fracturing in shale is only about a decade old, fracturing 
itself has been used in oil and gas production in the United 
States since the 1940s.
 Although fracturing poses environmen-
tal risks, a general ban on the practice would also entail enor-
mous costs, including higher energy prices, reduced economic 
activity and employment, deteriorating balance of payments, 
not to mention the risks associated with continued dependence 
on foreign sources of energy, greater emissions of greenhouse 
gases and, of course, reliance on other risky sources of energy 
(e.g. coal, nuclear power, offshore drilling). Indeed, a ban on 
fracturing would arguably exacerbate global warming, a risk 
that itself is often cited as subject to the precautionary princi-
ple. All of which supports the conclusion that the proper regu-
latory response to fracturing is to weigh all expected risks and 
benefits, not merely a select list of environmental risks. 
303 Since then, the industry has executed 
over two million “frack jobs” in the U.S. It is also widely used 
around the world. This experience should inform preliminary 
judgments about the risks of fracturing in shale. The evidence 
suggests that the risk of widespread or systemic devastation to 
water supplies is remote,304 and the prospect of local contami-
nation is manageable as long as fracturing is done properly.305
In an effort to develop a more rigorous foundation for what 
an optimal regulatory regime might look like, we turn to a con-
sideration of different regulatory strategies, and how to choose 
  
 
 301. See Ground Water Cleanup at Superfund Sites, EPA (Dec. 1996), 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/conmedia/gwdocs/brochure.htm (explain-
ing that ground water can be treated by pumping it to the surface, decontami-
nating it, and then discharging it back into the ground or into a stream or riv-
er). 
 302. E.g., Cross, supra note 296, at 860.  
 303. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8. 
 304. Spence, supra note 256, at 492–93. 
 305. See Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move in, Safety 
Goes Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013, at A10. 
  
206 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:145 
 
among them.  
B. FIVE POSSIBLE REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
1. Prohibitions 
One strategy for dealing with an environmental risk is 
simply to ban it. This strategy has a long lineage, from local or-
dinances banning gunpowder in central cities (because of the 
danger of fire)306 to European laws banning genetically modified 
foodstuffs.307
Activities should be banned when the risks of allowing 
them outweigh the benefits. A ban is more likely if good substi-
tutes are available; for instance, gunpowder can be stored out-
side central cities. Prohibition is obviously the most protective 
regulatory strategy. If an activity is prohibited, the associated 
risk is zero. A downside of prohibition, of course, is that it de-
prives society of the social benefits of the activity. When the 
benefits are substantial and the risks are manageable, prohibi-
tion represents regulatory overkill. Prohibition also impedes 
innovation by limiting possibilities for experimentation in de-
veloping new ways to reduce the risk. 
 Likewise, local zoning codes keep certain activi-
ties, such as industrial plants, out of sensitive areas like resi-
dential neighborhoods. Prohibitions can be temporary (morato-
ria) or permanent, and they can be jurisdiction-wide or local. 
2. Command and Control Regulation 
An alternative to banning an activity is regulating it. The 
oldest and most common form of command and control regula-
tion mandates “best practices” to minimize external harms, 
such as rules requiring ships to carry lifeboats, cars to have 
seat belts, and the like. This type of regulation typically re-
quires all firms to adopt practices that reflect the “state of the 
art,” meaning something more stringent than common practice 
that is still technologically and economically feasible.308
 
 306. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULA-
TION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 60–71 (1996) (discussing the rela-
tionship between restricting gunpowder storage and regulation). 
 The 
implicit judgment is that if some firms can operate profitably 
while providing certain harm-preventing measures, all firms 
 307. EUROPEAN RISK FORUM, supra note 297, at 23–24. 
 308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. d. 
See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that it was neg-
ligent for coastal tug to operate without a radio receiver given that some tug 
boat operators in the industry provided radio receivers for their vessels). 
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should be required to do so.309
Although command and control regulation is less protec-
tive than prohibition, it can still offer significant reassurance to 
the public. It is probably more reassuring than pollution taxes 
or the prospect of ex post litigation to recover damages for 
harms, since the latter have uncertain effects and are more dif-
ficult to perceive as providing an assurance of “safety.”
 
310
The familiar downside of command and control regulation 
is that it can yield inefficient regulations, since they are usually 
defined by the state of existing technology instead of a rigorous 
assessment of costs and benefits. Thus, command and control 
regulation can result in over-regulation of activity, which yields 
a deadweight loss, or in under-regulation, which yields exces-
sive risk.
  
311
Notwithstanding these defects, regulated industry often 
prefers command and control regulation over other forms of 
regulation because it generates relatively predictable regulato-
ry costs. Especially in making significant long term invest-
ments, firms may prefer certain—even if potentially exces-
sive—costs to highly uncertain costs.
 As with prohibitions, such regulations can also dis-
courage innovation by freezing best practices at a moment in 
time. 
312
 
 309. More sophisticated command and control regulations are expressed as 
abstract standards, such as the maximum allowable release of harmful sub-
stances. For water pollution, these are called “effluent standards.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(b) (2006). They usually use verbal formulas such as “best available,” 
“best achievable,” or “best practicable,” and are set by determining how much 
various technologies can reduce effluents. Id.; see also Notice of Final 2010 Ef-
fluent Guidelines Program Plan, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,286 (Oct. 26, 2011). Effluent 
standards, like best practices regulations, are generally set using existing 
technology as the relevant benchmark. Once the relevant range of standards is 
identified based on existing technology, however, it is possible to use cost-
benefit analysis in selecting among appropriate technological benchmarks. 
See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (uphold-
ing the use of cost-benefit analysis in setting effluent limits for thermal pollu-
tion from power plants). 
   
 310. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Im-
plementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1985).  
 311. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–37 (1985). 
 312. Cf. Khalid A. Rahim, Why Pollution Standards Are Preferred by In-
dustries: Pragmatism and Rent-Seeking Behavior, 16 ENVIRONMENTALIST 49, 
52–53 (1996) (noting that industry would also have more certainty of political 
influence, indirectly providing more predictable costs). 
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3. Disclosure 
A third strategy requires the party primarily responsible 
for the external risk to disclose information about it. This is a 
prominent strategy in environmental law,313
Information disclosure has regulative effects. When forced 
to disclose risks, firms often make changes to eliminate or re-
duce them, if only to avoid adverse publicity or having consum-
ers vote with their feet.
 and is also one of 
the duties imposed by tort law, such as informed consent in 
medical malpractice and the duty to warn in products liability 
law.  
314 Yet information disclosure is a more 
tentative regulatory response than prohibition or command and 
control. It assumes that different persons respond to risks dif-
ferently, that we should rely in part on potential victims to 
avoid risks, and that disclosure can stimulate innovation.315 
The most general assumption is that more and better infor-
mation about risks is a good thing, which is hard to dispute. 
One must remember, however, that gathering and disseminat-
ing information can be costly, and that information overload 
can be counterproductive.316
 
 313. It is reflected in environmental impact statements required by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)–(d) (2006), and 
its state analogues, the Toxic Release Inventory required by the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (2006), 
OSHA’s Hazard Communications Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2012), 
and California’s Proposition 65, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 
(2013).  
 
 314. See Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of 
Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 165 (1998) (“[Information disclo-
sure] relies heavily on markets and public opinion . . . enforcement of stand-
ards is expected to occur through the combined pressure of economic markets 
and public opinion.”); see also Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information 
as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emis-
sions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 118 (1997) (describing the effects of 
Toxic Release Inventory disclosure requirements on firm performance, finding 
that those firms with lower TRI emissions outperformed those classified as 
heavy polluters, and that TRI disclosure generally had negative impacts on a 
firm’s share price).  
 315. See generally WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL 
APPROACHES TO REGULATION (1992) (examining how people respond to dis-
closed safety risks); W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE (1983) (examining the 
manner in which government regulation intersects with market forces and in-
dividual choice in regard to risks). 
 316. See generally, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information 
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 
417 (2003). 
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4. Liability Rules 
A fourth regulatory strategy operates retrospectively ra-
ther than prospectively, levying monetary sanctions on firms 
that have imposed external harms on others. Common law tort 
liability is the most familiar example. Whether the harm is a 
collision, a spill, or the invasion of property by harmful sub-
stances, injured persons can sue and recover damages if the 
perpetrator has breached the relevant duty of care. Other types 
of liability rules include pollution taxes, deposit and refund 
schemes, and cap and trade regulations.317 Similarly, CERCLA, 
the federal “Superfund” statute, uses liability to allocate the 
cost of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.318
Liability rules have two significant advantages. The first is 
deterrence. To avoid liability, actors have an incentive to re-
duce (or “internalize”) harms they are likely to cause, especially 
if liability is imposed on the party with the best information 
and expertise to minimize risks efficiently. Second, liability 
provides compensation to those who suffer injury. The common 
law of torts and the Oil Pollution Act,
 In each case, liabil-
ity rules operate after the fact to levy a financial charge on ex-
ternality-generating activity. 
319
In practice, liability rules may not fully deliver on these 
advantages. They often are accompanied by uncertainty be-
cause they operate after harm has occurred. In the common law 
of torts, for instance, we sometimes do not know until the jury 
returns whether particular actors will be liable. For this rea-
son, it can be difficult for firms to predict the costs of their ac-
tions, leading to over- or under-deterrence. For the same rea-
 among other statutes, 
have this compensatory feature, although other liability rules, 
such as pollution taxes, cap and trade schemes, and CERCLA, 
do not. 
 
 317. Whether pollution taxes and cap and trade schemes are properly re-
garded as liability rules is debatable. Other commentators have classified the-
se sorts of regulatory tools as a form of command and control regulation. See 
Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 
2325 (2010). Pollution taxes and cap and trade schemes are similar to liability 
rules in that they set a price on an externality which is imposed only after it is 
generated. It is also true, however, that greater ex ante regulatory effort goes 
into setting up a pollution tax or cap and trade scheme than is the case under 
other liability rules like the common law of tort. For present purposes, nothing 
turns on this taxonomic issue, since we do not consider pollution taxes or cap 
and trade to be feasible options for dealing with water pollution risks caused 
by fracturing.  
 318. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006). 
 319. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). 
  
210 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:145 
 
son, the compensatory feature of liability is also uncertain; it is 
not necessarily reassuring to know we can file a law suit if a 
new risk threatens us with injury.320
Notwithstanding these imperfections, the prospect of liabil-
ity clearly has a powerful effect on businesses. For instance, 
products liability law has transformed the way consumer prod-
ucts are designed, and CERCLA has had a similar effect on 
waste disposal.
  
321
5. Coasean Bargains  
 Liability, therefore, is especially effective in 
encouraging risk-reducing innovation. This is a powerful argu-
ment for liability rules, even with all their uncertainties and 
imperfections.  
A final strategy, associated with the work of Ronald Coase, 
is to regulate external harms by contract.322 Contractual solu-
tions are unrealistic when transaction costs are high, as with 
highway accidents and smog.323 Yet contractual solutions may 
sometimes prove feasible for water contamination from fractur-
ing. Before energy companies begin drilling, they enter into 
mineral leases with owners of the mineral rights, typically the 
surface owners of the land above the oil or gas deposit. This 
lease can address water contamination. For example, landown-
ers in Noble County, Ohio, recently negotiated lease provisions 
requiring the energy company to test water quality before and 
after drilling and barring the company from drawing water for 
fracturing from the leaseholders’ land.324
 
 320. See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL 
INJURY LAW 35–40 (1989) (discussing the deficiencies of tort as a compensa-
tion system). 
 One could imagine 
lease provisions that go even further, either making landown-
 321. There is disagreement about whether the social benefits associated 
with these forms of liability exceed the social costs. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1437 (2010) (examining products liability); sources cited supra note 284 
(CERCLA). But there is little doubt that the prospect of products liability and 
CERCLA liability have changed the behavior of business firms. See, e.g., Carol 
E. Dinkins, George O. Wilkinson, Margaret E. Peloso & Thomas S. Meriweth-
er, The Role of Public and Private Litigants in Promoting Environmental Cor-
porate Responsibility, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 130–32, 135 (2010); 
Mark Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 1 ENCYCLODEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS, SECOND EDITION, TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 287, 300–04 (Michael Faure 
ed., 2009). 
 322. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
 323. See id. at 16–19. 
 324. Keith Schneider, New Value for Land in Rural Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, June 
5, 2012, at A11.  
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ers whole for any water contamination or releasing energy 
companies from any water contamination claim. In either case, 
the price would be adjusted for the enhanced or diminished 
rights.325
Other Coasean solutions are also imaginable. For example, 
the driller could purchase both mineral rights and groundwater 
rights, and could agree to sell groundwater to the landowner at 
a specified price and quality. Or energy companies could pur-
chase the full column of rights (a fee simple), effectively uniting 
the mineral rights, groundwater rights, and surface rights un-
der single ownership, with the objective of maximizing the joint 
value of the rights considered separately.  
 Regulators could enhance the prospects for such solu-
tions by prescribing model contracts, which would serve as de-
faults the parties would be free to modify. 
Coasean bargains nevertheless have significant limitations 
in this context. If fracturing threatens harm to parties not par-
ticipating in a lease (like neighboring landowners), contractual 
solutions become more difficult, if only because of the large 
number of potentially affected persons. Another problem more 
specific to the oil and gas industry is the prevalence of split es-
tates, in which the surface owner transfers subsurface mineral 
rights to a third party at t1, and the owner of the mineral estate 
later enters into a lease with an energy company allowing frac-
turing at t2.
326
C. FOUR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHOICE OF REGULATORY 
STRATEGY 
 In these circumstances, the surface owner may 
have bargained away all rights to receive royalties from oil and 
gas development at t1, and thus will view the costs of fracturing 
at t2 in purely negative terms. Indeed, the surface owner may 
resent the mineral rights owner’s good fortune in benefitting 
from the unanticipated emergence of fracturing, and may seek 
to obstruct fracturing as a way to force a renegotiation of the 
decision to split the estate. This sort of “holdup” is not an aus-
picious setting for Coasean bargaining.  
This brief survey suggests that regulatory strategies pre-
sent a series of tradeoffs, for instance, in protecting against 
 
 325. Groundwater contamination may, in some cases, trigger general liabil-
ity policies of a polluter. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 
So. 2d 167, 190 (La. Ct. App. 2003).  
 326. See generally Timothy Fitzgerald, Evaluating Split Estates in Oil and 
Gas Leasing, 86 LAND ECON. 294 (2010) (providing background information on 
split estates and discussing their decreased value to oil and gas developers). 
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risk, foreclosing benefits from risky activities, reassuring the 
public, operating efficiently, and encouraging innovation. These 
tradeoffs should inform our choices about regulatory strategies 
for water contamination from fracturing. It is worth asking, 
however, whether there is any more systematic basis for choos-
ing among regulatory strategies. If our goals are to encourage 
socially valuable behavior while also assuring an optimal level 
of safety at a minimal level of administrative cost, which of 
these five strategies—or what combination of them—should we 
choose? How do we strike the balance?  
While there is surprisingly little general theory on this 
question,327 a useful starting point is the literature on ex ante 
versus ex post regulation. While ex ante regulation seeks to re-
duce harmful externalities before they occur, ex post regulation 
puts a price or sanction on harmful events after they occur, 
thereby creating an incentive to reduce their incidence.328 The 
focus of this literature is whether it is cheaper to determine op-
timal behavior before or after some discrete accident or other 
external harm has taken place.329
 
 327. See generally REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
ECONOMICS AND LAW (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011) (essays by Richard Posner, 
Fred Schauer, and Richard Zeckhauser); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm 
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). 
 Of course, with any system of 
regulation, there will be at least some regulatory activity both 
before and after the decision about optimal behavior is made. 
Under a system that determines optimal behavior ex ante, re-
sources must be devoted to enforcing the designated rules of 
conduct. Likewise, even under a system that determines opti-
mal behavior ex post, resources must be devoted to establishing 
such a system and articulating general guidelines before par-
 328. See Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the 
Choice Between Ex-Post Liability and Ex-Ante Regulation, 24 INT. REV L. & 
ECON. 29, 35–38 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating after the Fact, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379–80 (2007); Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus 
Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 193, 199–200 (1977). Louis Kaplow, in an important article, assimilates 
the distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation to the distinction be-
tween rules and standards. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–62 (1992). Although we agree that 
there is a strong association between ex ante regulation and the use of rules, 
and that standards generally entail ex post regulation, we do not foreclose the 
possibility that ex post regulation can have significant rule-like elements. A 
pollution tax precisely calibrated to the tonnage of pollutants emitted would be 
an example. 
 329. Kaplow, supra note 328, at 572 (“The difference in promulgation costs 
favors standards, whereas that in enforcement costs favors rules.”). 
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ticular harms are investigated. The basic principle for choosing 
between ex ante and ex post regulation, then, is to pick the reg-
ulatory approach that minimizes the sum of external costs and 
regulatory costs. With ex ante regulation, the regulatory costs 
are front loaded; with ex post regulation, they are back loaded.  
Consider a choice between requiring manufacturers to in-
stall safety devices like airbags in cars, and examining particu-
lar vehicles after accidents to determine whether they were de-
signed safely. The first system (e.g., command and control 
regulation) will entail extensive investigations of airbags and a 
complicated process to shape the parameters of the regulation. 
Once the rule is promulgated, it must be enforced with occa-
sional spot checks, recall orders, and the like. Even so, more 
costs will be consumed in crafting the regulation than in enforc-
ing it.330
This framework only pushes us to the next question: what 
factors determine the relative effectiveness of ex ante or ex post 
regulation, and in particular, whether fewer social resources—
including accident costs, costs of preventing accidents, and ad-
ministrative costs—will be consumed by regulating in one mode 
or the other? The existing literature here is less helpful. Distil-
ling from a variety of commentary, we suggest four factors.  
 In contrast, under a system that examines cars after 
accidents (e.g., a liability rule), relatively little is needed to get 
the system up and running, and regulatory costs shift to the en-
forcement phase when accidents are investigated.  
1. Heterogeneity of Risk 
First, how much variation is there among the actions pro-
ducing the relevant harm?331
 
 330. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY 221–22, 228–29 (1990) (detailing the extensive costs and obstacles to 
implementing passive restraint rules for automobiles). 
 Injuries from secondary collisions, 
for instance, are likely to be similar even in different types of 
cars. This relative uniformity favors ex ante regulation (e.g. 
mandatory installation of passive restraints). Conversely, every 
accident in which human behavior plays a significant role is 
different, involving heterogeneous variables such as how the 
drivers were driving, whether they were impaired, the road and 
weather conditions, and so forth. Here it seems more appropri-
ate to apply a general standard of reasonable care and make 
judgments ex post, so we do not have to provide rules in ad-
 331. Kaplow, supra note 328, at 563–64. Kaplow briefly mentions this fac-
tor but offers little discussion of it. 
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vance for an almost infinite range of scenarios. 
2. Magnitude of Expected Harm 
A second factor in choosing between ex ante and ex post 
regulation is the expected frequency and severity of the harm. 
A large expected harm is more likely to justify the upfront ex-
penditure of resources needed for ex ante rules.332 Thus, if many 
people are killed and injured in car crashes each year, this jus-
tifies rules requiring seat belts.333 Even if the probability of 
harm is low, if the severity of the harm is great enough, the 
magnitude of expected harm may justify ex ante regulation, as 
in the case of meltdowns in nuclear plants. Conversely, if a 
harm is uncommon and not especially severe, it probably is 
more cost effective to rely a general standard of care applied af-
ter the fact. Consider the risk of being struck by a ball hit out of 
a sports stadium.334
3. “Settlement” Costs of Ex Post Judgments  
 These accidents are rare and, unless some-
one is struck in the head, injuries are not severe. Therefore, it 
is cheaper to wait for relatively rare accidents and then deter-
mine responsibility after the fact. 
A third factor influencing the choice of regulatory ap-
proach, which has received little attention in the literature, is 
the cost of making case-by-case judgments ex post. Borrowing 
from the takings literature, we call this variable the “settle-
ment costs” of engaging in ex post enforcement of a standard.335
 
 332. Kaplow argues that the frequency with which the two types of costs 
(promulgation costs and enforcement costs) will be incurred is the primary fac-
tor in choosing between rules and standards. Kaplow, supra note 
 
328, at 573; 
see also Noam Sher, New Differences Between Negligence and Strict Liability 
and Their Implications on Medical Malpractice, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
335, 344–45 (2007) (discussing relative advantages of liability regimes based 
on enforcement costs). 
 333. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has required by 
rule that all new vehicles have seat belts since 1968. The NHTSA adopted this 
rule in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208; the current form of this 
regulation is in 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2012). All states except New Hampshire 
now require by law that people wear seat belts while driving. 
 334. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) 852–54 (appeal taken from 
Eng.).  
 335. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1214 (1967). Michelman’s discussion is recast in terms of deterrence and com-
pensation in Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution 
in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. Rev. 997, 1004 (1999). See also ROBERT 
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 324 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing 
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Settlement costs can vary substantially in different contexts. If 
the sources of an external harm are diffuse, or victims are nu-
merous, the costs of case-by-case adjudication may be prohibi-
tive. Consider the case of urban smog. It would be impractical 
to impose liability on individual drivers, because there are so 
many sources of smog and everyone is harmed, at least to an 
extent. When settlement costs are high, ex ante rules (e.g., re-
quiring all cars to have catalytic converters) may be the only 
feasible regulation.336
4. Novelty of Risk 
 
A fourth factor, which is not extensively addressed in the 
literature, is the novelty of the risk. When technology is new, 
we can predict some harm that it could cause, but not all of 
them, and not always with confidence about their magnitude 
and severity. Also, it is especially difficult to devise solutions 
for these harms. Effective predictions and solutions—and, thus, 
effective ex ante regulation—require experience. Without expe-
rience, we generally will be better off with some form of ex post 
regulation. 
For example, when vehicles powered by internal combus-
tion engines were first invented, it may have been possible to 
predict that they would cause accidents and frighten horses. 
But it took time and ingenuity to develop solutions (e.g., better 
brakes and mufflers). Meanwhile, no one predicted that engines 
would cause urban smog. It took experience to design (and mo-
bilize popular support for) regulations addressing this unex-
pected problem. Similar stories can be told about steam boilers, 
organ transplants, and other novel technologies. The general 
lesson is that we need significant exposure to a novel technolo-
gy before developing efficient ex ante regulations. 
To sum up, then, we have, in a very rudimentary form, a 
general framework for choosing between ex ante and ex post 
regulation. The theory consists of a general principle: minimize 
the sum of ex ante and ex post costs of creating incentives for 
optimal behavior. The general principle is fleshed out with four 
factors illuminating sources of these costs: whether the sources 
of the harm are heterogeneous; whether the expected harm is 
 
the problems of settlement costs when individual harms are small and injur-
ers are numerous). 
 336. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE 
ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR AIR POLLU-
TION, 1940–1975, at 158 (1977). 
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high; whether settlement costs of allocating responsibility ex 
post are high; and whether the technology is novel. 
D . APPLYING THESE FACTORS TO THE RISK OF WATER 
POLLUTION FROM FRACTURING 
This Section applies this framework to the risks of water 
pollution from fracturing and recommends a blended regulatory 
strategy, using command and control regulation for issues that 
are already well understood with liability as a backstop for the-
se and other issues. 
1. Heterogeneity of Risk 
In controlling water pollution from fracturing, some 
sources of the risk are homogeneous while others are heteroge-
neous. Virtually all oil and gas production poses the risk of 
blowouts,337 leaks from vertical drill pipes into aquifers, and 
improper disposal of drilling waste and produced water.338 Each 
of these risks is present in conventional drilling (i.e., vertical 
drilling in porous rock) as well as fracturing, and technologies 
are available to address them. For example, blowout preventers 
are by now familiar, and the need for them is sufficiently uni-
form to require them.339 The same is true of rules governing the 
thickness and depth of well casings (to prevent leaks), as well 
as surface containment ponds for drilling waste and the safe 
transportation of produced water.340
 
 337. Blowouts are “gushers” or the uncontrolled release of gas or oil. See 
MARK ZOBACK ET AL., WORLDWATCH INST., ADDRESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISKS FROM SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 8–9 (2010); see also Seamus McGraw, 
Pennsylvania Fracking Accident: What Went Wrong, POPULAR MECHANICS 
(Apr. 21, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/ 
coal-oil-gas/pennsylvania-fracking-accident-what-went-wrong-5598621 (detail-
ing a widely-reported near-blowout at a Pennsylvania fracking operation run 
by Chesapeake Energy). 
 Other water contamination 
 338. Produced water is briny water from deep below the earth’s surface 
that comes up with the oil or gas during the drilling process. See supra Part 
IV.A.1.  
 339. States are already discussing and implementing such requirements. 
For example, Colorado Oil and Gas rules incorporate a blowout preventer re-
quirement, and one was recently proposed by the Texas Railroad Commission 
(the state body that oversees oil and gas exploration) as part of broad changes 
to the state’s regulation of energy extraction. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-
1:603(e)(4) (2013) (“Blowout Prevention Equipment”); Kate Galbraith, Pro-
posed Rules on Fracking Gain Cautious Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, at 
A39 (describing proposed Texas rules including blowout prevention equip-
ment). 
 340. See, e.g., FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 (noting the 
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risks are unique to fracturing, but also present issues that 
should not vary greatly from one fracturing site to another, in-
cluding the risk of surface spills of fracturing fluid and of the 
improper disposal of flow-back.341 Best practices regulations are 
also appropriate for this sort of issue—indeed, they already are 
common in states with oil and gas drilling.342
We assume that best practices regulations would be adopt-
ed by the relevant regulatory authority through notice and 
comment rulemaking. They would be developed through a vari-
ety of sources. The oil and gas industry would have an interest 
in proposing such regulations, if only to assure that maverick 
operators would not create spills or leaks that would exacerbate 
public uneasiness about fracturing. Other sources of proposed 
regulations would include manufacturers of control equipment, 
environmental organizations, and associations of local land-
owners. Regulations adopted by other jurisdictions could act as 
a source of inspiration, with trade associations, environmental 
groups, and perhaps the federal government serving as clear-
inghouses to disseminate the relevant information from one ju-
risdiction to another.
 
343
While some risks are homogeneous—and thus are especial-
ly well suited to this sort of effort—others are clearly heteroge-
neous,
 
344
 
need for well casing to be thick, muti-layered, and properly set, and describing 
well casing as an “ideal example” of a best practices approach); id. at 20 (rec-
ommending spill-containment technologies). 
 including the risk of fracturing fluid or methane es-
caping from target shale beds and migrating to aquifers, and 
the risk of vibrations from fracturing dislodging methane de-
posits near the surface or substances at the bottom of water 
 341. Flow-back is used fracturing fluid that is pushed back to the surface 
by the pressure of gas and oil released in the fracturing process. See supra 
Part IV.A.1. 
 342. See supra Part IV.A.2 (describing and citing various state regula-
tions). 
 343. Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2014) (manuscript at 51, 61–62), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257047. 
 344. See George E. King, Thirty Years of Gas Shale Fracturing: What Have 
We Learned?, (Society of Petroleum Engineers, Working Paper No. SPE 
133456, 2010) (“No two shales are alike. Shales vary aerially and vertically 
within a trend, even along a well bore . . . . There are no optimum, one-size-
fits-all . . . designs for shale wells.”); see also HEATHER COOLEY & CHRISTINA 
DONNELLY, PAC. INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND WATER RESOURCES: 
SEPARATING THE FRACK FROM THE FICTION 21 (2012) (detailing the variations 
in the composition of fracking fluids to compensate for the specifics of local ge-
ology and individual wells). 
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wells. These risks vary with the depth of the shale bed, the size 
of the producing field, the depth of the water aquifer, the dis-
tance separating the producing field from the aquifer, the po-
rosity of the rock between the shale and aquifer, the mix of 
chemicals used in fracturing, and the number of persons who 
draw water from the aquifer.345 There is also no one technology 
that can address these risks in a uniform way.346 It is possible 
that new technologies will emerge to address some of these 
risks, such as the development of non-toxic fracturing fluid that 
is cost effective. If so, it may be appropriate to ban toxic ver-
sions.347 Yet this sort of judgment cannot be made until the nec-
essary technology has been developed and widely tested. In all 
of these efforts, industry groups can play a role by helping to 
formulate a set of best practices.348
 
 345. The State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations 
(STRONGER), a nonprofit that has developed guidelines for state regulations, 
did not establish numerical criteria or uniform standards because “states vary 
too much in climate, geology, hydrology, topography, and other factors to be 
amenable to one-size-fits-all regulation.” Memorandum of the STRONGER Bd. 
of Dirs., to Persons Interested in the Hydraulic Fracturing Guidelines (Febru-
ary 8, 2010), available at http://www.strongerinc.org/sites/all/themes/ 
stronger02/downloads/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20posting.pdf; see also FIRST 
2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 
 Still, for these residual 
risks, some form of ex post regulation is needed, at least for 
now.  
10, at 9 (noting that “shale plays in different 
basins have different geological characteristics” and that “[t]his geological di-
versity means that engineering practice and regulatory oversight will differ 
widely among regions of the country”). 
 346. FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10 at 10 (“The realities of region-
al diversity of shale gas resources and rapid change in production practices 
and technology mean that a single best engineering practice cannot set for all 
locations and for all time.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 347. See Joe Carroll, Chesapeake Testing ‘Green’ Fracking Fluids in Shale 
Wells, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-10-02/chesapeake-testing-green-fracking-fluids-in-u-s-shale-wells 
.html. 
 348. See, e.g., AM. PETROLEUM INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE / 
BEST PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (HF) (2012), available at http:// 
www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Hydraulic_Fracturing_ 
InfoSheet.pdf; see also FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 27 (recom-
mending “creation of a shale gas industry organization dedicated to continu-
ous improvement of best practice through development of standards, diffusion 
of these standards, and assessing compliance among its members”) (emphasis 
omitted); SECOND 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 144, at 9 (reiterating recom-
mendation and noting that regional industry groups are taking regional ap-
proaches to best practices); infra notes 354–58 and accompanying text (de-
scribing industry-NGO partnerships developing codes of conduct for shale oil 
and gas drilling). 
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2. Magnitude of Expected Harm 
The second factor, the frequency and severity of the harm, 
also varies with the pathway of contamination. Here again, cer-
tain activities present an obvious risk of significant harm if not 
controlled, such as dumping flow-back or produced water on the 
ground or into streams, drilling without protective well casings, 
or spilling toxic chemicals on the surface. These sorts of risks 
are either already regulated by best practices regulations, or if 
not, they should be. 
Other risks appear to be more remote, such as the risk that 
either fracturing fluid or methane gas might migrate from 
shale seams into aquifers during fracturing. The evidence so far 
suggests that such incidents will be uncommon. Fracturing has 
been used for over sixty years to enhance production from con-
ventional oil and gas wells, with only limited evidence of 
groundwater contamination.349 To be sure, fracturing in shale 
has a shorter history, but at least so far its track record does 
not seem to be different. According to a number of studies, 
there are no documented cases in which fracturing fluid has 
migrated into aquifers from deep shale seams or from wells for 
storing used fracturing fluid.350 Methane contamination of 
groundwater is more common, although it is often naturally oc-
curring, so that only a subset of these incidents is caused by 
drilling.351 If such migrations of fracturing fluid and methane 
occur, how severe would they be? For now, it is impossible to 
make any categorical pronouncements. With fracturing fluid, 
for instance, the chemicals involved are a crucial variable.352
 
 349. See, e.g., EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES 
OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RES-
ERVOIRS 12 (2004), available at 
 
Some are a cause for concern even in diluted form, while others 
(e.g., biodegradable detergents) are less worrisome. Alleviating 
uncertainty about this variable is a good reason to require dis-
closure of chemicals used in fracturing, a subject to which we 
will return.  
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_ 
attach_uic_exec_summ.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL 
GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 39 (2009), 
available at http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/state_oil_and_gas_ 
regulations_designed_to_protect_water_resources_0.pdf.  
 350. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 351. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 352. For a list of chemicals commonly used in fracturing fluid, see What 
Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS.ORG, http://fracfocus.org/chemical-use/what 
-chemicals-are-used (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
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The risks whose severity are hardest to assess are those in 
which vibrations from fracturing disturb contaminants already 
in proximity to water sources, including pockets of methane 
near water wells or contaminants already at the bottom of wa-
ter wells. This sort of event is hard to distinguish from natural-
ly occurring contamination and, in any event, would not include 
(toxic) fracturing fluid. 
Whatever the pathway, another important variable is the 
number of persons and properties affected by an episode of con-
tamination. Water aquifers have finite dimensions, and are 
generally presumed to be isolated from other aquifers.353 If this 
is the case, the impact of any contamination will be localized. 
In some cases, however, a contaminated aquifer may be inter-
connected with other aquifers or with surface water. We do not 
know how common this is,354
Still another factor is whether the harm will be limited to 
property damage or will involve health effects. If contamination 
is detected early, injuries should be primarily economic; since 
alternative sources of water are available by truck or pipeline 
(at a price), the primary consequence should be a decline in 
property values. But if the harm is not detected early, so that it 
exposes people to toxic chemicals for an extended time period, 
there could be health effects that are significantly more costly. 
 or how far chemicals used in frac-
turing operations must travel before becoming sufficiently di-
luted not to affect water quality. Because of these uncertain-
ties, there is some risk—most likely small but currently 
impossible to quantify—that contamination from fracturing 
could damage water over a significant area. Likewise, aquifers 
or surface waters that serve millions of people, such as the wa-
tersheds supplying New York City, pose a different level of risk 
and warrant more stringent regulation, as discussed further 
below.  
 
 353. See, e.g., Luke W. Harris & Christopher J. Sanchez, Considerations for 
Analyzing Colorado Ground Water: A Technical Perspective, 15 U. DENV. WA-
TER L. REV. 105, 121–22 (2011). 
 354. See Nathaniel R. Warner et al., Geochemical Evidence for Possible 
Natural Migration of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Penn-
sylvania, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,961, 11,965 (2012) (detecting salinity 
in shallow groundwater in Pennsylvania which was present before fracturing 
operations began, and which did not include fracturing fluid chemicals, and 
thus probably was not caused by fracturing; concluding that this saline water, 
which resembles produced water, may have migrated naturally up from deep-
er areas over time, suggesting the presence of “a preexisting network of cross-
formational pathways that has enhanced hydraulic connectivity to deeper geo-
logical formations”). 
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3. Settlement Costs 
If we implement an ex post regulatory strategy for fractur-
ing, how difficult will it be to determine who is responsible and 
who deserves compensation? In other words, how high will set-
tlement costs be? Usually, the number of energy companies 
fracturing in a given locale will be small. Thus, identifying po-
tential defendants should not be a problem. Proving they are 
causally responsible and have violated the applicable standard 
of care, though, is another matter. The legal issues posed by a 
liability regime could prove daunting, making ex post liability 
an expensive proposition.  
A critical variable is whether the amount of injury per 
claimant—reflected in a loss in property values and possibly al-
so in health effects—is sufficiently large to warrant individual-
ized assessments. If water contamination goes undetected, re-
sulting in significant exposure to livestock and humans, the 
potential damages could be large enough to warrant individual-
ized adjudication. But if contamination is quickly detected and 
results in avoidance measures that prevent significant harm 
(like relocating water wells), the potential damages might be 
too small to sustain a liability regime. And of course, if signifi-
cant time has elapsed between fracturing and the discovery of 
contamination, identifying a defendant sufficiently solvent to 
pay damages may be difficult. These considerations about the 
magnitude of settlement costs (relative to the amount in con-
troversy) provide a reason to rely, at least in significant part, 
on command and control regulation rather than a pure liability 
regime. 
The possibility that the settlement costs will be too large 
relative to the injuries sustained by claimants also suggests the 
need for some modifications in the common law, insofar as it is 
used to backstop best practices regulations. We discuss these 
issues in Part VI.  
4. Novelty of Risk 
As we have seen, ex ante regulation is more challenging 
with a novel technology (or a novel application of existing tech-
nology), because there is no baseline of existing precautions to 
define the “best practices” regulatory standard. With new tech-
nology (or new applications) there is thus a strong reason to re-
ly at least in part on ex post regulation.  
Neither fracturing nor horizontal drilling is a new technol-
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ogy.355
However, ex ante regulation is much more difficult for 
pathways of contamination that are novel to fracturing. These 
include the risk that fracturing fluid or methane will migrate 
from shale seams to aquifers during fracturing, as well as the 
risk that vibrations from fracturing will disturb existing me-
thane pockets near aquifers or stir up contaminants already at 
the bottom of water wells. For now, there is insufficient under-
standing of the frequency and magnitude of these risks, as well 
as how to minimize them, to support a system of ex ante regula-
tion.  
 What is new is the application of this technology in 
shale. Thus, insofar as fracturing in shale presents water con-
tamination risks identical to those in conventional oil and gas 
production—such as disposing of produced water, minimizing 
well casing leaks, and controlling blowouts—the risks and po-
tential solutions are familiar, so this experience can support ex 
ante best practices regulation. Similarly, certain risks common 
to all fracturing sites—such as spills of fracturing chemicals on 
the ground and disposal of flow-back—are analogous to other 
activities that pose water contamination risks, and should also 
be amenable to best practices regulation.  
E. THE REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR WATER CONTAMINATION 
FROM FRACTURING 
We are now in a position to draw these considerations to-
gether and propose in broad outline a regulatory strategy. In 
brief, we would rely on best practices regulation backstopped by 
liability, and we would tailor our liability rules to encourage 
compliance with, and development of, efficient best practices 
regulation.  
1. The Need for Both Best Practices Regulation and Liability 
As a core element of our regulatory strategy, best practices 
regulation offers three advantages. First, it is especially well 
suited to risks that are either common to all forms of oil and 
gas production or are familiar from other types of industrial 
operations, including surface spills, vertical well leaks, blow-
outs, disposal of produced water, and disposal of flow-back, as 
 
 355. Nicolas Loris, The Fracking Truth on Government’s Role in Natural 
Gas Production, THE FOUNDRY (Jan. 31, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://blog.heritage 
.org/2012/01/31/the-fracking-truth-on-governments-role-in-natural-gas 
-production/ (stating that in the 1940s Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation be-
gan testing of fracking and horizontal drilling).  
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discussed above. Second, the idea that a public regulatory body 
is “on the case” is reassuring to the public. Given the enormous 
potential benefits of the shale boom, it is important to persuade 
the public that the practice is safe. Otherwise, we risk losing 
these potential benefits if, for example, an anti-fracking cru-
sade marshals public support for a ban on fracturing. As a re-
sult, the entire industry has a strong stake in promoting public 
confidence in shale oil and gas drilling, and in assuring that ac-
tions of a few irresponsible companies do not jeopardize the en-
tire industry. Third, because energy companies must make 
substantial investments to drill in shale, they need to estimate 
what regulatory costs they will face. Best practices regulation 
offers this predictability.356
However, best practices regulation has three important 
drawbacks, so that it must be backstopped by liability. First, 
best practices regulation is only as effective as the resources 
committed to enforcing it. If budget cutbacks result in irregular 
inspections and legislative inaction allows the real value of 
fines to erode, energy companies will have diminished incen-
tives to comply.
 
357
 
 356. Of course, energy companies may prefer best practices regulations for 
less laudable reasons, such as imposing costs on potential new entrants and 
competitiors, shifting blame to the regulator if things later go wrong, and so 
forth. 
 Second, best practices regulation is ineffec-
tive for heterogeneous or novel risks. As a result, risks that are 
unique to fracturing of shale seams and have no clear analo-
gous counterpart in other operations should be regulated ex 
post with liability rules. This includes the risks, discussed 
above, of migration from shale seams and of disturbance of ex-
isting contaminates near water sources. This is not to suggest 
that these risks would remain forever in the ex post camp. As 
we learn more about these risks, we presume industry will de-
velop ways of minimizing them, at which point they can move 
to the best practices column. Third, as we have seen, command 
and control regulation provides relatively poor incentives to de-
velop new risk-minimizing innovations. Liability rules provide 
a much more powerful incentive in this regard.  
 357. Even after a recent comprehensive revision in its oil and gas law, 
Pennsylvania caps civil penalties for violations of best practices regulations at 
$75,000 plus $5,000 per day for each day the violation persists. 58 PA. STAT.  
§ 3256 (2013). 
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2. Three Rules to Coordinate Liability with Best Practices 
Regulation  
The two anchors of our regulatory strategy—best practices 
regulation and liability—should be coordinated, so that liability 
standards vary depending on whether a best practices regula-
tion governs the conduct that caused the contamination. Specif-
ically, we envision three different liability rules depending on 
compliance with best practices regulations. First, any water 
contamination causally attributable to the violation of a best 
practices regulation should be considered negligence per se and 
should result in liability.  
Second (and conversely), any claim that water contamina-
tion was caused by the failure of an energy company to adopt a 
measure more protective than required by an applicable best 
practices regulation should generally be defeated by a regulato-
ry compliance defense (although we would include an exception 
for best practices regulations that are significantly less protec-
tive than comparable rules in other jurisdictions). These two 
per se rules, working in tandem, create a powerful incentive for 
industry to support the development of protective best practices 
rules and to comply with them.  
The third rule fills any gaps left by the first and second: if 
the water contamination is causally attributable to the defend-
ant’s fracturing, but cannot be linked to an activity governed by 
a best practices rule, we would apply a version of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. In such a regulatory vacuum, proof that the 
energy company caused the contamination would create an in-
ference that the firm was negligent, shifting the burden to the 
company to prove it exercised reasonable care. In effect, the en-
ergy company would have to show that the contamination was 
an inevitable accident that could not be prevented by any exer-
cise of reasonable care. Because this showing would be very dif-
ficult, the standard of care, as a practical matter, would ap-
proach strict liability. This high probability of liability for 
harms not covered by best practices regulations would give en-
ergy companies a strong incentive to learn how to reduce the 
residual risks not governed by best practices regulations and to 
help regulators develop new best practices regulations.  
3. The Supporting Role of Prohibitions, Disclosure, and 
Coasean Bargains 
Our proposed strategy would not ignore the other modes of 
regulation we have discussed, but each would play a subordi-
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nate role. Although we would not rely on prohibitions as the 
principal strategy, they are appropriate where risks are espe-
cially great. In New York State, for example, we would ban 
fracturing near the Catskill and Croton watersheds that supply 
virtually all of New York City’s water.358
Information disclosure would also play an important if sec-
ondary role. Mandatory disclosure becomes more important 
over time as we learn which information is crucial. We already 
know, though, that blowouts and leaks should be disclosed, as 
well as the chemicals used in fracturing fluid. Indeed, many 
companies have begun voluntarily disclosing the composition of 
their fracturing fluid, and a nonprofit has compiled some of this 
information in a searchable database.
 The expense of devel-
oping an alternative source of water for millions of people on 
short notice would be massive. Even a small risk of this costly 
scenario should be ruled out; if the risk assessment changes 
over time, then the ban can be reconsidered later. 
359 Many states have be-
gun requiring disclosure, and EPA (under the Toxic Substances 
Control Act) and the Bureau of Land Management are also de-
veloping federal disclosure standards.360
 A more ambitious information disclosure strategy would 
be to require regulators to prepare an environmental impact 
  
 
 358. The New York City water supply originates in the Catskill Mountains 
and Hudson River Valley, an area of over 1900 square miles within dozens of 
counties, towns, and villages. The watershed—and the city’s drinking water 
specifically—is protected by a 1997 Memorandum of Agreement, which created 
a watershed partnership council and series of regulations on water quality 
throughout the watershed. N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, ARTICLE I (1997), available at http://www 
.dos.ny.gov/watershed/nycmoa.html. See also ARTHUR, URETSKY & WILSON, 
supra note 155, at 10 (noting that Catskill and Croton Watersheds supply all 
water to New York City and the surrounding area, including Northern New 
Jersey). 
 359. See New Website Makes Information on Fracking Chemicals More Ac-
cessible to the Public, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www 
.foreffectivegov.org/new-website-makes-info-on-fracking-chemicals-more 
-accessible (discussing a new searchable website launched by SkyTruth); What 
Chemicals Are Used, supra note 352. 
 360. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing on 
Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be 
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160) (development of new BLM standards); ARNOLD 
& PORTER LLP, ADDITIONAL FRACKING CHEMICAL SUBSTANCE REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER TSCA MAY FURTHER COMPLICATE LANDSCAPE (2012), 
available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory% 
20Additional_Fracking_Chemical_Substance_Reporting_Requirements_ 
Under_TSCA_May_Further_Complicate_Landscape.pdf. For a discussion, see 
infra Part VI.A.1.b. 
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statement (EIS), along the lines of the federal NEPA process, 
before issuing any permission to drill that contemplates the use 
of fracturing. This would require consideration of all environ-
mental impacts—road damage, noise, water usage, habitat de-
struction, and induced earthquakes, as well was water contam-
ination—before production commences. Proposed alternatives 
that would mitigate harms along each of these dimensions 
could be explored, which might lead to beneficial modifications. 
Public participation would be possible, either in the form of 
comments on a draft impact statement or in one or more public 
hearings. And information about impacts and mitigating alter-
natives for each project could be assembled in a large database, 
providing feedback to regulators in developing new best prac-
tices regulations.361
Experience with the federal NEPA program, nevertheless, 
suggests strong reasons for caution about mandating such an 
ambitious information disclosure program for every application 
for permission to drill. The full-blown EIS process is very ex-
pensive.
 
362 The discussion of impacts and alternatives usually 
requires hiring an environmental consulting firm, which adds 
considerably to the expense of any energy project. Responding 
to comments entails further diversion of staff resources by reg-
ulatory bodies. To the extent that compliance with disclosure 
requirements is enforced through judicial injunctions, the costs 
mount even higher. Moreover, the threat of injunctions trans-
forms the benign-sounding information disclosure regime into a 
weapon for delay by disgruntled opponents, driving up the costs 
of projects even further and often forcing cancellation of other-
wise beneficial undertakings.363
 
 361. Federal NEPA rather notoriously includes no provision for follow-up 
monitoring. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring 
and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 908 (2002). 
 Enforcement through injunc-
tions also has the effect of shifting de facto authority over pro-
duction decisions from landowners, production companies, and 
regulators to environmental organizations and judges, who may 
have relatively little perspective on the larger societal interests 
at stake. Perhaps the most decisive objection, however, is that 
one cannot take a “hard look” at the environmental conse-
 362. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 930–34 (6th ed. 2009), and sources cited therein. 
 363. For an instructive case study, see William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory 
Fragmentation Continuum, Westway, and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 
21 J.L. & POL. 323 (2005).  
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quences of fracturing, as recently mandated by a federal magis-
trate judge in California,364 until we have more experience tell-
ing us what those consequences are.365 Information disclosure 
only works when there is information—as opposed to specula-
tion—to disclose.366
We also view Coasean bargains as an appropriate regulato-
ry strategy. Given the uncertainty about water contamination 
risks, it is unrealistic to expect landowners and energy compa-
nies systematically to engage in negotiations about allocating 
these risks by contract, although as previously noted, there is 
evidence this is beginning to happen in some lease negotiations. 
The problem is not just the familiar one of asymmetric infor-
mation, but the concern that neither the energy companies nor 
the landowners have definitive information about the nature 
and magnitude of the risks. We therefore expect at least some 
parties to be reluctant to allocate these risks by contract. Yet 
the process should become easier with time and experience.  
  
One promising development is that energy companies have 
begun working with environmental organizations to formulate 
private codes of best practices. For example, the Center for Sus-
tainable Shale Development—a joint venture of energy compa-
nies with NGOs such as the Environmental Defense Fund—
offers certification to energy companies whose drilling practices 
meet their standards.367 This initiative is analogous to LEED 
certification for green buildings.368
 
 364. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. C 11-06174 
PSG, 2013 WL 1405938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2013).  
 It gives landowners a 
 365. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 creates a “rebuttable presumption” that 
certain oil and gas development and production activities on federal lands are 
categorically excluded from NEPA. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 390, P.L. 109-
58, 119 Stat. 594, 747–48. Examples of excluded activities include surface dis-
turbances of less than five acres and drilling within five years of previous drill-
ing activity. Id. § 390(b)(1), (2). These exclusions were apparently not at issue 
in Center for Biological Diversity. See generally, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
2013 WL 1405938, supra note 364.  
 366. Magistrate Judge Grewal’s opinion in Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
acknowledges that water contamination is the most serious environmental is-
sue. But rather than citing any concrete evidence supporting a risk of water 
contamination, he relies heavily on the existence of “public controversy” as a 
reason to delay fracturing on public lands until a new EIS is completed. Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity, 2013 WL 1405938, supra note 364, at *11–15.  
 367. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://www.sustainableshale.org/ 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 368. How to Certify a Building Project, USGBC LEED, http://www.usgbc 
.org/leed/certification (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (describing process for secur-
ing LEED certification for green buildings). 
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straightforward way to require best practices when negotiating 
a mineral rights lease: instead of having to specify various 
practices, they can simply require certification. Similarly, the 
International Energy Agency has developed a set of “Golden 
Rules for a Golden Age of Gas.”369
VI.  DESIGNING A REGULATORY REGIME FOR WATER 
CONTAMINATION   
 This sort of initiative is a use-
ful supplement for best practices regulation and liability, and 
could ultimately reduce the need for such regulation.  
In this Part, we offer more detail about our proposed regu-
latory regime, focusing on the design of the liability rule and its 
interaction with best practices regulations. We also consider 
other features, including comparative negligence, the measure 
of damages, attorneys’ fees, and the risk of insolvency. The next 
Part addresses institutional options for implementing these 
features, including who should establish the best practices reg-
ulations.  
A. CAUSATION 
In designing the liability system, we begin with causation, 
which we regard as the most crucial issue. We distinguish three 
questions. First, did oil or gas production cause the water con-
tamination? If not, there should be no liability. Second, what 
was the pathway of the contamination? Third, what was the 
scope of the harm caused by the contamination? Did it impair 
the value of property by rendering the water supply useless? 
Did it cause further harm to vegetation, livestock or human 
health?  
1. Contamination Injury 
For energy companies to have the right incentives, they 
should be liable only if they actually cause harm.370
 
 369. Int’l Energy Agency, Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas, WORLD 
ENERGY OUTLOOK (May 29, 2012), available at http://www.worldenergyoutlook 
.org/goldenrules/. 
 Thus, plain-
 370. In theory, one could impose liability for imposing not just harm, but 
also a risk of harm. But this risk of contamination would be virtually impossi-
ble to calculate. If one imposed liability for risk of harm, it would also be nec-
essary to reduce recoveries in all cases to expected damages, in order to avoid 
over-deterrence. This, too, would be very difficult to calculate. Over a large 
enough number of cases, imposing liability only for actual harm generates the 
same aggregate liability as expected harm, and it has the added virtue of 
providing full compensation to those who are actually injured, as opposed to 
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tiffs should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that fracturing was a but-for cause of water contamina-
tion on their property.371
This showing is challenging for three reasons. First, if the 
plaintiff’s water well contains an unusual chemical, how do we 
know it comes from fracturing, as opposed to a natural cause or 
some other source of pollution? Even if the plaintiff’s water con-
tains methane, how do we know it was not naturally present in 
the water? Second, if several energy companies are fracturing 
in a given locale, how do we know which one is responsible? 
Third, what if contamination is discovered years after energy 
companies have stopped fracturing in a particular locale? How 
do we know whether the contamination comes from a long-
closed oil or gas well or some other source? These questions are 
difficult because the parties have only limited information. Af-
ter all, fracturing occurs deep underground, and aquifers are 
also underground (though much closer to the surface), so nei-
ther can be observed directly from the surface. 
 
To generate reliable answers to these questions, the liabil-
ity regime should create incentives to develop better infor-
mation. We suggest three ways to pursue this “information 
forcing” goal,372
 
those who experience near misses.  
 ranked in order of importance: baseline testing; 
 371. Our focus is on cause-in-fact—in effect, “but-for causation”—and not 
on the narrower concept of proximate cause, which asks whether a cause-in-
fact was sufficiently direct or foreseeable or otherwise relevant to the policies 
pursued by the liability regime. One can imagine issues of proximate cause 
arising. For example, suppose A is engaged in fracturing under B’s land, and B 
digs an extremely deep water well that reaches the shale bed, and thus be-
comes contaminated with fracturing chemicals. Here, there is no doubt that 
A’s fracturing activity is a cause-in-fact of the water contamination. Neverthe-
less, the water well’s unusual depth would probably be regarded as supersed-
ing cause of the injury, such that A’s drilling would likely not be treated as a 
proximate cause. Or suppose fracturing by C sets off weak vibrations on the 
surface, causing explosives stored in a cabin miles away to fall off a shelf and 
explode. Here too, the fracturing is a cause-in-fact of the explosion, but it is 
not foreseeable and thus is unlikely to be regarded as a proximate cause. The-
se hypotheticals suggest that proximate cause issues will arise only in unusual 
circumstances. We therefore put issues of proximate cause to one side, and as-
sume that they can be resolved using the doctrinal tools developed in ordinary 
tort suits. 
 372. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information Forcing Environmental 
Regulation, 33 FLORIDA ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006). Information forcing can be 
considered a variant on “action forcing,” which has long been a centerpiece of 
environmental regulation, for example, under NEPA. See Kleppe v. Sierra 
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976) (describing NEPA’s requirements as “action-
forcing provisions intended as a directive to all agencies to assure considera-
tion of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking”) (internal 
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disclosure; and tracer chemicals. 
a. Baseline Testing 
The most important step is to test groundwater before frac-
turing begins in order to establish a benchmark of water quali-
ty. Then, if an allegation of contamination is made, the water 
would be tested again. If contaminants are found that were not 
present in the baseline sample, this would support the allega-
tion that fracturing caused the contamination. Conversely, if 
the contaminants were already there, this would powerfully re-
but such a claim.373 In illuminating causation in this way, base-
line testing is the most important information forcing strategy 
we propose. A number of states have recognized the value of 
baseline testing and have moved to require or encourage it.374
Baseline testing has four limitations. First, its inferential 
value erodes over time. If contamination is found one year after 
baseline testing was conducted, the inference of causal respon-
sibility is strong. But if contamination is found twenty years 
later, the inference is much weaker. Over twenty years, the wa-
ter could have been contaminated in many ways having noth-
ing to do with fracturing. A solution to this problem would be 
periodic testing, which has the further advantage of alerting 
landowners to emerging water quality problems, thereby reduc-
ing risks to health that otherwise could arise from contamina-
tion. Of course, periodic testing increases the cost of any testing 
program.  
 
Second, the inferential value of baseline testing also dimin-
ishes with distance. The farther a water well is from fracturing, 
the less likely it is that fracturing has caused any water con-
tamination. So how close must fracturing be to water in order 
for baseline testing to be required? Obviously, a longer distance 
 
quotation marks omitted).  
 373. See FIRST 2011 DOE REPORT, supra note 10, at 23 (“Availability of 
measurements in advance of drilling would provide an objective baseline for 
determining if the drilling and hydraulic fracturing activity introduced any 
contaminants in surrounding drinking water wells.”). 
 374. Wiseman, supra note 163, at 157–58 (discussing regulations in Colo-
rado, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania). 
Two states (Pennsylvania and West Virginia) have sought to encourage base-
line testing by adopting a rebuttable presumption that, if the testing is not 
done before drilling, water contamination within a certain time and distance 
of a fracturing operation was caused by the operator. Id. at 158. Wyoming is 
also likely to require baseline sampling. Mark Wilcox, Baseline Water Testing 
Moves Forward, WYO. BUS. REP., June 12, 2013, http://www 
.wyomingbusinessreport.com/article.asp?id=65090. 
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means more water wells have to be tested, and thus higher 
costs. 
Third, baseline testing cannot be conducted if landowners 
do not allow access to their water wells. They might be moti-
vated by a desire for privacy or, for that matter, by a concern 
that any negative information they learn would have to be dis-
closed when they sell their property. Whatever their reasons, if 
landowners refuse to consent to a baseline test, they should pay 
a price for doing so. We would require them to overcome a pre-
sumption that the drilling activity did not cause the contamina-
tion. Or if a stronger incentive is needed, we can bar them from 
bringing suit.  
Fourth, baseline testing does not prevent certain types of 
litigation-related misconduct. For instance, landowners might 
deliberately pollute their own land after the test in order to 
seek damages in a lawsuit and, correspondingly, energy com-
panies might introduce pollutants before the test. We think it 
will be rare for landowners to foul their own nest by destroying 
their water supply or for energy companies to risk liability for 
this sort of willful misconduct, but we recognize the possibility. 
If it happens, the parties would be free to introduce evidence of 
the other side’s misconduct; admittedly, though, this effort may 
prove costly and may not always succeed. To deter this sort of 
misconduct, therefore, we should deem any such tampering a 
criminal offense subject to severe penalties.  
Notwithstanding these four limitations, we believe the cost 
of baseline testing is justified. We say this even though it is 
possible that a large scale program will seem wasteful if frac-
turing turns out to present little or no danger, as its proponents 
maintain. Yet even in this best case scenario, testing offers the 
significant advantage of allaying public anxiety about fractur-
ing, as well as the collateral benefit of educating landowners 
about the quality of their water. Of course, if incidents of con-
tamination do occur, testing becomes all the more valuable. It 
reduces the risk of health effects by ensuring that contamina-
tion is detected, while also increasing the accuracy and reduc-
ing the cost of adjudicating disputes.  
Moreover, while the cost of performing these tests is not 
trivial, it is modest compared with the revenue generated by a 
successful oil or gas well.375
 
 375. The cost of performing the test is likely to be between $200 and $1500 
per well, depending upon which analytes (and how many) are included in the 
test. There would be further costs in hiring professionals to gather samples. 
 We assume the energy company 
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would fund the baseline test (for instance, as a condition of re-
ceiving permission from the state to drill). For successful oil or 
gas wells, companies presumably would pass on some or all of 
this cost—as well as the costs of any periodic testing—to lease-
holders through adjustments to the royalty. It may also be pos-
sible to contain costs, for instance, by testing only wells that 
are quite close to fracturing, or by gathering samples only from 
some, but not all, water wells in an area, if they draw on the 
same aquifer.376
b. Disclosure of Fracturing Chemicals 
 Landowners who prefer more comprehensive 
testing can negotiate for it in return for a reduced royalty. Ad-
justments can be made over time as we develop a better under-
standing of the risks.  
We should also require disclosure of all chemicals used in 
fracturing fluid, a step taken voluntarily by many companies 
and now required in a number of states.377 When paired with 
baseline testing, disclosure can make determinations of causa-
tion more accurate, at least when the claim is that fracturing 
fluid caused the contamination.378
 
We thank our colleague, Mike Gerrard, as well as Nelson Johnson of Arnold & 
Porter LLP, for this estimate.  
 For example, assume that 
plaintiffs find hydrochloric acid in a water well, and that base-
line testing did not show any hydrochloric acid before fractur-
ing began nearby. If the energy company discloses that its frac-
turing fluid contains hydrochloric acid, a court will likely 
conclude that fracturing caused the contamination.  
 376. If fracturing occurs in an area where there are no existing water wells, 
baseline testing would be far more expensive. We would rely on the appropri-
ate regulatory authority to develop local rules addressing this situation. In 
these circumstances, we would also recognize a general privilege on the part of 
energy companies to engage in baseline testing, at their own expense, should 
they wish to do so as a form of assurance against future unfounded claims. 
 377. Kate Galbraith, Seeking Disclosure on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/business/energy-environment/ 
seeking-disclosure-on-fracking.html?_r=0 (noting that Texas, Pennsylvania, 
Wyoming, Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, Oklahoma and Ohio all require dis-
closure, and that Ohio legislature had approved mandatory disclosure as well). 
For a discussion of voluntary disclosure by companies, see supra note 314.  
 378. This disclosure is less helpful with contaminants other than fracturing 
fluid, such as methane or other naturally occurring contaminants. Also, a po-
tential downside is that disclosure might inadvertently facilitate fraud by po-
tential plaintiffs. Someone who wishes to add pollutants to their own water in 
order to collect damages in a law suit (or an energy company that wishes to 
embarrass a competitor) is better able to do so if they know what chemicals to 
add. Yet our hope is that this sort of misconduct would be rare, and all the 
more so if deterred with criminal penalties, as discussed above. 
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Disclosure of fracturing chemicals has other benefits as 
well. It should also encourage energy companies to minimize 
the use of toxic or carcinogenic ingredients, if satisfactory sub-
stitutes are available. Likewise, landowners may respond by 
negotiating for limits on the use of these substances (e.g., if 
nontoxic fracturing fluid proves to be viable). In addition, 
knowledge of the chemicals will assist physicians in treating 
individuals who have been exposed to fracturing fluid. 
Disclosure of fracturing chemicals is also cheap to adminis-
ter. Energy companies know what chemicals they use, and 
would be required to share this information with the relevant 
regulator or post it on a website. Regulators would have to en-
sure that the disclosure is accurate, so the main expense here is 
to fund enforcement.  
The primary objection to disclosure is that the composition 
of each energy company’s fracturing fluid is a trade secret. 
While confidential disclosure to regulators would not destroy a 
trade secret, disclosure to the public is more of an issue. Even 
then, however, the trade secret would not necessarily be com-
promised if companies were required to disclose only the ingre-
dients in their fluid, but not the quantities or proportions 
used.379 The critical question is whether companies will contin-
ue to try to improve fracturing fluid—making it safer and more 
effective—if they have to share innovations with competitors. 
We believe they will, if only to reduce their potential liability 
for contamination. If so, then mandatory disclosure has the ad-
vantage not just of reassuring the public and making liability 
determinations more accurate, but also of helping more energy 
companies learn about risk-reducing innovations.380
 
 379. We thank Mike Gerrard for this observation. Also, if the recipe is suf-
ficiently novel to be patented, mandatory disclosure would not eliminate the 
energy company’s right of exclusive use. But we have encountered no reference 
to patented chemical mixtures in the literature, and it seems unlikely that al-
terations in the use and proportions of existing chemical additives would satis-
fy the standard of nonobviousness required for a patent. See Sara Dastgheib-
Vinarov, Comment, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Pro-
tecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4. MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.REV. 
143, 151–153 (2000).  
 Moreover, 
 380. If government-mandated disclosure destroys a trade secret, this cost 
would be borne by the government—not by the energy company—if it qualifies 
as a taking of property. The Supreme Court has held that mandatory disclo-
sure of trade secrets can be a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987–88 (1984). The Court has distin-
guished between disclosure of trade secrets associated with existing operations 
(which can be a taking) and disclosure that is required to receive a permit for 
new operations (which is not a taking because applying for a permit is treated 
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even if mandatory disclosure discourages innovation, the added 
reassurance to the public is probably of greater benefit in terms 
of securing the future of this form of production. 
c. Tracer Chemicals 
 A third information forcing strategy would require energy 
companies to include tracer chemicals in their fracturing flu-
id—a kind of DNA testing for fracturing.381 Each energy com-
pany would include a unique but harmless and nondegradable 
chemical in their fracturing fluid, and would register it with 
the relevant regulator. If water contamination is alleged, the 
water would be tested for this chemical marker. If it is found, 
the energy company’s fracturing fluid probably caused the con-
tamination; if not, it presumably did not.382
Tracer chemicals would be especially helpful when baseline 
testing and disclosure do not provide enough certainty about 
causation—for instance, when contamination occurs at some 
distance from fracturing, when contamination is alleged years 
after fracturing took place, or when more than one energy com-
pany is operating near the water.  
  
In theory, landowners eager to bring a law suit could inject 
tracer chemicals into groundwater, while also contaminating 
their own water to establish liability. Similarly, there is the 
risk that one energy company would try to use another’s tracer 
chemicals to deflect blame for any contamination it causes. As 
discussed above, this sort of misconduct would hopefully be ra-
re, and should be deterred with criminal penalties.  
Another objection to tracer chemicals is grounded in feasi-
bility and cost. Many industry participants believe that it 
would be relatively easy to identify enough chemicals with the 
required criteria—unique, harmless, nondegradable, detecta-
ble—making a rule requiring the use of tracer chemicals feasi-
ble and relatively inexpensive. But this remains to be demon-
strated. If the idea proves feasible, there will nevertheless be 
costs associated with registering the chemicals and enforcing 
 
as a waiver of trade secret protection). Id. Assuming this reasoning is followed, 
states that mandate disclosure only prospectively for new oil and gas wells 
should not be liable. 
 381. Chris Mooney, The Truth about Fracking, 305 SCI. AM. 80, 80–85 
(2011) (describing the introduction of tracers into fracking fluid mixtures as 
“relatively easy,” but facing industry opposition). 
 382. Like disclosure of the ingredients in fracturing fluid, tracer chemicals 
are less helpful with contaminants other than fracturing fluid, such as me-
thane or other naturally occurring contaminants. 
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the relevant rules.383
To sum up, then, baseline testing and disclosure go some 
distance in resolving issues of causation, and tracer chemicals 
could help as well. More generally, since the problem here is 
inadequate information, the solution should be to generate 
more information.  
 
2. Pathway of Causation 
Once the plaintiff establishes that fracturing activity 
caused the contamination, the next issue concerns how the wa-
ter was contaminated—and, in particular, whether the path-
way of contamination was governed by best practices regula-
tions. As we detail more fully in the next subpart, we would 
apply different liability rules depending on whether the path-
way is governed by best practices regulations. Consequently, it 
is important to make a determination about the pathway of 
contamination.  
We suspect that direct proof of the pathway of contamina-
tion will be possible only in a subset of cases. We would allow 
either party to introduce such evidence. For example, if the 
plaintiff can show that the contamination was caused by a 
blowout, the plaintiff may then be able to prove that the energy 
company violated best practices regulations governing blowout 
preventers. If the defendant can show that a blowout did not 
cause the contamination, its compliance with the regulations 
prescribing blowout preventers would be irrelevant.  
In many cases, the evidence will not reveal exactly how the 
water was contaminated, and thus whether a best practices 
regulation addressed the relevant conduct in the case. In these 
circumstances, we would rely on rebuttable presumptions of 
causation. Specifically, if the plaintiff proves both (1) that frac-
turing caused the contamination and (2) that the energy com-
pany violated a best practices regulation governing a particular 
pathway of contamination, we would create a presumption that 
this was the pathway of contamination.384
 
 383. We would not impose a requirement of using tracer chemicals until its 
feasibility has been fully vetted. But the idea is sufficiently promising that the 
oil and gas industry, or perhaps the Energy Department or EPA, should un-
dertake a study examining its benefits and costs. If doubts about feasibility 
remain, it could be implemented on a pilot basis.  
 The energy company 
 384. This is analogous to what Ken Abraham calls “self-proving causation,” 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Self-Proving Causation (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Research 
Paper Series, September 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2320596, although we would ground the inference of causation in the violation 
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would be free to rebut this presumption. For example, assume 
that baseline testing reveals that contaminants emerged after 
drilling began, and that the plaintiff establishes that the well 
casing was an inch thinner than the regulations require. Un-
less the energy company can show otherwise, we would pre-
sume that this violation of the well casing rule caused the con-
tamination. Alternatively, if the energy company shows that it 
was in compliance with applicable best practices regulations 
governing a particular pathway of contamination, and there is 
no evidence it was otherwise negligent with respect to this 
pathway of contamination (e.g., the well casing is sufficiently 
think and deep and was set properly), we would create a pre-
sumption that this was not the pathway of contamination. This, 
too, would be subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff. 
The difficult cases fall in the residual category—where (1) 
the plaintiff can prove that fracturing caused contamination, 
(2) there is insufficient direct evidence of the pathway of con-
tamination, and (3) no presumption based on best practices 
regulations is available to identify the pathway of contamina-
tion. In these cases, we would adopt a rebuttable presumption 
that the contamination was caused by a pathway not governed 
by any best practices regulation. As we discuss further below, 
we would adopt a rule similar to res ipsa loquitur in such cases.  
3. The Scope of the Harm 
Once landowners have established that fracturing has 
caused water contamination, and the tribunal has determined 
the pathway of contamination, it is necessary to determine the 
scope of the harm. In nearly all cases, the contamination will 
have caused property damage. In addition, contamination that 
goes undetected for some time might also have caused more se-
rious injuries. The landowner might have irrigated crops or 
other vegetation that were damaged, or hydrated cattle that 
were sickened. Or the landowner and her family might have 
consumed the water, developing health problems or, in the 
worst case, cancer or some other potentially fatal disease.  
In establishing any of these more severe harms, plaintiffs 
face an uphill battle. Proving harm from exposure to chemicals 
is uniquely challenging.385
 
of the best practices regulation rather than in a finding of negligence. 
 Extensive expert testimony is needed 
 385. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DIS-
ASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and 
Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 
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to identify which chemicals are hazardous, drawing on epide-
miological data, animal studies, or molecular comparisons. Ex-
perts also have to develop a dose-response curve relating differ-
ent levels of exposure to the probability of harm, and they have 
to show the extent and scope of the plaintiff’s exposure. All of 
this expert testimony is expensive, and serious concerns have 
been raised about whether it is within the comprehension of 
judges and juries.386
Nor is an information-forcing strategy available to increase 
the reliability and reduce the cost of these judgments. After all, 
although a reliable and relatively inexpensive baseline test can 
be performed for water quality, the same cannot be said for 
human health. 
  
Instead, the best we can do may be to establish additional 
presumptions. In the common law, for example, if we know a 
plaintiff’s injury was caused by either A or B, but we do not 
know which, there is a presumption of joint causation, in effect 
forcing defendants to show they are not responsible.387 Similar-
ly, CERCLA establishes four categories of “potentially respon-
sible parties,” who are presumed to be causally responsible for 
contamination of a hazardous waste site.388
By analogy, in deciding whether exposure to water contam-
ination caused further injury, we could rely on EPA guidance 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Specifically, EPA 
has established a series of maximum contaminant levels 
(MCLs) for a variety of chemicals found in drinking water. The-
se regulatory standards apply only to public drinking water 
supply systems, and hence do not directly regulate private wa-
ter wells drawing on groundwater—the situation of principal 
concern here. Nevertheless, the MCLs can be adopted as a kind 
of shorthand for resolving disputes about exposure injury from 
  
 
845 (1987).  
 386. The Supreme Court has held that in federal cases, trial judges must 
serve as gatekeepers excluding expert testimony that is not grounded in stud-
ies that have been peer reviewed and published. Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
 387. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948). 
 388. They are current owners and operators of the site; owners and opera-
tors of the site when the wastes were deposited; persons who arranged for the 
deposit of wastes at the site; and persons who transported the wastes to the 
site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). For qualifications of the rule of joint and sev-
eral liability, see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599, 616 (2009); Aaron Gershonowitz, The End of Joint and Several Liability 
in Superfund Litigation: From Chem-Dyne to Burlington Northern, 50 DUQ. L. 
REV. 83 (2012). 
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contaminated private wells. Specifically, (1) if an energy com-
pany has increased the concentration of a chemical in a water 
well; (2) the concentration exceeds the applicable MCL under 
the SDWA; (3) the landowner has been exposed to the water for 
an appreciable period of time (e.g., at least one year); and (4) 
the landowner has experienced an injury associated by EPA 
with exposure to the chemical, then a presumption would arise 
that exposure to the chemical caused the injury. The burden 
would shift to the energy company to rebut the presumption. 
Admittedly, our proposal may leave gaps unfilled. Alt-
hough EPA has established a large number of MCLs for a wide 
range of chemicals found in drinking water, it is conceivable 
that fracturing could give rise to contamination by a chemical 
not covered.389
A more general concern, of course, is that such presump-
tions are an inherently imperfect mechanism. Yet without such 
a presumption, a health effects claim would entail prohibitive 
costs, which would be impractical except, perhaps, in a large 
class action. If the liability system is to provide meaningful re-
covery for exposure injury—and thus a meaningful incentive to 
avoid this type of harm—some kind of shortcut, such as the 
proposed presumption, is needed. 
 In addition, the MCLs are established with a 
view to human health effects, which may not translate easily to 
vegetation or livestock.  
To be sure, the presumption creates a risk of subjecting en-
ergy companies to liability for health effects they did not cause, 
and thus of deterring socially valuable economic activity. Yet 
energy companies can mitigate this risk with self-help. By peri-
odically testing the water, as recommended above, they can ei-
ther ensure that it is not contaminated or act promptly (e.g., 
within a year) to clean or replace it if it is. After all, energy 
companies cannot be liable for health effects unless there first 
is a showing that they contaminated the water. 
B. STANDARD OF CARE 
Once issues of causation are resolved, it is necessary to 
specify the standard of care we will use to evaluate the energy 
company’s conduct. Most discussions assume there are two op-
tions: strict liability and negligence. Under strict liability, de-
fendants must offer compensation for any harms they cause. 
 
 389. Current EPA regulations list MCLs for 79 chemicals. 40 C.F.R. 
 §§ 141.61–.65 (2012). 
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Under negligence, by contrast, defendants are liable only if 
they fail to take reasonable precautions. Under the so-called 
Hand formula, they are negligent (and thus liable) if (a) the 
marginal benefits of the untaken precaution (in terms of reduc-
tion in the probability or severity of the harm) are greater than 
(b) the marginal costs of taking the precaution.390
1. Our Hybrid Proposal 
  
In contrast, we recommend a hybrid approach that, in 
form, is based on negligence, but as a practical matter would 
function like strict liability in many circumstances. Our main 
goal in offering this hybrid approach is to integrate best prac-
tices rules with the liability regime. Specifically, we recommend 
adopting a negligence framework requiring energy companies 
to conform to a standard of reasonable care that would be de-
fined in significant part by best practices regulations.  
Thus, we would apply three different standards of care de-
pending on the circumstances: First, violation of best practices 
regulations would establish negligence per se (which functional-
ly resembles strict liability). Second, compliance with best prac-
tices regulations would establish a (qualified) regulatory com-
pliance defense. Third, if no best practices regulations govern 
the problem leading to the contamination—or, relatedly, if it is 
impossible to identify how the contamination occurred—we 
would apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which would, for 
practical purposes, function much like strict liability. Thus, 
although we are advocating a rule that is negligence-based in 
form, the practical effect is a combination of a regulatory com-
pliance defense with what otherwise is in function (if not in 
form) strict liability (i.e., when energy companies violate best 
practices regulations or when no best practices regulation gov-
erns the cause of the contamination). 
2. Comparison of Strict Liability, Negligence, and Our Hybrid 
Proposal: Five Factors 
To explain this recommendation, we should step back and 
 
 390. The “Hand formula” derives from an algebraic formulation of negli-
gence developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). As Judge Posner explains, “If . . . the benefits 
in accident avoidance exceed the costs of prevention, society is better off if 
those costs are incurred and the accident averted, and so [injurers are] made 
liable, in the expectation that self-interest will lead [them] to adopt the pre-
cautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort judgments.” Richard A. Posner, 
A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972). 
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evaluate how strict liability and negligence—and, for that mat-
ter, our hybrid proposal—compare on five dimensions: the in-
centive they create for defendants to take precautions; decision 
costs; the incentive for defendants to modulate the level of their 
activity; the incentive of plaintiffs to take precautions; and the 
interaction with best practices regulations. 
a. Incentive to Take Precautions 
Strict liability and negligence are thought to create essen-
tially the same incentive for defendants to take efficient pre-
cautions (as, of course, would a hybrid of the two).391 Under neg-
ligence, defendants will take precautions as long as the 
marginal cost is lower than the expected harm (or, otherwise, 
they will be liable). They will do the same under strict liability, 
since their choice is either to take the precaution or to pay the 
damages, and they will presumably choose the course that is 
less expensive.392
b. Decision Costs  
 
With respect to decision costs, negligence and strict liabil-
ity potentially diverge.393
 
 391. See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort 
Law: The Puzzle of Negligence, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 707, 715–16 (2010) (“[E]arly 
on, economic analysts of law recognized that negligence rules and strict-
liability rules provided similar incentives to injurers.”); Richard A. Epstein, 
Causation—In Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 661 (1987) 
(“[T]he incentive effects of both the strict liability rule and the negligence 
rule—in the situation of private necessity or not—are essentially identical.”). 
 In its cost-benefit or Hand formula in-
carnation, negligence requires two calculations: first, the ex-
pected harm if a precaution is not taken; and, second, the cost 
of taking the precaution. In contrast, strict liability requires a 
calculation only of the actual harm the plaintiff has incurred, 
without any need to determine the cost of taking precautions. 
Thus, strict liability requires one less calculation—and a less 
complicated one at that (actual as opposed to expected harm). 
For this reason, strict liability is thought to reduce decision 
costs. Nevertheless, there is an offsetting factor: strict liability 
is likely to generate more cases, since defendants are liable 
 392. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict 
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); Stephen G. Gilles, Negli-
gence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 
1297–98 (1992). 
 393. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF TORT LAW 65–66 (1987); Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability versus Negli-
gence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1921–22 (2007). 
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even if precautions are not cost-justified.394
c. Incentives to Reduce the Level of Activity 
 In other words, the 
reduction in decision costs per case must be weighed against 
the cost of processing more cases, making it on balance unclear 
which standard generates higher decisional costs. In any event, 
our proposal obviously requires a determination not only of 
whether the defendant caused the harm, but also of how (i.e., so 
that a determination is made about whether the conduct was 
subject to a regulation). This second inquiry potentially adds to 
decision costs. It is impossible to determine, however, whether 
the hybrid would impose higher decision costs than either a 
pure negligence or a strict liability regime, since it would incor-
porate elements of both. 
Although negligence and strict liability provide identical 
incentives to take efficient precautions, strict liability creates a 
greater incentive to reduce the level of potentially harmful ac-
tivity.395 Unlike negligence, strict liability imposes liability even 
if all efficient precautions are taken. This liability—even for 
non-negligent conduct—can motivate defendants to avoid po-
tentially harmful conduct. Relatedly, strict liability creates 
stronger incentives to innovate. Since defendants bear all acci-
dent costs, they are motivated to find new ways to minimize 
them.396
 
 394. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
 Negligence, by contrast, spares defendants from liabil-
ity as long as they take identified precautions, which usually 
are grounded in existing practices. If the status quo is enough 
to avoid liability, there is less incentive to improve upon it. This 
difference motivates us to incorporate aspects of strict liability 
in our hybrid proposal (through negligence per se and res ipsa 
loquitur). After all, since fracturing in shale is relatively new, it 
is important to create incentives for energy companies to take 
water contamination risks into account in deciding where (and, 
indeed, whether) to drill and to develop risk-reducing innova-
tions. 
393, at 65.  
 395. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
7 (1980); see Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 
1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“By making the actor strictly liable . . . we give him 
an incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of 
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care, assumed to be 
futile, but instead relocating, changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing 
point) the activity giving rise to the accident.”). 
 396. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 335, at 340. 
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d. Incentives for Plaintiffs  
Negligence and strict liability create different incentives 
for plaintiffs. Under negligence, plaintiffs cannot collect from 
defendants who have taken efficient precautions.397 In this cir-
cumstance, plaintiffs have a greater incentive to adjust their 
own behavior to avoid injury, an incentive that does not arise to 
the same extent under strict liability.398
e. Coordination with Best Practices Regulation: Three 
Liability Rules  
 At the margin, it is of 
course helpful to motivate plaintiffs to take precautions, alt-
hough in the context of fracturing, their largely passive role re-
duces the importance of this variable. 
Although the analysis so far might suggest a mild prefer-
ence for strict liability (given its incentive effects on activity 
levels and innovation), a key advantage of a negligence frame-
work is it can be adapted more readily to reinforce best practic-
es regulation, which, as discussed above, is an important ele-
ment of our regulatory strategy. Indeed, we can use a 
negligence framework to encourage both compliance with such 
rules and the development of new rules. At the same time, we 
can couple the negligence framework with the doctrines of neg-
ligence per se and res ipsa loquitur so that it operates function-
ally like strict liability in settings that are not yet governed by 
best practices regulations. 
Let us now take a closer look at the three liability rules. 
Under the doctrine of negligence per se, any violation of a stat-
utory or regulatory standard of care that causes harm automat-
ically gives rise to liability.399
 
 397. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 194 
(4th ed. 2012) (noting that a negligence regime can be characterized as “strict 
liability for the victims of non-negligently caused accidents”). 
 In effect, the tribunal forgoes any 
 398. If plaintiff recoveries are reduced by comparative negligence, then this 
doctrine motivates plaintiffs to take precautions—even if it is paired with 
strict liability, as it is in some states. See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 
1162, 1168–69 (Cal. 1978). Comparative negligence has been adopted by legis-
lation and occasionally by judicial decision in 46 states. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 517–22 (5th ed. 2010). The proliferation of com-
parative negligence clearly diminishes the advantage of negligence in motivat-
ing plaintiffs to avoid harm.  
 399. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTION-
AL HARM § 14 (2010) (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor vio-
lates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the ac-
tor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons 
the statute is designed to protect.”); id. at cmt. a (“statute” should be broadly 
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direct comparison of the benefits and costs of taking particular 
precautions, using the regulatory determination instead. As a 
result, any violation of a best practices regulation that causes 
water contamination would yield a finding of negligence. This 
doctrine provides a powerful incentive for firms to comply with 
best practices regulations. It also reduces the factfinder’s deci-
sion costs by eliminating the need for a cost-benefit analysis.  
The mirror image of negligence per se is the regulatory 
compliance defense. Just as a violation establishes liability, 
compliance with a regulation can shield the defendant from lia-
bility.400
The regulatory compliance defense comes in two versions: a 
strong version, in which the regulatory standard serves as a 
“ceiling” as well as a “floor” in establishing the defendant’s duty 
of care;
 For example, if a best practices regulation requires a 
four-inch cement casing, the plaintiff cannot argue that rea-
sonable care requires six inches. To be sure, the regulatory 
compliance defense would not, however, stop a plaintiff from 
showing that the energy company was negligent in the way it 
implemented the required best practice. Thus, even if the well 
casing was the requisite four inches, the energy company could 
still be deemed negligent if it installed or maintained the cas-
ing improperly. Even so, the regulatory compliance defense, 
like the doctrine of negligence per se, provides a strong incen-
tive to comply with best practices regulations. 
401 and a qualified version, in which compliance with a 
regulatory standard is regarded as “evidence of nonnegligence” 
but is not conclusive.402 Most commentators favor the qualified 
version of the defense, on the ground that regulatory require-
ments will often lag behind the state of the art, perhaps be-
cause agencies are underfunded or become captured by the 
firms they are supposed to regulate. These are legitimate con-
cerns.403
 
defined to include administrative regulations); see Ariel Porat, Expanding Li-
ability for Negligence Per Se, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979 (2009). 
 But watering down the defense reduces the incentives 
 400. E.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993).  
 401. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compli-
ance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210 (1996).  
 402. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTION-
AL HARM § 16 (2010); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety 
Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1988).  
 403. A related problem is that best practices regulations will generally be 
formulated as minimum standards of safety. Relying on a breach of such a 
standard to establish negligence, as under the negligence per se doctrine, is 
unproblematic, because the defendant has clearly fallen below the minimum 
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of the industry to support the development of additional best 
practices regulations. It also overlooks the dangers of allowing 
courts and juries to second-guess regulators in matters that en-
tail considerable scientific uncertainty, and ignores the sub-
stantial savings in litigation costs from adopting regulatory 
standards as the measure of reasonable care.404 On balance, we 
prefer a relatively robust version of the regulatory compliance 
defense, leaving open the possibility of overriding it in unusual 
circumstances. Thus, we would suggest that compliance with 
best practices regulations should create a presumption that the 
defendant has exercised reasonable care with respect to the 
conduct governed by the regulation, but should be subject to 
rebuttal if the plaintiff could show that the relevant best prac-
tices rule deviates substantially from the rule followed in other 
oil and gas jurisdictions.405
What if water is contaminated through a pathway that is 
not governed by any best practices regulation? In this circum-
stance, we would use the burden-shifting rule associated with 
the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
  
406
 
required standard of care. Relying on compliance with a minimum standard to 
establish the absence of negligence is potentially problematic, however, if the 
minimum standard falls below the standard that would be established using 
the cost-benefit approach of the Hand formula. See Mark Geistfield, Tort Law 
in the Age of Statutes, 98 IOWA L.REV. (forthcoming 2014). Although it is not 
clear how often this theoretical possibility would emerge with clarity in actual 
practice, it provides an additional reason to adopt a qualified rather than com-
plete version of the regulatory compliance defense. 
 Specifically, 
 404. Ausness, supra note 401, at 1265–66. 
 405. The use of best practices regulations to establish negligence per se or 
regulatory compliance could be mandated by statute, in which case these un-
derstandings would of course be binding on the liability tribunal as a matter of 
legislative supremacy. Absent such legislation, we believe tribunals should de-
fer to best practices regulations as a matter of comity to the legislature or the 
agency exercising delegated authority that has adopted these regulations. See 
Geistfield, supra note 403. Because such deference would be grounded in comi-
ty, the tribunal would not need to consider such questions as whether it was a 
purpose of the regulation to protect the plaintiff or the defendant. The tribunal 
would also be free, in appropriate cases, to conclude that the regulation does 
not reflect a considered judgment about the appropriate degree of precaution 
necessary to establish or defeat a claim of negligence. 
 406. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTION-
AL HARM § 17 (2010) (“The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been 
negligent when the accident causing the plaintiff’s harm is a type of accident 
that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of actors of 
which the defendant is the relevant member.”). Courts have traditionally re-
quired, in addition, that the agency or instrumentality that caused the harm 
be “within the exclusive control of the defendant” and that the injury “must 
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the 
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provided the evidence eliminates other responsible causes, in-
cluding the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, the fact 
finder would be authorized to infer that the energy company’s 
negligence caused the contamination—in effect, without any di-
rect evidence of such negligence. Although this inference would 
satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof in showing negligence, the 
defendant can try to rebut it, for instance, by arguing that the 
contamination was caused by an Act of God (like an earth-
quake), or was an inevitable accident that would have occurred 
even if fracturing had not taken place in the vicinity.407
In practice, this application of res ipsa loquitur would op-
erate something like strict liability for pathways of contamina-
tion not governed by best practices regulations. Defendants 
would rarely have the information needed to rebut the pre-
sumption—for example, about movements deep underground 
that may have caused fracturing fluid or methane to migrate 
from shale seams aquifers. Thus, they would likely be found 
negligent. By subjecting energy companies to a high certainty 
of liability where there is no applicable regulation, we give 
them yet another incentive to support the development of new 
risk-reducing technologies or practices which, in turn, would 
provide the basis for additional best practices regulations.  
  
A further reason to use something like de facto strict liabil-
ity for unregulated pathways of contamination is to ensure that 
compensation is available to injured parties. Compensation is 
especially important where insurance is unavailable. Since 
fracturing in shale deposits is relatively new and there is un-
certainty about the magnitude of the relevant risks,408 insur-
ance companies are unlikely to issue landowners policies cover-
ing water contamination, at least for now. A relatively secure 
right to compensation for risks that are especially uncertain 
could also marginally help reduce public apprehensions about 
fracturing.409
 
plaintiff.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
244 (5th ed. 1984).  
 
 407. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FORPHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 cmt. g (2010). 
 408. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.6. 
 409. As George Fletcher has argued, strict liability is appropriate for non-
reciprocal risks: that is, when defendants are imposing risks on plaintiffs, but 
plaintiffs are not imposing comparable risks on defendants. George P. Fletch-
er, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 541–48 (1972). 
Although energy companies create a risk that a landowner’s water will be con-
taminated, landowners do not impose a comparable risk on energy companies 
(other than the risk of liability). As a result, fracturing presents the sort of 
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Which sorts of risks would be governed by one of the per se 
rules based on best practices regulations and which would be 
governed by res ipsa loquitur? By and large, the per se rules 
would apply to those water contamination risks that are best 
understood and have the highest probability of occurring, such 
as surface spills, leaks of fracturing fluid or methane through 
well casings, and improper disposal of flow-back or produced 
water.410
C. PLAINTIFF FAULT AND RELEASES FROM LIABILITY 
 Conversely, those risks that are less well understood—
and that would appear, based on what we know so far, to pre-
sent lower probabilities of occurring—would be governed by res 
ipsa loquitur. This would include migration of methane or frac-
turing fluid from shale seams, and contamination produced by 
vibrations that dislodge pockets of gas or contaminants already 
present in aquifers or water wells.  
We do not expect plaintiff fault to be an issue in the typical 
water contamination case, where the energy company is active 
and the landowner is passive. But the issue could arise in some 
cases. For instance, assume that an abandoned well on plain-
tiff’s property contributed to the contamination, and the plain-
tiff knew about the well but did not disclose it before the energy 
company began fracturing. In this sort of case, energy compa-
nies should be allowed to raise the plaintiff’s comparative neg-
ligence as a defense. Liability should be apportioned between 
the plaintiff and the defendant based on how much each con-
tributed to the contamination.411
In some cases, we would also recognize a defense of as-
sumption of risk. In theory, one could hold that the plaintiff as-
sumed the risk simply by signing a mineral lease, with the ex-
pectation of sharing in oil and gas revenues. Given the large 
uncertainties about the risks associated with fracturing, we are 
reluctant to endorse any such broad defense. If, however, a 
plaintiff has signed a lease that includes a written (and promi-
nently disclosed) release of liability for water contamination—
 Likewise, if the plaintiff in-
vokes a health effect, but has also engaged in unhealthy behav-
ior (e.g., smoking), the energy company could argue 
comparative negligence. 
 
nonreciprocal risk that favors strict liability. 
 410. For discussion of these risks see supra Parts IV.A–D. 
 411. To be clear, we do not recommend contributory negligence, which af-
fords a complete defense to liability, since this might undercut defendants’ in-
centives to take precautions.  
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and especially if this entitles the plaintiff to extra considera-
tion—we would respect the release.  
D. MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
Any harm incurred by the plaintiff should be measured ac-
curately.412 A key element of harm will be damage to the land, 
which ordinarily is measured by the decline in the land’s fair 
market value. Yet this measure could undercompensate land-
owners by ignoring their subjective valuation of the land; after 
all, the fact that owners have not sold it means they value it 
more than its market value.413 A partial solution is to let the 
plaintiff choose instead to recover the cost of restoring access to 
potable water, for instance, by decontaminating the existing 
well, digging a new one, or piping or trucking in water.414 In 
addition, damages for any health effects will also have to be 
calculated. This sort of damages is, of course, familiar in other 
types of litigation, and is sometimes accompanied by damages 
for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and other noneco-
nomic damages.415
 
 412. Accurate compensatory damages are more important under strict lia-
bility than under negligence. Under the Hand formula, as long as the compen-
sation is sufficiently large to influence the conduct of the defendant, under- or 
over-compensation arguably does not matter: the defendant will take only 
those precautions that are cost-justified. Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanc-
tions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2324 (2010). Under strict liability, by 
contrast, the defendant will take efficient precautions only if the measure of 
damages accurately mirrors the costs incurred by the plaintiff. If the damages 
are too low, the defendant will take insufficient precautions; if they are too 
high, the defendant will take excessive precautions. Since our liability scheme 
will operate in part like a strict liability regime—relying extensively on negli-
gence per se and res ipsa loquitur—accuracy in measuring damages is im-
portant to maintaining correct incentives for defendants. 
  
 413. Ignoring the subjective value of landholdings may work two harms: 
first, by undercompensating property holders and thereby creating perverse 
incentives for injury; second by denigrating the personal connections that ren-
der land important to owners in the first place. Christopher Serkin, The Mean-
ing of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 677, 722–23 (2005). 
 414. We do not believe the difference in these damage measures would be 
so great as to render the “cost of cure” grossly disproportionate to the benefit 
to the plaintiff, at least in the usual case. At most, the restorative measure 
would be the cost of installing a large tank and paying periodically to truck in 
water to fill it. Cf. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 
(Okla. 1962) (refusing to award cost of cure when the fair market value meas-
ure of damages was $300 and the cost of restoring land disrupted by mining 
was $25,000).  
 415. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering 
Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal 
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Punitive damages are another matter, since they can lead 
to large and unpredictable awards that can chill socially valua-
ble activity. One potential rationale for punitive damages—the 
need to offset the difficulty of detecting harm416
E. ATTORNEY’S FEES 
—should not 
apply if our suggestions about periodic retesting and presump-
tions about health effects are adopted. We believe punitive 
damages would be appropriate for defendants who falsify re-
porting requirements or knowingly violate regulations insuring 
well integrity or preventing surface spills. However, we would 
preclude the award of punitive damages for defendants who are 
in full compliance with all best practices regulations and disclo-
sure requirements, engage in periodic testing, and are free of 
any affirmative misconduct. This safe harbor rule would give 
energy companies an added incentive to comply with these 
safety-promoting rules.  
Will competent lawyers be willing to bring cases? A contin-
gent fee should be a sufficient inducement if the potential re-
covery is large enough, as, for instance, in class actions or cases 
involving serious health effects.417 In cases that present only 
property damage to individual landholdings, however, recover-
ies may not be sufficient to attract the contingent-fee bar. To 
eliminate this possibility, we can adopt a one-way fee shifting 
rule, like those found in the civil rights laws and the citizen 
suit provisions of environmental laws.418 In these regimes, if de-
fendants are held liable, they have to pay the plaintiff’s reason-
able attorneys’ fees. Experience with civil rights and environ-
mental claims suggests that such a fee-shifting rule is 
sufficient to attract legal representation, even if damage 
awards are modest in scope.419
 
for Change, 100 NW. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006) (reporting that pain-and-suffering 
awards comprise fifty percent of total awards in some areas). 
 
 416. Id. at 2075. 
 417. Cf. Janet C. Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 
DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 350 (1998) (describing a benefit of contingent fees as be-
ing access to representation for those who otherwise would not have it). 
 418. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (civil rights suits); Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) 
(2006). 
 419. Martin A. Schwartz, Attorney’s Fees in Civil Rights Cases—October 
2009 Term, 27 TOURO L. REV. 113, 114–15 (2011). 
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F. INSOLVENCY RISK 
Liability regimes cannot achieve their deterrence and com-
pensation goals if defendants are insolvent when the action is 
brought. In general, we think the risk of insolvency is low, if 
only because any contamination from a particular oil or gas 
well will probably be localized, and this will largely eliminate 
the prospect of catastrophic liability. Yet the cumulative effect 
of many incidents of contamination could create at least some 
risk of insolvency, especially if health effects emerge. In addi-
tion, this insolvency risk could increase with time. If water con-
tamination arises only years after fracturing (e.g., because it 
takes time for chemicals to migrate), the energy company might 
be gone by the time the problem comes to light. 
The standard private solutions to insolvency risk are bond-
ing and insurance.420 Bonding is common in the oil and gas in-
dustry to ensure proper well closure and site remediation once 
drilling is over. These bonds are commonly required by mineral 
leases and, in some states, by law. For instance, energy compa-
nies often can secure a drilling permit only if they post a bond 
or otherwise demonstrate their solvency. This makes sense.421 
At least one state, Maryland, has required that energy compa-
nies show evidence of insurance before they may undertake oil 
or gas drilling activity.422
Solvency is less of an issue, moreover, as an increasing 
share of shale oil and gas production is conducted by major 
companies. Large production companies are gradually replac-
ing the small and independent firms that pioneered this prac-
tice.
 
423 Even the small companies are likely to partner with 
large and well capitalized well servicing companies, which 
build the wells and engage in fracturing.424
 
 420. See generally Klass & Wilson, supra note 
 There is some evi-
255, at 160–64 (explaining 
the ways bonding and insurance are used to manage risk). 
 421. See, e.g., Heather Ash, EPA Launches Hydraulic Fracturing Study to 
Investigate Health and Environmental Concerns While North Dakota Resists 
Regulation: Should Citizens Be Concerned?, 87 N.D. L. REV. 717, 737–38 
(2011) (comparing North Dakota’s bonding requirements to Pennsylvania’s). 
 422. MD. CODE ANN., Envir. § 14-111(7) (West 2013). For a discussion, see 
Hannah J. Wiseman & David A. Dana, A Market Approach to Regulating the 
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncer-
tain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 423. See Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move in, Safety 
Goes Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013, at A1. 
 424. In 2003—which was early in the development of the practice of frac-
turing in shale beds—three companies (Halliburton, Schlumberger, and BJ 
Services Company) performed 95% of all fracturing services in the United 
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dence, moreover, that larger and better capitalized companies 
generally make fewer mistakes and use safer, state of the art 
practices.425
If insolvency turns out to be a problem, a mixed liabil-
ity/government insurance regime may be needed. The Price 
Anderson Act, which applies to nuclear power, is one model;
 
426 
the Oil Pollution Act, governing oil spills, is another.427
VII.  IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS   
 In this 
spirit, any energy company that engages in fracturing could be 
required to contribute to a general insurance fund, which would 
cover the damages if the responsible energy company is insol-
vent. If the fund is exhausted, taxpayers would make up the 
difference. In other words, the first recourse would be the firm 
responsible. But if it cannot satisfy the judgment, the insurance 
fund would step in, backstopped by the government. To miti-
gate moral hazard, firms should be charged experience-based 
fees, so that those with a record of accidents have to pay more. 
So far, our analysis has focused on the functional charac-
teristics that our proposed regime should have. We now turn to 
the separate question of institutional choice, namely, which 
level of government should implement it (federal, state, or lo-
cal) and which branch should do so (legislature, administrative 
agency, or court).  
In considering these issues, we add an assumption that has 
 
States. See EPA 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. More companies 
have begun engaging in pressure pumping, so that this sector has become 
more competitive. Alison Sider, Fracking Firms Face New Crop of Competitors, 
WALL ST. J., July 9, 2013, at B6. Even so, the Department of Justice has begun 
an antitrust investigation of the pressure pumping industry. Alison Sider, 
U.S. Starts Antitrust Probe of Pressure-Pumping Sector, WALL ST. J., July 24, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732361070457862660257 
2779248.html.  
 425. Daniel Gilbert & Russell Gold, As Big Drillers Move In, Safety Goes 
Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013, at A1 (“Regulators and some environmentalists 
say the multinationals bring more rigorous approaches, mindful that one big 
mistake can affect their ability to operate everywhere.”); id. (“The rate of envi-
ronmental violations has steadily dropped as major energy companies have 
bought up smaller drillers, according to a Journal review of Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Protection inspection records for Marcellus opera-
tions from 2008 to 2012.”). 
 426. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). For a general overview of the Price Anderson 
Act, amendments, and implementing regulations, see Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-
Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?—The Sixty-Three Million Dol-
lar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 427. 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006). 
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not featured in our analysis so far: historical practice will have 
significant influence over these allocations of authority. Institu-
tions that have regulated issues in the past will have a pre-
sumptive claim to do so in the future, based on their expertise, 
their relationships with important interest groups, and their 
natural inclination to protect their turf. Of course, if the status 
quo were severely dysfunctional, we would recommend a 
change. But as we will suggest, reasonable normative argu-
ments support the existing allocation of authority.  
Another preliminary point is that ambiguity about the ul-
timate assignment of authority can be a virtue. The threat of 
enhanced federal regulation of fracturing, for instance, may 
motivate states to invigorate their regulatory systems.428 Like-
wise, pressure from local governments which may be eager to 
regulate fracturing may cause states to reconsider their poli-
cies.429
A. JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE 
 Indeed, in the same way that we do not yet have enough 
information to adopt best practices regulations for all pathways 
of contamination, we also should not rush to finalize the alloca-
tion of regulatory authority. In the face of pervasive uncertain-
ty, the existing alignment of authority is a sensible place to 
start, and it can be revisited if new information justifies a 
change. 
1. Historical Practice 
Currently, states have principal regulatory responsibility 
over oil and gas production as well as groundwater. Indeed, 
states have been primarily responsible for oil and gas regula-
tion ever since Colonel Drake erected his first oil well in west-
ern Pennsylvania in the nineteenth century.430 This is because 
oil and gas production involves difficult issues of property law, 
including allocating oil and gas reserves among different land-
owners, as well as regulating the common pool problem and the 
incentives for waste created by the rule of capture. As a result, 
every state where fracturing is taking place has an oil and gas 
commission.431
 
 428. Kurth et al., supra note 
 
258, at 174–75. 
 429. Cf. id. at 156–57. 
 430. Cf. Benincasa, supra note 11, at 8, 9 (discussing state control over oil 
and gas regulation for more than a century). 
 431. Cf. Kurth et al., supra note 258, at 65–154 (detailing state regulations 
of fracking). Although Utah does not specifically regulate fracking, it does 
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In contrast, the federal government has played almost no 
role in regulating oil and gas production on private land.432 Alt-
hough it regulates production on federal lands through the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) of the Department of Interi-
or, historically the BLM has largely tracked the regulations of 
the state where federal lands are located.433 Another division of 
the Department of the Interior regulates offshore drilling.434 
Although environmentalists often criticize the lack of federal 
oversight—describing exemptions from federal environmental 
law as “loopholes”—an alternative explanation is that states 
were already regulating these issues when these statutes were 
enacted, and there was no perceived need to replace them.435
The regulation of groundwater has a similar history. 
Again, the states’ role emerged from property law. Starting 
with a simple rule of capture by surface owners, states have 
evolved toward either “reasonable use” regimes where ground-
water is plentiful or more elaborate prior appropriation and 
permitting systems in arid areas.
  
436 Today, many state water 
authorities regulate the use of pesticides to protect groundwa-
ter, a number of states have wellhead protection programs, and 
a handful of states mandate groundwater monitoring.437 The 
Federal Clean Water Act generally leaves groundwater to state 
regulation,438
 
have an oil and gas commission. Id. at 140. See Utah Oil and Gas: Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, UTAH DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://oilgas.ogm.utah 
.gov (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 except that the federal Safe Drinking Water Act 
 432. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political 
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 477 (2013). 
 433. BLM is in the process of completing a major rulemaking to establish 
preliminary best practices regulations for fracturing activity on federal lands. 
Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal 
and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
 434. Once called the Minerals Management Service, it was reorganized and 
renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and En-
forcement (BOEMRE) after the Deepwater Horizon accident. See Reorganiza-
tion of Title 30, Code of Federal Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,051 (Oct. 4, 
2010). 
 435. For a general discussion of the exemptions fracking operators have 
secured in Congress, see Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Frac-
tured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 242–44 (2010). 
 436. Cf. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 4:1, 
4:7–12, 6:1, 4:28–32 (John Damico & Barbara J. Hagan eds., 2013). 
 437. See generally PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 184–92 (2004) 
(explaining factors affecting state decisions to pass these regulations).  
 438. See generally Jason R. Jones, The Clean Water Act: Groundwater Reg-
ulation and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J. 
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(SDWA) offers a partial exception (primarily) for public water 
systems.439 After the Eleventh Circuit applied the SDWA’s Un-
derground Injection Control program to fracturing opera-
tions,440 Congress amended the act to exempt fracturing.441 In-
jection of waste water is still covered by the program, as is the 
use of diesel fuel in fracturing. This has again been decried as a 
“loophole,”442 but it can also be seen as restoring the status quo 
ante existing before this decision, in which states regulated 
groundwater quality unless public water systems were impli-
cated.443
2. Policy Justifications for State Regulation 
 
Of course, if the states’ historical role is unjustified on poli-
cy grounds, we should change it. In theory, we could try to re-
solve this question based on an abstract assessment of the ef-
fects of inter-jurisdictional competition. Does environmental 
federalism inspire “races to the bottom” or “races to the top”?444 
Likewise, does NIMBYism (the “not in my backyard” syndrome) 
affect one level of government more than others?445 These de-
bates often turn on competing hypotheses—built on conflicting 
assumptions—about the distribution of interest group influence 
at different levels of government.446
 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93. 101 (1999). 
 At the state and local level, 
some observers contend that energy companies have captured 
regulators; others claim landowners ultimately call the shots. 
At the national level, some think oil and gas interest groups 
 439. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)8 (2006) (providing authority to regulate pub-
lic water systems and groundwater). 
 440. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
 441. See sources cited supra note 278. 
 442. See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2009, at A28.  
 443. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appala-
chia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 246 (2010).  
 444. Compare Kirstin H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is 
There a “Race” and Is it “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (defend-
ing the race to the bottom thesis), with DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (1995) (argu-
ing for race to the top). 
 445. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Why Are there NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 
144, 145 (2001) (arguing that homeowners comprise most NIMBYs and that 
homeowners exert “major political force” at a local level). 
 446. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking 
the ‘Race-to-the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).  
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have undue clout; others claim that environmentalists have 
disproportionate influence. We have no unique empirical in-
sights that would allow us to endorse or condemn state regula-
tion based on one of these inter-jurisdictional competition mod-
els.447
a. Matching Principle 
 Instead, we focus on four other policy considerations.  
We believe a regulatory jurisdiction generally should corre-
spond to the geographic scope of the externality, sometimes 
known as the “matching principle.”448 Thus, the federal gov-
ernment should regulate interstate pollution, the states should 
regulate spillovers confined to a single state, and localities 
should regulate externalities with local effects. This assures 
that the regulator considers all costs and benefits of the activity 
without ignoring those borne by outsiders, while simultaneous-
ly preserving flexibility to account for local conditions, tradi-
tions, and preferences. The Europeans call this the principle of 
subsidiarity.449 In this spirit, groundwater contamination from 
oil and gas production is generally assumed to be a local issue. 
Contamination from fracturing is likely to affect only water 
that is close to the relevant drilling or waste disposal.450
 
 447. For an (inconclusive) debate about these issues, compare David B. 
Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2012) (concluding that state regulation is 
optimal) with Michael Burger, Response, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150 (2013) (arguing for federal regulation). 
 Cases 
in which an aquifer straddles more than one county or crosses a 
state line are thought to be rare. If these assumptions are cor-
rect, the scope of the externality suggests that localities should 
take the lead, perhaps as an adjunct to zoning and other land 
use controls. Of course, there is uncertainty about the possible 
scope of contamination, like much else. If it turns out that inci-
dents of contamination affect multiple jurisdictions, this varia-
ble should be reconsidered. 
 448. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the 
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Au-
thority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal En-
vironmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 204 (1974). 
 449. See George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in 
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339 
(1994). 
 450. Spence, supra note 256, at 492–93 (concluding that groundwater con-
tamination issues “are local”). 
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b. Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale in regulation are also important.451 
Complex issues require a staff of experts, and a tax base that 
can support them. All else being equal, then, more complex is-
sues are likely to be addressed centrally, where there is greater 
capacity to raise revenue and less duplication of effort. Indeed, 
the best justification for the SDWA—and the federal role in 
regulating local public drinking water systems—is the tech-
nical expertise required, although actual enforcement ordinari-
ly remains with the states.452
Cutting against this, however, is EPA’s lack of expertise in 
oil and gas production. States have much more experience with 
this industry, as do other parts of the federal government (e.g., 
BLM and BOEMRE). Likewise, federal expertise about 
groundwater hydrology is concentrated in the U.S. Geological 
Survey, another unit of the Department of the Interior (alt-
hough EPA also has relevant experience from administering 
CERCLA, RCRA, and the SDWA). In regulating fracturing, 
then, EPA would need to build out its expertise substantially. 
Federal regulation also tends to be ponderously slow, perhaps 
in part because the stakes are higher and consequently more 
interest groups get involved.
 By analogy, scale economies 
might justify federal regulation of fracturing. After all, the 
technology is complex, and the federal government—and, in 
particular, EPA—has a comparative advantage in mobilizing 
resources for field research, gathering and comparing data from 
across the country, and so forth.  
453
 
 451. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federal-
ism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 
YALE L. J. 1196, 1212 (1977); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Fed-
eralism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 614–15 (1996) (“[T]echnical capacity generally 
will be weakened by devolution . . . . Data collection and quality control, fate 
and transport studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and risk as-
sessments all represent highly technical activities in which expertise is im-
portant and scale economies are significant.”); Buzbee, supra note 
 While the states have fewer re-
sources overall, they have a significant head start in regulating 
oil and gas and, to a lesser extent, groundwater. Although this 
expertise is divided among the states, and there is undoubtedly 
363, at 111–
12.  
 452. Cf. Sarah E. Lewis, The 1986 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water 
Act and Their Effect on Groundwater, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893, 894–95 at 
n.17 (1989) (mentioning a major motivation argued by proponents of the 
amendment as being the states lack of expertise). 
 453. Cf. Christopher S. Kulander, Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Is-
sues and Trends, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1001, 1141 (2013). 
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duplication of effort, it is also true that production technology 
varies significantly from one oil and gas field to another, as do 
groundwater conditions. 
c. Brandeisian Experimentalism 
The third factor, Brandeisian experimentalism, favors 
states and localities over the federal government.454 States have 
adopted diverse approaches in regulating groundwater, as well 
as oil and gas, because physical conditions vary dramatically, 
as do property rights. As a result, states (and localities) are 
likely to implement different liability regimes, offering a natu-
ral experiment about what works best and why. State regula-
tors talk to each other, and are likely to emulate approaches 
adopted in other states that prove successful.455 Institutional 
mechanisms have been created to promote the exchange of in-
formation, including STRONGER (a coalition of state oil and 
gas regulators) and the Groundwater Protection Council (a 
group of state groundwater protection regulatory agencies).456
d. Capacity to Adjudicate Disputes  
  
Finally, because our regulatory scheme incorporates a lia-
bility rule, the relevant regulatory jurisdiction must have the 
capacity to adjudicate disputes about water contamination ex 
post and enforce judgments. Both the states and the federal 
government have judicial systems that have extensive experi-
ence with liability regimes. Localities generally do not have 
their own liability regimes, which is a sufficient reason to elim-
inate local regulation as an option. In addition to their judicial 
systems, states have experience with worker compensation 
schemes, and the federal government has a variety of special-
ized liability regimes, many of which are implemented by ad-
ministrative agencies.457
 
 454. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). For a recent defense of state experimentalism, see JOHN 
O. MCGINNIS, ACCELERATING DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMING GOVERNANCE 
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 40–59 (2013). 
 It is not clear that either the states or 
 455. Empirical studies show that state legislators are more willing to pass 
groundwater regulations “when neighboring states have already done so, as 
political uncertainty is reduced and legislators may also benefit from a ‘band-
wagon effect.’” TESKE, supra note 437, at 191. 
 456. For a discussion, see SURYA RAJAN, PRUDENT OIL AND GAS DEVELOP-
MENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF US REGULATIONS 2 (2013). 
 457. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in National Child-
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the federal government has any strong advantage on this score. 
e. Policy Justifications: Summing Up 
Admittedly, these four factors do not all point in the same 
direction. Arguably, the geographic scope of the externality fa-
vors localities, although uncertainties about the scope of con-
tamination would perhaps warrant centering regulation in a 
body having a larger jurisdictional scope, like the states.458 
Economies of scale favor the federal government.459 The states 
are a viable compromise on both dimensions, since they are 
closer to the externality than the federal government and have 
greater expertise and resources than local governments. At the 
same time, states are well positioned to serve as Brandeisian 
laboratories and also have deep experience regulating the oil 
and gas industry.460
Although we believe it makes sense for states to spearhead 
the regulatory response to the water contamination risk, the 
federal and local governments can still play a role. Given the 
federal government’s superior resources and data-gathering ca-
pacity, it is reasonable for it to sponsor studies, and to encour-
age the exchange of information about best practices among 
state regulators.
 The states also have significant experience 
with liability regimes. Therefore, it is certainly reasonable—
and arguably preferable—for states to take the lead in regulat-
ing the risk of water contamination from fracturing, at least for 
now. 
461
B. IMPLEMENTING BODY 
 Also, we reiterate that this analysis applies 
to the water contamination risk, but not to other environmental 
risks. Air pollution risks, for example, which could have na-
tional or even global implications, may more sensibly be regu-
lated by the federal government than the states. That question 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
If states are the logical locus of regulatory authority, then 
the relevant state regulatory commission is the logical body to 
 
hood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 352–54 (2011) (detailing 
the compensation structure under the NCVIA).  
 458. Supra Part VII.A.2.a. 
 459. Supra Part VII.A.2.b. 
 460. Supra Parts VII.A.2.c., VII.A.1. 
 461. See Wiseman, supra note 163, at 810 (urging that “the federal gov-
ernment should provide a comprehensive database of state, local, and regional 
oil, gas, and fracturing regulations and should separately document regulatory 
modifications as they occur”). 
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adopt best practices regulations for water contamination risks. 
In most states, this is the oil and gas commission; in some it is 
the department of natural resources or the department of envi-
ronmental protection. This follows from our pragmatic principle 
of starting with what already exists. Every state in which frac-
turing is taking place or is contemplated has a functioning reg-
ulatory commission. Although they have varying degrees of dis-
cretionary authority to adopt new regulations, all have at least 
some authority in matters of well construction, spacing, and 
safety. State water authorities are another possible locus of au-
thority, although in many states they are thinly staffed and 
have little experience with oil and gas contamination issues.462
Legislation may be needed to augment their authority. As 
previously discussed, regulators should be empowered to re-
quire baseline testing of water quality and to compel public dis-
closure of chemicals used in fracturing. In addition, commis-
sions should be authorized to adopt best practices regulations 
to minimize the risk of water contamination from fracturing 
and from the disposal of wastewater. They likewise should have 
authority to modify these regulations in light of experience.  
 
We will assume, therefore, that state commissions with current 
regulatory authority over oil and gas production are the place 
to start.  
A further question is who should implement the liability 
regime that we propose. Should it be a specialized administra-
tive tribunal or a generalist court?463 There is much to be said 
for using an administrative tribunal. The evidence, especially 
on causation, is likely to be highly technical. Recent experience 
suggests that administrative tribunals can minimize the costs 
and delay of adjudication, while achieving a high degree of sat-
isfaction on the part of claimants. Examples include the 9-11 
Commission, the BP Oil Spill Tribunal, and the arbitral awards 
entered under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.464
 
 462. Cf., e.g., Camille Pannu, Comment, Drinking Water & Exclusion: A 
Case Study from California’s Central Valley, 100 CAL. L. REV. 223, 262–63 
(2012) (asserting California’s water agency is “understaffed and unable to 
achieve consistent protection of its own agency goals”). 
 
 463. See generally Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litiga-
tion (Courts): An Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW, supra note 327.  
 464. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/vcffaq.html (last visited Oct. 5, 
2013); Colin McDonell, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the Deepwater 
Horizon Litigation: Judicial Regulation of Private Compensation Schemes, 64 
STAN. L. REv. 765, 770–72 (2012) (describing the claims process for BP oil spill 
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State worker compensation systems provide another possible 
example. Further, if the administrative tribunal is organized as 
an adjunct to the body regulating the industry, it can provide 
valuable feedback to commissioners charged with developing 
best practices regulations, apprising them of issues that war-
rant additional attention. Finally, an administrative forum re-
duces uncertainty associated with judicial adjudication, espe-
cially the prospect of irrationally large damage awards from 
unsophisticated hometown juries.  
Yet notwithstanding these advantages, it does not make 
sense to establish a tribunal that has nothing to do. At this 
point, it is not clear that fracturing will generate water contam-
ination on a scale that will require the adjudication of very 
many disputes. If a case arose after a period of dormancy, 
moreover, the tribunal would have no body of precedents or 
procedural conventions to process the claim, which could lead 
to delay and confusion. We also doubt legislatures will be moti-
vated to enact a new regime of this sort, unless and until it ap-
pears that fracturing has produced a significant water contam-
ination problem. As Jim Krier recognized years ago,465
Fortunately, if courts must adjudicate water contamination 
claims, we have an off-the-rack liability regime: the common 
law of torts. This brings us to a justification for tort law that is 
rarely encountered in the literature. Whatever its imperfec-
tions, the common law has the important advantage of provid-
ing a general form of ex post regulation applicable to virtually 
any new technology that presents novel and poorly understood 
risks. Tort law can be viewed as a default regime that allows 
new technologies to be implemented without advance govern-
ment approval, encouraging innovation.
 
legislatures rarely are inspired to act by potential environmen-
tal risks, and are moved only when there is incontrovertible 
proof of harm.  
466
 
victims); Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 352–54 (2011) (detailing the 
compensation structure under the NCVIA). 
 And it provides a 
form of protection for those injured by technological innova-
tions, while information gradually accumulates that may even-
tually lead to more protective ex ante regulation. 
 465. See James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
851 (1994). 
 466. Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 
385 (2007) (commenting that “[e]x post accountability is the prerequisite for ex 
ante liberalization”).  
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Admittedly, the common law of tort does not have all the 
features we would ideally like to see in an ex post liability re-
gime, like fee shifting and insolvency protections. Nevertheless, 
it is sufficiently flexible to replicate many aspects of our pro-
posal.  
Consider, first, the questions about proof of causation. Or-
dinarily, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation, 
which will be difficult without evidence about pre-fracturing 
water quality. Thus, an ideal liability scheme would require pe-
riodic testing, mandatory disclosure of fracturing chemicals, 
and perhaps also tracer chemicals in fracturing fluid. Although 
common law courts cannot mandate these measures, at least 
before any suit is filed, they can use presumptions to get to a 
similar place. For instance, a court can presume that energy 
companies caused the contamination if they failed to conduct 
baseline testing before fracturing. In response, energy compa-
nies would likely seek to conduct a baseline test when negotiat-
ing mineral leases, in order to reduce the risk of future liability. 
Likewise, if a landowner were to block the energy company 
from taking water samples, the court could adopt a counter-
presumption of no causation if the landowner later decided to 
sue. This reverse-presumption would provide a further induce-
ment to landowners to consent to testing. At the same time, en-
ergy companies are likely to engage in periodic testing to en-
sure that they are not held liable for health effects, especially if 
courts hold that periodic testing generally insulates companies 
from punitive damages. 
With respect to the standard of care, the common law eve-
rywhere recognizes the doctrines of negligence per se (based on 
the defendant’s violation of a statutory or regulatory standard), 
and most jurisdictions recognize some form of regulatory com-
pliance defense.467 Likewise, nearly all jurisdictions recognize 
some version of res ipsa loquitur. In its standard formulation, 
res ipsa requires that “the event must be of a kind which ordi-
narily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence.”468
 
 467. See William E. Westerbeker & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kan-
sas Tort Law: Part I, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1053 (2001) (comparing Kansas 
negligence per se to the doctrine in “every other state” and their use of crimi-
nal statutes and administrative regulations). As previously discussed, we 
would nudge the regulatory compliance defense in the direction of making it a 
presumption of reasonable care, subject to rebuttal if the state regulation is 
badly out of sync with the regulation in other states. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 
 
399–404.  
 468. KEETON ET AL., supra note 406, at 244. 
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How can we say with confidence that the contamination, alt-
hough caused by the fracturing company rather than the plain-
tiff or a third party, would ordinarily be due to negligence? The 
answer, we think, lies in the impressive track record that frac-
turing has amassed to date in avoiding appreciable incidents of 
water contamination. Fracturing, if done properly, ordinarily 
does not cause contamination.469
There is some risk that courts will adopt a rule of strict li-
ability to all cases involving fracturing, instead of the blended 
regime we recommend, perhaps on the theory that fracturing is 
an “abnormally dangerous” activity. Although the precedents 
are mixed,
 If and when it does cause con-
tamination, it is fair to raise an inference that somewhere, 
somehow, the energy company was negligent. This is all that 
res ipsa requires. As noted, the inference is subject to rebuttal 
by the defendant. 
470 the doctrinal support for this is strained. The Re-
statement of Torts defines an “abnormally dangerous activity” 
as an activity that presents “a foreseeable and highly signifi-
cant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exer-
cised by all actors” and “is not one of common usage.”471
 
 469. Cf. Gilbert & Gold, supra note 
 Frac-
305 (noting that well-financed opera-
tions improve safety). 
 470. See, e.g., Hannah Coman, Balancing the Need for Energy and Clean 
Water: The Case for Applying Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing Suits, 39 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 147–54 (2012) (discussing rationales, factors in-
volved, and applications in cases with varying outcomes). Although we recog-
nize the parallels between fracturing and the classic English case adopting 
strict liability, Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R. (H.L.) 330 (appeal taken from 
Eng.), there are important differences. In Rylands, the defendant constructed 
a reservoir on his land. Id. at 331–32. The weight of the water caused aban-
doned mining shafts below the reservoir to collapse and fill with water, which 
then caused mining shafts running under neighboring property to flood. Id. at 
332. Contamination from fracturing, like Rylands, involves a water-borne sub-
stance propelled from one landowner’s property to another. Yet the incident in 
Rylands, where the water completely inundated neighboring mineshafts, de-
prived the neighbor of possession of the mine shafts, and was in the nature of 
a trespass. See id. The anticipated injuries from fracturing are in the realm of 
nuisance rather than trespass. And nuisance has long between understood to 
require a balancing of interests, more akin to negligence law, not the strict li-
ability associated with trespass. 
 471. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTION-
AL HARM § 20 (2010). The Restatement (Second) of Torts provided a more elab-
orate six-part test for strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979). The additional factors re-
quired that the harm be “great,” that the activity be “inappropriate[] . . . to the 
place where it is carried on,” and that its “value to the community is out-
weighed by its dangerous attributes.” These factors were eliminated in the 
Third Restatement, evidently to make the inquiry more categorical and less 
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turing does not present a “highly significant risk of harm,” 
since there is little evidence to date of water contamination 
from fracturing.472 Nor is it the case that reasonable care can-
not reduce the risk of water contamination. Quite to the contra-
ry, the whole premise of best practices regulation is that adop-
tion of state of the art control technology and operational 
practices will significantly reduce the risk of contamination. It 
is also hard to argue that fracturing is not a matter of “common 
usage,” now that an estimated two million fracturing treat-
ments have been pumped in the United States, and virtually 
every new oil and gas well drilled in the U.S. today uses frac-
turing.473
In addition to its capacity to accommodate our proposal, 
the common law has the added virtue of already addressing vir-
tually any issue that a liability regime is likely to face, includ-
ing defenses based on plaintiff misconduct, joint and several li-
ability, the measure of damages, and the enforcement of 
judgments. Indeed, any regime created through legislation will 
undoubtedly be incomplete, and will have to draw on the com-
mon law by analogy.  
  
Finally, state legislatures often legislate on discrete issues 
that arise in common law adjudication. If they intervene on on-
ly one issue, our priority would be to require baseline testing of 
water before fracturing begins. Of course, given the Krier 
rule—that no environmental legislation is forthcoming until 
harmful effects occur474
  CONCLUSION   
—even this may be too much to hope for. 
But it is worth a try, and this legislation may appeal to both 
energy companies and local opponents as a way to alleviate un-
certainty about the effects of fracturing. 
Fracturing is transforming the energy landscape of the 
United States. By unlocking massive reserves of natural gas 
and oil in shale beds and other tight rocks, fracturing is creat-
ing drilling jobs, fueling a revival of domestic manufacturing, 
strengthening consumer purchasing power, improving our bal-
ance of payments, enhancing our energy independence, and re-
ducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
contextual and nuisance-like. 
 472. See Spence, supra note 447, at 492. 
 473. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 2. 
 474. See Krier, supra note 465. 
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Yet at the same time, fracturing poses a number of risks. 
Some arise in conventional oil and gas drilling as well as in 
other economic activities, such as competition with renewable 
energy, traffic and congestion, air pollution, the use of signifi-
cant amounts of water, and the risk of inducing earthquakes. 
Fracturing also poses unique risks of water contamination, 
which are the focus of this Article. Although there is only lim-
ited evidence of water contamination from fracturing so far, the 
risks are not yet fully understood and mechanisms for regulat-
ing them are not yet fully developed.  
In response, we offer a general framework for regulating in 
the face of uncertainty and apply it to water contamination 
from fracturing. A core element of our proposal is best practices 
regulation, which should provide significant reassurance to a 
public worried about water contamination, as well as predicta-
bility to energy companies making large commitments of capi-
tal. Since best practices regulations cannot be adopted until we 
know what the best practices are, we favor such regulation only 
for issues that are already well understood. This includes the 
thickness and depth of well casings, the need for liners for stor-
age pits and blowout preventers, and the like. Over time, as we 
develop more experience, the number of issues governed by 
such regulations is likely to grow.  
Meanwhile, we can encourage the development of a robust 
best practices regime by backstopping it with liability rules. 
Under our proposed liability regime, unless an energy company 
is in full compliance with applicable best practices regulations, 
it generally would have to pay for any water contamination 
harms caused by fracturing operations. Such a liability system 
will motivate energy companies to take precautions and devel-
op risk-minimizing innovations, and will also compensate vic-
tims. Moreover, it spares regulators the need to mandate best 
practices before we know enough about the risks and how to 
address them. A key challenge in implementing such a liability 
regime is to make reliable judgments about causation, and we 
recommend a system of information-forcing rules to inform the-
se judgments, including baseline testing, the disclosure of frac-
turing chemicals, and possibly also the use of tracer chemicals. 
We also consider the proper measure of damages, the allocation 
of attorney fees, the risk that defendants will be judgment 
proof, as well as other issues.  
Finally, we believe our proposed regime should be imple-
mented at the state level. Although this could take the form of 
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new legislation prescribing all desirable elements of the liabil-
ity regime, a more realistic option, at least in the near term, is 
to adapt the existing common law of torts to the unique prob-
lems posed by fracturing. In our view, this blended strategy—
an evolving body of best practices regulation paired with a well-
crafted liability regime—can perform the vital function of pro-
tecting our water resources, while also harnessing the substan-
tial economic, national security, and environmental advantages 
of the shale oil and gas revolution.  
 
 
 
